JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal, J.
1. Petitioner Shiv Kant Tripathi a Judicial Officer in the State of U.P. working on the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division) was compulsorily retired in exercise of power under Fundamental Rule 56 (in short "F.R.-56") vide order dated 17th May 2005. Aggrieved thereto, he has preferred this writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the said order and has also sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate him on his original post and not to interfere with his functioning as Additional Civil Judge (S.D.).
2. The facts in brief as stated in the writ petition giving rise to the present dispute are that the petitioner was appointed as Munsif [now designated as Civil Judge (Junior Division)] in the year 1978. While posted as Judicial Magistrate, Unnao, an adverse remark was recorded in his Annual Character Roll (hereinafter referred to as "A.C.R.") for the year 1994-95 by the then District Judge, Unnao and he also recommended for departmental inquiry against him wherein ultimately, he was exonerated as communicated by letter dated 15th April 2005. In the meantime, various annual confidential remarks were given by the concerned District Judge(s) referring to pendency of the said inquiry and his integrity was either withheld or otherwise made subject to the said inquiry which ultimately, resulted in exoneration. It is said that there was no adverse material otherwise existing in his service record, despite thereto, the Screening committee constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice recommended his name for compulsory retirement. The said recommendation was accepted by the Full Court on 30th April 2005. Recommendation was made to the Governor by this Court's letter dated 2nd May 2005 pursuant whereto, the impugned order dated 27th May 2005 was issued compulsorily retiring the petitioner.
3. Though in the writ petition, a number of grounds have been taken but Sri Vikas Budhwar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner assailed the impugned order of compulsory retirement also on the ground that it is arbitrary and has been passed without there being any material and, therefore, is liable to be set aside. He contended that though compulsory retirement is not a punishment but it ceases his right to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation and thus has to be founded on some material. The competent authority has to form its opinion objectively otherwise the order of compulsory retirement is liable to be set aside. Placing reliance on the Apex Court decisions on All India Judges' Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. S. Ram Chandra Raju v. State of Orissa , State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Anr. (1979) 2 SCC 102, Nawal Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. , The State of West Bengal and Anr. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi State of U.P. and Ors. v. Vijay Kumar Jain Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. and Anr. State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand H.C.S. and Ors. Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah Baikunth Nath Das and Anr. v. Chief District Medical Officer Baripada and Anr. Ashok Tanwar and Anr. v. State of H.P. and Ors. Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 305 State of U.P. and Anr. v. Bihari Lal 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 593 Jugal Chandra Saikia v. State of Assam and Anr. and M.S. Bindra v. Union of India and Ors. he contended that in view of the law laid down therein and considering the service record of the petitioner, it is evident that there was no material to substantiate any allegation of corruption or dishonesty against the petitioner. Character Roll entries awarded during the period when the disciplinary inquiry was pending could not be treated to be adverse for the purpose of justifying the impugned order. Since there was no other material justifying formation of opinion that the petitioner has outlived his utility or is not a person who should be allowed to remain in service any more in public interest, the opinion formed by the respondents is clearly arbitrary and it vitiates the impugned order.
4. Respondent No. 2 has filed a detailed counter affidavit placing on record besides others, gist of the service record of the petitioner. It is said that the petitioner joined U.P. Nyayik Sewa (hereinafter referred to as "UPNS") on 20th November 1978 and after completion of training at Administrative Training Institute, Nainital, was posted as Munsif, Mirzapur on 27th January 1979. He was confirmed in UPNS on 18th May 1985 and was promoted as Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah on 28th November 1989. For the year 1994-95 District Judge, Unnao recorded ACR of the petitioner when he was working as C.J.M. Unnao and awarded following entry:
Integrity not certified at present as Enquiry No. 24/95 Head No. X is pending against him on the complaint made by members of the Bar Association Unnao in which his integrity is in question.
.
Relations with members of Bar--Not good as enquiry is pending against the P.O. filed by members of Bar.
5. The aforesaid entry was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 30th April 1996 whereagainst he represented on 4th June 1996 which was considered and rejected by this Court vide order dated 3rd September 1996. With respect to the complaint received against the petitioner involving his integrity, a vigilance enquiry was directed and on the basis of report submitted by the Officer on Special Duty, Enquiries, (Vigilance), the administrative committee vide resolution dated 18th September 1994 decided to hold a regular enquiry against the petitioner. A charge sheet was issued and the District Judge, Lucknow was appointed Inquiry Officer who submitted his report on 3rd February, 2005 exonerating petitioner which was accepted by the administrative committee in its meeting dated 6th April, 2005 and it resolved not to take any further action in the matter.
6. For the year 1997-98 while the petitioner was working as Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah, he was awarded following adverse entry by the Administrative Judge.
The officer has not taken interest in the disposal of execution cases, He has disposed of only two contested regular execution cases and did not dispose of even a single SCC Execution Case.
The District Judge has reported that there were complaint touching integrity but the same were not substantiated. Some complaints against the integrity of the officer are pending in the High Court as well The office has reported that a vigilance enquiry is pending against the officer. In the circumstances, the integrity of the officer may be kept under supervision for the next two years.
7. Again for the year 1998-99 when the petitioner was working as C.J.M., Banda, the District Judge, Banda gave an adverse entry to the petitioner. The relevant extract whereof is reproduced as under:
Number of complaints received but not substantiated, general reputation is not good. Integrity is certified reluctantly.
Complaints received regarding partiality in dealing with public and Bar but could not be substantiated.
The officer has not filled up the court diary in his own handwriting. In order to have effective control, the P.O. himself must maintain the diary. Fixation of cause list requires attention.
Unnecessary adjournments in old cases could be avoided if he had taken pains.
Disposal of old cases just satisfactory.
Judgments require improvement on facts and law, language satisfactory.
....
As C.J.M. he was required to give Annual Confidential Remarks to Magistrates regarding their criminal work but inspire of my D.O. No. C-20/PA/99 dt. 16.6.99 in this regard he did not give any remark to the Magistrates.
8. The Hon'ble Administrative Judge, except the part of the adverse entry which refers to D.O. dated 16.06.1999 regarding remarks to be given to the Magistrates, agreed with rest of the entry recorded by the District Judge, Banda. The entry recorded by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge for the year 1998-99 is reproduced as under:
Seen the remarks sent by the District Judge. The remarks were to be given from 1.4.1998 ending on 31st March 1999. The D.O. was sent on 16.6.1999 which is after 31st March 1999. Hence, this cannot be considered in the Annual Confidential remarks ending on 31st March 1999.
In respect of the rest of remarks, I agree with the District Judge. The officer is rated as fair, integrity certified.
9. Further, District Bar Association, Banda made complaint against the petitioner regarding his involvement in corrupt practices and polluting atmosphere of the judgeship. The District Judge vide letter dated 23rd August 1999 communicated the Administrative Judge that the petitioner was carrying a very bad reputation and was bringing bad name to the Judiciary, and, recommended an enquiry against him as well as his transfer from Banda Judgeship. The matter was considered by the Court and the petitioner was thereafter transferred from Banda to Tehri. A vigilance inquiry was also initiated against him but the charges could not be substantiated in the vigilance inquiry, hence, matter was dropped.
10. While posted as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bijnor, for the year 2002-03 following adverse entry was awarded to the petitioner by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge:
...On my surprise visit to Bijnor a large number of lawyers complained his behaviour as well as against his integrity. I had asked the District Judge to keep a strict watch over his work, integrity and conduct. However, unfortunately the then District Judge died and I could not get the improvement report. However, subsequently also the new District Judge also did not give good report about this officer. There had been several complaints against his integrity. However, the same could nut be substantiated as yet and, therefore, the integrity of this officer is certified reluctantly.
11. The entire service record of the petitioner was placed before the Screening Committee consisting of five Hon'ble Judges, constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The Committee vide its report dated 2nd April 2005 recommended for compulsory retirement of petitioner along with some other officers. The matter was placed before the Full Court on 30th April 2005. The Full Court unanimously resolved to accept the report of Screening Committee and directed to take consequential steps as expeditiously as possible. Subsequently, vide letter dated 2nd May 2005 the recommendation was made to the State Government for compulsory retirement of the petitioner and vide order dated 17th May 2005, the petitioner was ultimately compulsorily retired. It is averred that order of compulsory retirement based on objective appreciation of entire service record of the petitioner by the competent authority and after satisfying itself that the petitioner needs to be compulsorily retired in public interest, the impugned order has been passed, strictly in accordance with law.
12. Sri Amit Sthalekar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 besides referring to various authorities mentioned in the counter affidavit also relied upon the Apex Court's decision in Union of India v. M.E. Reddy and Anr. Swatantra Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. and I.K. Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. .
13. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record as also the various authorities cited at Bar in support of rival submissions.
14. In State of U.P., provision for compulsory retirement has been made by legislative enactment, i.e., F.R. 56 as substituted by U.P. Act No. 33 of 1976 [U.P. Fundamental Rule 56 (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1976]. The relevant portion of Rule 56 dealing with compulsory retirement is reproduced as under:
56. (a)....
(b)....
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (a) or Clause (b) the appointing authority may, at any time, by notice to any Government servant (whether permanent or temporary) without assigning any reason, require him to retire after he attains the age of 50 years, or such Government servant may, by notice to the appointing authority, voluntarily retire at any time after attaining the age of 45 years or after he had completed qualifying service of 20 years.
(d) The period of such notice shall be three months:
Provided that:-
(i) any such Government servant may, by order of the appointing authority, without such notice or by a shorter notice, be retired forthwith at any time after attaining the age of 50 years, and on such retirement the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, if any, for the period of the notice or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months, at the rates at which he was drawing them immediately before his retirement;
(ii) It shall be open to the appointing authority to allow a Government servant to retire without any notice or by a shorter notice without requiring the Government servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice:
Provided further that such notice given by the Government servant against whom a disciplinary proceeding in pending or contemplated, shall be effective only if it is accepted by the appointing authority, provided that in the case of a contemplated disciplinary proceeding the Government servant shall be informed before the expiry of his notice that it has not been accepted;
Provided also that the notice once given by a Government servant under Clause (c) seeking voluntary retirement shall not be withdrawn by him except with the permission of the appointing authority;
(c) A retiring pension shall be payable and other retirement benefits, if any, shall be available in accordance with the subject to the provisions of the relevant rules to every Government servant who retires or is required or allowed to retire under this rule:
Provided that where a Government servant who voluntarily retires or is allowed voluntarily to retire under this rule the appointing authority may allow him, for the purposes of pension and gratuity, if any, the benefit of additional service of five years or such period as he would have, served if he had continued till the ordinary date of his superannuation, whichever he less.
Explanation:- (1) The decision of the appointing authority under Clause (c) to require the Government servant to retire as specified therein shall be taken if it appears to the said authority to be in the public interest, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to require any recital, in the order, of such decision having been taken in the public interest.
(2) In order to be satisfied whether ita will be in the public interest to requires a Government servant to retire under Clause (c) the appointing authority may take into consideration any material relating to the Government servant and nothing herein contained shall be construed to exclude from consideration:
(a) any entries relating to any period before such Government servant was allowed to cross any efficiency bar or before he was promoted to any post in an officiating or substantive capacity or on an ad hoc basis; or
(b) any entry against which a representation is pending, provided that the representation is also taken into consideration along with the entry; or
(c) any report of the Vigilance Establishment constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Act 1965, (2-A) Every such decision shall be deemed to have been taken into the public interest.
(3) The expression " appointing authority' means the authority which for the time being has the power to make substantive appointments to the post or service from wihch the Government servant is required or wants to retire, and the expression "qualifying service" shall have the same meaning as in the relevant rules relating to retiring pension.
15. Compulsory retirement is a facet of "doctrine of pleasure" embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. The rule holds balance between the rights of individual Government servant and the interest of the public. It is intended to enable the employer to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest. The object is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain high standard of efficiency and honesty. It does not cast any stigma and cannot be constituted to be a punishment of a Government servant when exercised in public interest under F.R. 56.
16. In Shyam Lal (supra) it was held that an officer who has compulsory retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned and is entitled for pension and other retiral benefits in accordance with Rules. There is no deprivation of the accrued benefits. Though from the point of view of the officer/employee concerned, he may think to have been punished for not being allowed to serve till he attains the age of superannuation prescribed under the Rules, but there is distinction between the loss of benefits already earned and loss of prospects to earn something more. It was held that since compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(c) is not a punishment when resorted to in public interest, Article 311 of the Constitution of India has no application.
17. The whole purpose of the provision made for compulsory retirement is to weed out the worthless without resorting to bona fide extreme process covered under Article 311 of the Constitution. After all the administration to be efficient has to be manned by active and competent prone workers and should not be manned by drones do nothing, incompetent and unworthies. Lack of efficiency by itself does not amount to a misconduct and, therefore, such incumbent may not be delinquent needs to be punished but may prove to be a burden on the administration, if by insensitive, insouciant, unintelligent or dubious conduct impede the floor or promote stagnation. In a developing country where speed, probity, sensitive, enthusiastic, creativity and non-brevity process are immediately required, callous cadres and paperlogged are the bees setting sin of the administration. Sometimes, reputation or otherwise the information available to the superior officers reflects on the integrity of the employee but there may not be sufficient evidence available to initiate punitive action, but simultaneously conduct and reputation of such person is menace for his continuance in public service is injurious to public interest. In all such cases order of compulsory retirement may be passed by the competent authority.
18. In making the aforesaid observations we are fortified by the view taken by Apex Court in a catena of judgments and we may refer only some of such authorities hereunder.
19. In Allahabad Bank Officers' Association and Anr. v. Allahabad Bank and Ors. the Apex Court observed as under:
The power to compulsorily retire a government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution. The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain efficiency and initiative in service and also to dispense with the services of those whose integrity is doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration."
20. In S. Ramchandra Raju (supra) the Apex Court held as under:
It is thus settled law that though the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and the government employee is entitled to draw all retired benefits including pension, the government must exercise its power only in the public interest to effectuate the efficiency of the service. The dead wood need to be removed to augment efficiency. Integrity in public service need to be maintained. The exercise of power of compulsory retirement must not be a haunt on public servant but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and free from corruption and incompetence. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take punitive disciplinaiy action of removal from service. But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service would be a menace in public service and injurious to public interest.
21. In Posts and Telegraphs Board v. C.S.N. Murthy the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the scope of judicial review as under:
An order of compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. F.R. 56(j) authorizes the government to review the working of its employee at the end of the point of their service referred to therein and to require the servant to retire from service, if in its opinion, public interest calls for such an order. Whether the conduct of the employee is such as to justify such a conclusion is primarily for the departmental authorities to decide. The nature of delinquency and whether it is of such a degree as to require the compulsory retirement of the employee are primarily for the government to decide upon. The Courts will not interfere with the exercise of this power, if arrived at bona fide and on the basis of material available on the record.
(emphasis added)
22. In M.S. Bindra v. Union of India and Ors. the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
judicial scrutiny of any order imposing premature compulsory retirement is permissible if the order is either arbitrary or mala fide or if it is based on no evidence. The observation that principles of natural justice have no place in the context of compulsory retirement does not mean that if the version of the delinquent officer is necessary to reach the correct conclusion, the same can be obviated on the assumption that other materials alone need be looked into.
23. In State of Orissa and Ors. v. Ram Chandra Das the Apex Court held:
....It is needless to reiterate that the settled position is that the government is empowered and would be entitled to compulsorily retire a government servant in public interest with a view to improve efficiency of administration or to weed out the people of doubtful integrity or are corrupt but sufficient evidence was not available to take disciplinary action in accordance with the rules so as to inculcate a sense of discipline in the service.
24. Thus, compulsory retirement of an employee is actually a prerogative of the Government but it is also true that it should be based on material and on the satisfaction of the authority concerned based on record that the Government servant should not be allowed to continue in public interest and be made to retire.
25. It would be useful to refer certain principles in respect to compulsory retirement, culled out by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Baikunth Nath Das (supra) which have been reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Umed Bhai M. Patel held.
(i) When the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest.
(ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution.
(iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead-wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer.
(iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order.
(v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration.
(vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable.
(vii) If the officer is given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer.
(viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure.
26. In respect to the judicial officers, maintenance of high standard of efficiency and honesty is of much more importance so that public confidence in the impartiality in dispensation of justice may not be shaken. The Apex Court in All India Judges' Association (supra) in para 8 of the judgment reminded all concerned of the distinct nature of the duties that a judge is called upon to discharge the society's expectations of the conduct of the judge, the lifestyle of the judge, the occupational hazards to which he is exposed and of the need to keep judges above their essential wants. It also quoted from David Pannick's book "Judges", observing that that they are equally, if not more, applicable to the Judges in India also. Amongst others, the Apex Court quoted the following passages which are very apt in the context of the present case:
He (judge) is a symbol of that strange mixture of reality and illusion, democracy and privilege, humbug and decency, the subtle network of compromises, by which the nation keeps itself in its familiar shape.
The qualities desired of a judge can be simply stated: 'that if he be a good one and that he be thought to be so'. Such credentials are not easily acquired. The judge needs to have 'the strength to put an end to injustice and 'the faculties that are demanded of the historian and the philosopher and the prophet'.
27. In Nawal Singh (supra) dealing with the matter of compulsory retirement of judicial officers in the State of U.P. in exercise of power under F.R. 56(c), the Apex Court emphasized need to maintain high standard of efficiency and honesty in judicial service and keep it unpolluted by observing:
Further, it is to be reiterated that the object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain high standard of efficiency and honesty to keep judicial service unpolluted. It empowers the authority to retire officers of doubtful integrity which depends upon overall impression gathered by the higher officers and it is impossible to prove by positive evidence that a particular officer is dishonest.
28. In order to find out as to whether continuance of a judicial officer is in public interest or not, his reputation in general he enjoys is of utmost importance. It is difficult to prove by positive evidence the basis for doubting integrity of a judicial officer but that cannot be a reason to ignore this aspect altogether and allow him to continue in service though he does not enjoy good reputation which may have adverse impact on the very judicial system. It is in this view of the matter that remarks with respect to reputation made by superior officers in the confidential roll of the government officer/servant have been upheld and have also been found to be valid material to form an opinion as to whether the officer concerned should be compulsorily retired or not, having rendered himself a dead wood. In M.E Reddy (supra) the Apex Court dealing with the remarks with respect to general reputation, honesty and integrity of an officer observed:
The superior officer may make certain remarks while assessing the work and conduct of the subordinate officer based on his personal supervision or contact. Some of those remarks may be purely innocuous, or may be connected with general reputation of honesty or integrity that a particular officer enjoys. It will indeed be difficult if not impossible to prove by positive evidence that a particular officer is dishonest but those who have had the opportunity to watch the performance of the said officer from close quarters are in a position to know the nature and character not only of his performance but also of the reputation that he enjoys....
29. In Swatantra Singh (supra) reiterating the similar view, the Supreme Court held:
It is sad but a bitter reality that corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politics, social fabric of efficiency in the public service and demoralising the honest officers. The efficiency in public service-would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post. The reputation of corrupt would gather thick and unchaseable clouds around the conduct of the officer and gain notoriety much faster than the smoke. Sometimes, there may not be concrete or material evidence to make it part of the record. It would, therefore, may be impracticable for the reporting officer or the competent controlling officer writing the confidential report to give specific instances of shortfalls, supported be evidence, like the remarks made by the Superintendent of Police. More often the corrupt officer manipulates in such a way and leaves no traceable evidence to be made part of the record for being cited as specific instance. It would, thus, appear that the order does not contain or the officer writing the report could not give particulars of the corrupt activities of the petitioner. He honestly assessed that the petitioner would prove himself efficient officer, provided he controls his temptation for corruption. That would clearly indicate the fallibility of the petitioner, vis-a-vis the alleged acts of corruption. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the remarks made in the confidential report are vague without any particulars and, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is seen that the officers made the remarks on the basis of the reputation of the petitioner. It was, therefore, for him to improve his conduct, prove honesty and integrity in future in which even, obviously, the authority would appreciate and made necessary remarks for the subsequent period.
30. In Nawal Singh (supra) the Court observed as under:
Further, it is to be reiterated that the object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain high standard of efficiency and honesty to keep judicial service unpolluted. It empowers the authority to retire officers of doubtful integrity which depends upon overall impression gathered by the higher officers and it is impossible to prove, by positive evidence that a particular officer is dishonest.
31. In S.Ram Chandra Raju (supra) the Court held in para 9 of the judgment that the dead wood needs to be removed to augment efficiency. Integrity of public servants needs to be maintained. The exercise of power of compulsory retirement must not be a haunt on public servant but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and free from corruption and incompetence. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take punitive disciplinary action of removal from service. But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service would be a menace in public service and injurious to public interest. This has been followed in Bishwanath Prasad Singh (supra) wherein with respect to the object, purpose and precaution which are to be taken while writing confidential report, the Court emphasized the need of fairness, justness and objectivity in awarding the entries.
32. Now coming to the present case, in view of the aforesaid exposition of law with respect to compulsory retirement, we find that besides others, in 1994-95 while he was working as Chief Judicial Magistrate, (sic) the members of the Bar Association made complaints against him with respect to his integrity and the District Judge also recommended for inquiry on the basis of those complaints though in departmental inquiry the complaints could not be substantiated. In 1997-98, the Administrative Judge recorded an entry observing that the officer has not taken interest in disposal of execution cases and the District Judge had also reported complaint touching integrity though the same could not be substantiated. The aforesaid entry was of the period when the petitioner was working as Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah. The petitioner while working as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda again earned an adverse entry in 1998-99 from District Judge who also observed that his general reputation was not good and number of complaints were received against him though could not be substantiated. The District Judge though certified his integrity but with the remark "reluctantly". He has also mentioned in the A.C.R. that the public and Bar both made complaints against the petitioner regarding his partiality though the complaints could not be substantiated. With respect to judicial performance also, the District Judge found that the petitioner was not making entry in Court Diary, granted unnecessary adjournments and his judgements require improvement on facts and law both. The said remarks recorded by the District Judge, Banda were confirmed by the Administrative Judge. In 1999 when the District Bar Association made complaint against the petitioner for his involvement in corrupt practices and polluting atmosphere of the judgeship, the District Judge recommended for his transfer from Banda Judgeship and also an inquiry against his conduct. This Court transferred the petitioner from Banda to Tehri and also directed for vigilance inquiry wherein the charges, however, could not be substantiated.
33. Likewise, in the year 2002-03 he was working as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bijnor and there also the Hon'ble Administrative Judge received complaints against his integrity for which he directed the then District Judge to keep strict watch over the work and conduct of the petitioner. The said District Judge however, died and could not submit his report but his successor gave a bad report against the petitioner. Thus, though the complaints of corruption etc. made against the petitioner could not be substantiated in inquiry but the fact remains that the petitioner enjoyed stinking reputation wherever he was posted, namely, Unnao, Etah, Banda, Bijnor etc. It may be that at one place some members of Bar Association, for reasons other than bonafide can be said to have complaints against the petitioner but it is inconceivable that at different places wherever he was posted false and frivolous complaints had been received regarding his reputation touching his integrity and honesty. Not only the members of the Bar but different District Judges and Administrative Judges all have expressed similar opinion about the petitioner. Everywhere he enjoyed very bad reputation.
34. Thus, it is difficult to hold that there was no material adverse in the service record of the petitioner justifying the order of compulsory retirement. While considering the validity of an order of compulsory retirement passed in public interest under F.R. 56, this Court would not sit in appeal over the decision of the competent authority. The employer takes into account various factors emanating from employee's past record and takes a view whether it would be in the interest of employer to continue service of the employee concerned or not. If it forms an opinion that employee is rendered a dead wood and has outlived his utility, it can certainly pass an order of compulsory retirement. In Jugal Chandra Saikia (supra) the Apex Court observed:
...It cannot be disputed that the passing of an order of compulsory retirement depends on subjective satisfaction of the competent authority, of course on objective consideration. Unless it is shown that the order of compulsory retirement was passed arbitrarily and without application of mind or that such formation of opinion to retire compulsorily, was based on no evidence or that the order of compulsory retirement was totally perverse, the Court cannot interfere....
35. Considering the entire service record of the petitioner and in particular, the aforesaid adverse entries, it cannot be said that the competent authority has acted arbitrarily and there was no material at all to form an opinion that the petitioner deserved to be compulsorily retired under F.R. Rule 56(c). It is not the case of the petitioner that the above entries have been recorded against him by the various authorities on account of any malice or mala fide nor anyone has been impleaded eo-nomine. There is no challenge by the petitioner to the aforesaid entries. This Court will not sit in appeal over the decision of the competent authority based on over all assessment of service record of a Government servant for taking the decision of compulsory retirement of such an officer unless it is arbitrary ex facie. F.R. 56 as enacted in Uttar Pradesh empowers the competent authority to consider the entire service record and the same having been perused, the competent authority, in our view, has rightly held that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired and we do not find any reason to interfere with the said decision. The contention of the petitioner, thus, that the impugned order has been passed without any material and is arbitrary, is rejected. The writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.