JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. Heard Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
2. Petitioner was employed as Collection Amin in District Banda. It appears that he issued fake receipts about the money collected by him which was not deposited. The Naib Tahsildar reported this matter on 17.6.96 and a First Information Report was also lodged against him which was registered as Criminal Case No. 157 of 1995 in Police Station Mataundha, District Banda. However, the police submitted a final report in this case. Thereafter, the District Magistrate initiated disciplinary proceedings on 22.8.1998 framing three charges against him.
3. The petitioner alleges that he demanded copies of ten documents by his letter dated 9.9.98 and Up Zila Adhikari, Naraini, District Banda was appointed as Enquiry Officer. He by letter dated 10th September, 1999 supplied certain documents and informed that some papers are not available. The petitioner gave a reply to the chages by letter dated 9.3.99. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 16.3.99.
4. The grievance of the petitioner is that no date of enquiry was fixed nor any witness was examined to prove the charge and he was not given any personal hearing and not given any opportunity to defend himself. The District Magistrate dismissed him from service by order dated 19.3.99 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition).
5. Perusal of charge-sheet would show that the charges sought to be proved by reports and documents on record, copies of which were supplied to the petitioner. Where charges are sought to be proved by documentary evidence before the domestic enquiry in such matters, it is not absolutely necessary to hold enquiry to prove charges by oral evidence.
6. In the case of Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ananda Chandra Prusty, AIR 1997 SC 2274, the Supreme Court held that burden of proof is not always on the department. In Paragraph 5 of the judgment the Apex Court held as under :
"In a disciplinary or a departmental inquiry, the question of burden of proof depends upon the nature of charges and the nature of explanation put forward by the dilinquent officer. In this sense, the learned Counsel for the appellant may be justified in complaining that the standard of proof stipulated by the High Court in this case sounds inappropriate to a disciplinary inquiry. At the same time we must say that certain observations made by the Inquiry Officer in his report to lend themselves to the criticism offered by the High Court. On a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case including the nature of charges we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. The position with respect to burden of proof is as clarified by us hereinabove viz., that there is no such thing as an absolute burden of proof, always lying upon the department in a disciplinary inquiry. The burden of proof depends upon the nature of explanation and the nature of charges. In a given case the burden may be shifted to the delinquent officer, depending upon his explanation. For example take the first charge in this case. The charge was that he made certain false notings on account of which loans were disbursed to certain ineligible persons. The respondent's case was that those notings were based upon certain documents produced and certain records maintained by other employees in the office. In such a situation, it is for the respondent to establish his case. The department is not expected to examine those other employees in the officer to show that their acts or records could not have formed the basis of wrong notings made by the respondent."
7. In the case of Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman and Disciplinary Authority and Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 565, in Para 5 the Apex Court held as under :
"Sri B.D. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that for proof of the charges none of the witnesses was examined nor any opportunity was given to cross-examine them and the petitioner has disputed his liability. As a consequence, the entire enquiry was vitiated by manifest error apparent on the face of the record. We find no force in the contention. The thrust of the impuation of charges was that he had not discharged his duty as a responsible officer to safeguard the interest of the Bank by securing adequate security before the grant of the loans to the dealers, and had not ensured supply of goods to the loanees. It is based upon the documentary evidence which has already been part of the record and copies thereof had been supplied to the petitioner. Under those circumstances, we do not think that there is any manifest error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference."
8. It follows from the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex court that in a disciplinary enquiry the burden of proof is always dependent upon the nature of charges and the explanation given by the dilinquent employee. In the instant case also it was on the workman to have discharged his burden of proof. The allegations of embezzlement and misappropriation of Government money against the petitioner have been found to be proved on basis of the official documents. It is not a fit case for interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to cost.