Court No. - 59
Case :- CONTEMPT APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 845 of 2018 Applicant :- Sheo Pujan Opposite Party :- Dr. Om Prakash Rai , District Inspector Of Schools And Other Counsel for Applicant :- Udai Chandani
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.
Supplementary affidavit is taken on record.
Heard Shri Udai Chandani, learned counsel for the applicant.
The applicant in a pending writ petition had called in question an order dated 24 May 2017, in respect of the inter se seniority between the applicant and the opposite party No.2. The challenge in the writ petition to the order is to the effect that the opposite party No.2 has wrongly been shown as senior to the applicant. The writ Court by its order of 7 June 2017 has placed the order dated 24 May 2017 in abeyance.
The submission before this Court is that since the order has been stayed, the applicant must be handed over the charge of the officiating Principal. The Court finds itself unable to sustain this submission for the following reasons:-
Evidently and as is apparent from a reading of the order dated 18 January 2018, the opposite party No.2 appears to have been conferred charge of the post of officiating Principal sometime in March 2017. The District Inspector of Schools, bearing in mind the interest of the administration of the institution coupled with the fact that examinations were impending, had proceeded to attest his signature. The supplementary filed today clearly admits that the applicant was never acting as the officiating Principal. In fact it has been candidly stated that the opposite party No.2 was continuing as such right from May 2017. In view thereof, it is evident that the opposite party No.2 was acting as the officiating Principal on the day when the interim order came to be passed. The clear distinction between an order of stay and an order quashing has been duly enunciated by the Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Assn., (1992) 3 SCC 1, wherein the following observations were made:-
"10. In the instant case, the proceedings before the Board under Sections 15 and 16 of the Act had been terminated by order of the Board dated April 26, 1990 whereby the Board, upon consideration of the facts and material before it, found that the appellant-company had become economically and commercially non-viable due to its huge accumulated losses and liabilities and should be wound up. The appeal filed by the appellant-company under Section 25 of the Act against said order of the Board was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by order dated January 7, 1991. As a result of these orders, no proceedings under the Act were pending either before the Board or before the Appellate Authority on February 21, 1991 when the Delhi High Court passed the interim order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991. The said stay order of the High Court cannot have the effect of reviving the proceedings which had been disposed of by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991. While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the Appellate Authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the Appellate Authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the Appellate Authority after the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991 by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the Appellate Authority. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that any proceedings under the Act were pending before the Board or the Appellate Authority on the date of the passing of the order dated August 14, 1991 by the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court for winding up of the company or on November 6, 1991 when the Division Bench passed the order dismissing O.S.A. No. 16 of 1991 filed by the appellant-company against the order of the learned Single Judge dated August 14, 1991. Section 22(1) of the Act could not, therefore, be invoked and there was no impediment in the High Court dealing with the winding up petition filed by the respondents. This is the only question that has been canvassed in Civil Appeal No. 126 of 1992, directed against the order for winding up of the appellant-company. The said appeal, therefore, fails and is liable to be dismissed."
Bearing in mind the principles enunciated therein, this Court finds itself unable to hold that the interim order passed by the High Court results in or requires restoration of the status quo ante or for divesting of charge from the opposite party No.2, since till date the impugned order has not been set aside.
Accordingly and for the reasons noted above, this petition is dismissed.
Order Date :- 26.2.2018 nethra