JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. Heard Sri B. Malik learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri V.K. Goel learned counsel representing respondent Nos, 2 to 7/2 as well as learned standing counsel for respondent No. 1.
2. By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has challenged, the order dated 19.3.2002, passed by the revisional court, Annexure-2 to the writ petition, whereby the decree of the trial court dated 14.10.1999, passed by J.S.C.C.. Moradabad decreeing the suit against the petitioner-tenant for his eviction from the accommodation in question has been upheld.
3. The landlord terminated the tenancy of the petitioner by means of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The petitioner-tenant however denied this fact with regard to service of the notice, but the authorities below have recorded a finding that the notice aforesaid was duly served on the petitioner-tenant.
4. It is admitted fact that because of the non-compliance of the provisions of Order XV. Rule 5 for the filing of the written statement, the suit was proceeded ex parts against the petitioner. Petitioner in paragraph 14 of his statement has stated that he has been inducted as tenant in the building in question in the year 1983. He further stated in paragraph 15 that the building in question is at least 15 years old and, therefore, U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 will be applicable and the suit should have been dealt with in accordance with the provision of Section 20 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The landlord-plaintiffs produced the sanctioned map issued by the concerned local authority of the year 1981 in evidence, which has been allowed to be cross-examined by the Court to the petitioner-tenant and after considering the evidence on record the authorities have come to the conclusion that the accommodation in question is an accommodation on which U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 did not apply, the suit, therefore, was decreed for eviction and arrears of rent. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed a revision before the revisional court. The revisional court agreed with the view taken by the trial court and recorded a finding that the subordinate court has not committed any error of law in decreeing the suit and therefore refused to interfere with the order of the trial court.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri B. Malik strenuously argued that the finding recorded by both the courts below to the effect that U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the accommodation in question, suffers from the manifest error of law. So far as the finding with regard to this aspect is concerned, Sri Malik, however, contended that in view of Explanation 1 (a) of Section 2 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, this accommodation cannot be said to be an accommodation, which is exempted from the operation of the Act and thus the view taken by both the courts below that the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable is not correct. Explanation 1 (a) of Section 2 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which is relevant, is reproduced below :
"2. Exemptions from operation of Act.--
Explanation 1.--(a) The construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time :
Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants."
6. A perusal of the Explanation, referred to above, will demonstrate that the first stage is that the completion of the building is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction with regard to this aspect neither any pleadings nor any evidence. The second stage is that in case the building is subjected to assessment, the day on which the first assessment comes into effect. There is no evidence to this effect also. The Explanation further provides the date, where there are different dates, the earliest of the said dates, but there is neither any evidence, nor any pleadings, in this regard. The last stage of the Explanation provides that in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied in the absence of any findings with regard to other ingredients. It is admitted by the petitioner in his written statement that it will be said to be completed and if the building is said to be completed in the year 1983, the view taken by the courts below that the Act is not applicable does not warrant any interference.
7. In this view of what has been stated above, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.