ORDER S.K. Singh, J.
1. Heard Sri Vikrant Pandey, learned Advocate in support of this petition and Sri Wasim Alam, learned Standing Counsel ably assisted by Sri Govind Saxena, learned Brief Holder, who appeared/argued as State Counsel to assist the court.
2. By means of this writ petition challenge is to the order of the learned District Judge, Mainpuri dated 27.9.2006 by which revision filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the order dated 3.8.2006 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bhogaon/Election Tribunal by which petitioner's application for dismissal of the election petition for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and the notice under Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 has been rejected.
3. Before proceeding to deal with the submission so advanced, a brief notice of small undisputed facts will be necessary. Petitioner happens to be winning candidate on the post of Pradhari, Gram panchayat, Rajwana, Tehsil Bhogaon, district Mainpuri in the election held in the year 2005 of which result was declared on 29.8.2005. Challenging the election of the petitioner, election petition v/as filed on 22.9.2005 by the respondent No. 3, impleading the petitioner as main contesting opposite party and three other candidates in the election as opposite parties 2 to 4 besides the Returning Officer and the Assistant Returning Officer as opposite party No. 5 and 6. The relief sought in the election petition is that election of the opposite party No. 1 who is the petitioner here be declared to be illegal. An application was filed by the election petitioner on 22.9.2005 itself that as the limitation for filing the election petition is only three months a notice, if required to be given under Section 80(2) C.P.C. and Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act be waived and election petition be entertained. After hearing the arguments in this respect permission was granted on 22.9.2005 itself. The opposite party No. 1/petitioner appeared in the proceeding only after the service by way of publication and on 7.2.2006 written statement was filed. Election petitioner filed application on . 16.5.2006 that issue of recounting be decided and recounting be directed. Thereafter on 26.6.2006 and 3.7.2006 opposite party No. 1/petitioner filed application that election petition be dismissed for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and notice under Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. The election tribunal after hearing arguments of both sides by the order dated 3.8.2006 rejected the application filed by the election petitioner for recounting of the votes and at the same time rejected the application filed by the opposite party/petitioner for dismissal of the election petition for want of both notices mentioned above. The order of the Tribunal was challenged in revision which was dismissed by the learned District Judge by judgment dated 27.9.2006 and thus both the orders are under challenge in this petition.
4. Sri Pandey, learned Advocate submits that giving of the notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and notice under Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act being mandatory, as it was not given the election petition merited dismissal on this score alone. Submission is that no suit or any legal proceedings can be instituted against the State authorities and Gaon Sabha or Gram Panchayat (or a member or officer or servant thereof) unless the required notice under the aforesaid provisions has been given and thus as Returning Officer and Assistant Returning Officer are parties opposite party No. 5 and 6 and there is no notice as required, election petition is to be dismissed. In support of the submission that for want of notice the election petition could not proceed, reliance has been placed on the judgments given by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Khalid Abdullah reported in 1990 (1) A.R.C. 423; Triloki Nath Pandey v. IIIrd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bareilly and Ors. reported in 1999 (1) JCLR 2:89 and judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India .
5. Sri Wasim Alam, learned Standing Counsel assisted by Sri Govind Saxena, learned Brief Holder while assisting the court submitted that the argument of counsel for the petitioner that election petition is to be dismissed for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and notice under Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act is totally misconceived and has no valid basis. Submission is that firstly in the election petition no relief has been claimed against the State authorities or the officer of the Gram Panchayat and otherwise also the necessity of notice and for want of notice the dismissal of the proceedings can only be raised by the State authorities or the Gram Panchayat or its officers as the case may be for whose benefit the provision of the notice is meant and in no case a third party can be entitled to take the plea of want of notice. Submission is that as there is no objection in respect to the want of notice on behalf of opposite parties 5 and 6 in the election petition and otherwise also no relief has been claimed against them, on the plea of want of notice the election petition could not be dismissed and thus it was rightly not dismissed. In support of the aforesaid, reliance has been placed on a judgment given by this Court in the case of Smt. Raj Kumari v. Board of Revenue reported in 1985 All. C. J. 222 and the judgment of the Apex Court given in the case of State of A. P. and Ors. v. Pioneer Builders, A. P. .
6. In view of the aforesaid submission as noticed, the question which need to be decided is that whether in the election petition challenging the election of a returned candidate on the post of Pradhan Gram Panchayat the election petition is to be dismissed for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and notice under Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act?
7. To appreciate the aforesaid issue, first this Court will nave to briefly notice contents of the aforesaid provisions and the purpose/object behind it.
8. The relevant part of the concerned provisions is to be reproduced here. Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code relevant for our purposes is quoted at this place:
80. Notice - (1) Save as otherwise provided in Sub-section (2) no suit shall be instituted. against the Government including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to, or left at the office of-
(a) in the case of a suit against the Central Government, except where it relates to a railway, a Secretary to that Government;
(b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it relates to a railway, the General Manager of that railway;
(bb) in the case of a suit against the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Chief Secretary to that Government or any other officer authorised by that Government in this behalf.
(c) in the case of a suit against (any other Slate Government), a Secretary to that Government or the Collector of the district; and, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.
(2) A suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government (including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or any public officer in respect of any act purporting- to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, may be instituted, with the leave of the Court, without serving any notice as required by Sub-section (1); but the Court shall not grant relief in the suit, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving to the Government or public officer, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit:
Provided that the Court shall, if it is satisfied, after hearing the parties, that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of Sub-section (1).
(3) No suit instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity shall be dismissed merely by reason of any error or defect in the notice referred to in Sub-section (1), if in such notice -(a) the name, description and the residence of the plaintiff had been so given as to enable the appropriate authority or the public officer to identify the person serving the notice and such notice had been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority specified in subsection (1), and
(b) the cause of action and the relief claimed by the plaintiff had been substantially indicated.
9. The provisions of Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act is also to be quoted at this place for convenience:
106. Suits against Gram Sabhas, Gram Panchayats, their officers or the officers and servants of Nyaya Panchayat - (1) No suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against a Gram Sabhas or Gram Panchayat or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or against a member or officer or servant thereof or of Nyaya Panchayat or against any person acting under the direction of any of these bodies or persons for anything done or purporting to have been done in official capacity under this Act, until the expiration of 2 months next after notice in writing has been in the case of Gram Sabha or Gram Panchayat, delivered in or left at the office of the Gram Panchayat concerned and in the case of a member, officer or servant of any person acting under his direction or the direction of the Gram Sabha or Gram Panchayat or Nyaya Panchayat delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the reliefs sought, the amount of compensation, if any, claimed and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) No action such as is described in subsection (1) shall be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action.
10. A bare reading of the aforesaid two sections makes it clear that idea behind the mandate of giving notice is that if any suit or a legal proceedings or any action is to be instituted against State, Gram Panchayat or any officer of the aforesaid authorities then they are to be apprised of the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation, if any, claimed so that the authorities may be in a position to know the allegation against them, the relief if any, they are in a position to extend to the plaintiff, without any litigation upon which both sides may be saved of any kind of harassment, wastage of time besides other complications. Thus there is a purpose/idea behind the provision of giving a notice to the officials/authority against whom there is any cause of action and the relief is claimed and that too if act done is in official capacity in which they are posted. In the event there is no cause of action against them and no relief has been claimed from the authority/ official then even though if it is accepted that their impleadment may -be necessary on the ground that they are formal party, proforma party and even if necessary party, for want of notice the suit or legal proceedings may not be in a position to be dismissed.
11. Besides the aforesaid, the purpose behind the mandate to give notice before instituting a suit or legal proceeding is that authority/officer may know claim against him so that to cut short the litigation he may get it solved, if it is possible. Thus as this provision is to benefit some body, on the principles that it is for that party who can be beneficiary of any legislation is to raise that objection or not for getting its benefit, no third party can be said to be entitled to take its advantage as the provision of giving notice is never intended for his/their benefit. It is for this reason it can be safely said that party to whom no notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and the notice under Section 106 of the U P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 is required to be given may not be entitled to take plea of want of notice.
12. Now this Court may take note of the decided cases which have been cited from rival sides. Judgments given by this Court in the case of Union of India (Supra) and Triloki Nath Pandey (Supra) as referred by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have no application to the facts of the present case as those cases were in relation to the suit for eviction in which the question was in respect to a composite notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. So far the judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association (Supra) is concerned it was observed that giving of the notice to the Government Department, Government or statutory authorities in respect to threatened action may curtail and avoid litigation which is to result in heavy expenses and cost to the exchequer as well. The observation of the Apex Court in this respect can be quoted at this place:
The Governments, government departments or statutory authorities are defendants in a large number of suits pending in various courts in the country, Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in a large number of cases either the notice is not replied or in the few cases where a reply is sent, it is generally vague and evasive. The result is that the object underlying Section 80 CPC and similar provisions gets defeated. It not only gives rise to avoidable litigation but also results in heavy expenses and costs to the exchequer as well. A proper reply can result in reduction of litigation between State and the citizens. In case a proper reply is sent cither the claim in the notice may be admitted or the area of controversy curtailed or the citizen may be satisfied on knowing the stand of the State. There is no accountability in the Government, Central or State or the statutory authorities in violating the spirit and object of Section 80.
13. In view of the aforesaid observation of Apex Court, it is clear that purpose behind giving of notice has been clearly explained and thus that not being the situation here, petitioner is not to get any help, rather the judgment of the Apex Court may be read against her.
14. Now we can turn to the cases on which reliance has been placed by Sri Alam and Sri Saxena, learned State Counsel. In the judgment given by this Court in the case of Smt. Raj Kumari (Supra), it has been clearly held that State Government or the public authority to whom notice is required to be given can very well choose to waive the notice and it is not open for the private parties to raise that objection. The observation as made by this Court in the case referred above can be quoted at this place:
It was held that the State Government or the public authority in whose favour the notice can be given can very well choose to waive the notice and it is not open to private parties to raise that objection. It is open to the party protected by Section 80, C.P.C. to waive his rights and the waiver binds the rest of the parties.
The natural conclusion is that it is not open to other party (i.e. the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 in the instant case) to urge the want of notice against maintainability of the suit. It is the authority for whose benefit Section 80 has been enacted can raise an objection about want of notice and press the same.
15. Similarly in the judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of State of A. P. (Supra) observations made can be quoted at this place:
We find it difficult to hold that the order passed by subordinate Judge on contractor's application under Section 80(2) C.P.C. was beyond his jurisdiction. Accordingly, we decline to interfere with the finding recorded by the High Court on this aspect of the matter. The High Court has held that having participated in the original proceedings, it was not now open to the State to raise a fresh issue as to the maintainability of the suit, in view of waiving the defect at the earliest point of time. The High Court has also observed that knowing fully well about non-issue of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. the State had not raised such a plea in the written statement or additional written statement filed in the suit and therefore, deemed to have waived the objection. It goes without saying that the question whether in fact, there is waiver or not necessarily depends on facts of each case and is liable to be tried by the court, if raised, which, as noted above is not the case here.
16. The issue of dismissal of the suit or proceeding for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. has already engaged attention in further past also and thus series of pronouncements on this aspect, right from the Privy Council and this Court, can be further referred, to give more strength to the view which is being taken in this case.
17. In the case of Vellayan Chettiar and Ors. v. The Government of the Province of Madras and Anr. reported in AIR 1947 P.C. 197 the Bench decided the issue by making the following observation:
On the other hand, there appears to their Lordships to be no reason why the notice required to be given under Section 80, should not be waived if the authority concerned thinks fit to waive it. It is for this protection that notice is required: if in the particular case he does not require that protection and says so, he can lawfully waive his right.
18. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of District Board, Banaras v. Churhu Rai and Anr. reported in AIR 1956 Alld. 680 made following observation:
We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is open to a defendant for whose benefit a notice is prescribed by law to waive it. We have held above that in the circumstances of the present case the District Board has by its conduct" waived the notice. In the circumstances the only ground on which the claim for compensation could fall disappears.
19. In another judgment given by this Court in the case of Gaja and Ors. v. Dasa Koeri and Ors. reported in AIR 1964 Alld. 471 following observation were made:
20. The object of a notice under Section 80 is to be acquaint the authorities mentioned in the section of the facts and circumstances which are said to necessitate the institution of the threatened suit and to afford them as opportunity to take stock of the situation and avoid litigations, if so advised, by setting the claim or making amends. The section is thus intended to grant to such authorites a special protection for their own benefit of which, if they so choose, they may avail. The objections to the entertain ability of a suit for want of notice may be waived by the authorites concerned."
If the State Government could be said to have waived its objection regarding want of notice by not taking a plea to that effect in a written statement filed by it, it can be said with equal reason that the State Government waived it by filing no written statement at all.
If a notice can be and has been waived by the authority concerned, it is not open to any other party to the suit to urge want to notice against the maintainability of the suit.
21. In the similar manner this Court in the case of Ishtiyaq Husain Abbas Husain v. Zafrul Islam Afzal Husain and Ors. gave following verdict:
It appears to me that the plea of want of notice is open only to the Government and the Officers mentioned in Section 80 and it is not open to a private individual. In this particular case the State Government did not even put in appearance. The notice, therefore, must be deemed to have been waived by it.
In Hirachand Himatlal v. Kashinath Thakurji AIR 1942 Bom. 339 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court said this:
It is well settled and is conceded that the party in whose favour the section prescribed notice to be given can waive his right to notice....
22. In the first place defendant 3 is not the proper party to raise it, and in the second place the receivers in our opinion must be deemed to have waived their right to notice. It is open to the party protected by Section 80 to waive his rights, and his waiver binds the rest of the parties. But only he can waive notice, and if that is so, it is difficult to see any logical basis for the position that a party who has himself no right to notice can challenge a suit on the ground of want of notice to the only party entitled to receive it."
23. Similarly in the case of Sheo Pujan and Ors. v. Gram Sabha and Ors. reported in 1964 RD 157, the court made following observations:
Section 106 of the Act is thus confined to suits instituted against the Gaon Sabha or its members or officers for acts done in their official capacity under the Act itself. It would follow that if any act was done which was neither done under the Act nor was done by the Gaon Sabha or any of its officers it would not attract the provisions of Section 106 of the Act." "The provisions of Section 106 would apply to suits directly against Gaon Sabha. Gaon Panchayat or officers and servants of Nyaya Panchayat.
24. So far the case in hand is concerned the act done by opposite party 7 and 8 cannot be said to have been done in their official capacity under Panchayat Raj Act. They were deputed to supervise and get election work conducted under Election Rules.
25. Otherwise also Returning Officer and Assistant Returning Officer cannot be said to be necessary party to the proceeding and the allegation against them of some collusion with winning candidate even if accepted to be correct, that cannot be an act in discharge of their official duty so as to entitle them to get a notice of the allegations about them and thus provision of notice may not apply for them on these facts.
26. In view of the aforesaid analysis and keeping in mind the consistent approach in the matter, this Court is of the considered view that plea of want of notice can only be raised by the party for whose benefit provision of giving notice is meant and not by a third party and thus the election petition is not to be dismissed for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and Section 106 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act as argued by the counsel for the petitioner.
27. Accordingly this writ petition fails and is dismissed.