JUDGMENT Poonam Srivastava, J.
1. Heard Sri Triveni Shanker, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Awadhesh Kumar Singh Advocate for the contesting respondents.
2. The order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 28.8.1981 is impugned in the instant writ petition. The controversy in the instant writ petition arises out of proceedings under Section 42-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in respect of land situtated in village Pagahi, Pargana Mahaich, Tehsil Chandauli, District Varanasi. After completion of the consolidation, chaks were carved out and the petitioner was allotted chak No. 306 whereas respondent Nos. 4 to 6 are chak holders of chak No. 301. The allotment of chak was notified under Section 20 of the Act and CH Form 23 was confirmed on 10.1.1973. According to the submission of the counsel for the petitioner, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 got the value altered in the original CH Form 23 which resulted in increase of rental value of chak No. 301 considerably. The proceeding was initiated by the lekhpal under Section 42-A of the Act and on the basis of a report forwarded by the Assistant Consolidation Officer on 4.7.1977, the Consolidation Officer passed an order making correction of the valuation of the respective chaks of the parties vide its order dated 7.7.1977. This order was passed without notice to the petitioner and he had no opportunity whatsoever to oppose the said alteration/correction. When the petitioner came to know about the aforesaid fact, he moved an application on 20.12.1978 for recalling the order of the Consolidation Officer with the specific allegation that he was given no notice before the CH Form 23 was amended on the basis of a report forwarded by the lekhpal and valuation of the chaks of the contesting respondents was considerably increased. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 9.10.1980 allowed the application and recalled his earlier order. The order of the Consolidation Officer has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The earlier order of the Consolidation Officer dated 7.7.1977 stood recalled so far it related to the petitioner's chak No. 306 and 301 of the contesting respondents. This order was challenged in revision by the contesting respondents which was allowed vide order dated 28.8.1981. This revsional order is impugned in the instant writ petition.
3. The submission of Sri Triveni Shanker is two folds. The first submission is that once the village was de-notified under Section 52 of the Act on 4.5.1977, the consolidation authorities were completely divested of any authority or jurisdiction to pass an order specially an order behind the back of the petitioner, which was admittedly to his detriment. Reliance has been placed on a number of decisions by Sri Triveni Shanker. In the case of Rampati and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. it was ruled that where de-notification has taken place under Section 52 of the Act, the Deputy Director Consolidation would have no jurisdiction to exercise powers under Section 48(3) of the Act and also that the revenue entries made in favour of a person as a consequence of the proceeding before the consolidation authorities, such entries can not be altered without intimation and notice to the said person. In the instant case, admittedly CH Form 23 was issued; in confirmation with the orders passed during the consolidation operation but subsequent changes were made without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner which could not be done. Similar view was expressed by this Court in another decision in the cases of Sabha Sunder and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Siddharth Nagar and Ors. 2006(101) RD, 81 and Bhuleliya and Ors. v. Additional Collector /Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur and Anr. 2006 (101) RD, 118. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. Krishnamurthy 1999 (1) A.W.C. 15 (S.C.). On the basis of this decision it is argued that once the Consolidation Officer allowed and condoned the delay in filing the recall application, the Deputy Director of Consolidation could not disturb it, much less in revisional jurisdiction unless it was brought to his notice that the discretion exercised by lower court was wholly arbitrary or perverse. In the instant case, the only ground for upsetting the finding of the Consolidation Officer allowing the recall application is that the petitioner had knowledge about the order dated 7.7.1977 when he had entered into a compromise before the S.H.O. Police Station Dhanapur, Varanasi on 30.4 1978. Admittedly the exparte order was passed on 7.7.1977 and recall application was moved on 20.12.1978 along with an application for condoning the delay. The compromise was entered into on 30.4.1978, and on perusal of the same, it is evident that it was subsequent to 7.7.1977 and in case the Consolidation Officer accepted the contention of the petitioner that the said order was passed behind the back of the petitioner, there was no illegality whatsoever, if the exparte order was recalled.
4. Sri A.K. Singh has emphatically disputed the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on a number of decisions, Ramapati v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad 1995 RD, 358, Raghubar Charan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and Ors. 1998 (SuppL) RD, 267. The first decision relates to a question where the subordinate authority had declined to' grant limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and revisional court declined to interfere. This Court was of the view that no interference with the finding of fact recorded by the revisional court could be done. In the second case related to the scope of revisional jurisdiction, where it was ruled that the powers under Section 48 of the Act are very wide and the Deputy Director of Consolidation can interfere on both law and fact. In the instant case, the Consolidation Officer has recalled his order granting benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and come to a definite conclusion that the notice was served by Chaspa and service does not appear to be sufficient while recalling his earlier order, has specifically recorded a finding that it was an exparte order without sufficient notice to the petitioner. This finding of fact could not be interfered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of revisional powers. The next decisions of the Apex Court relied by Sri A.K. Singh are, Seshmani and Anr. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation Basti and Ors. 2000 (91) RD, 210 (S.C.) and Ram Dular v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and Ors. 1994 RD, 290 (S.C.) which relate to the powers of the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding the title, legality and correctness of an order passed by the subordinate authority, whereas in the instant case, the proceeding initiated subsequent to the completion of the consolidation while making necessary correction amounted to an alteration in the orders passed during the consolidation operation. Not only this, in fact it was implemented and CH Form 23 was issued, subsequently certain alterations were made under Section 42-A of the Act and that too behind the back of the petitioner.
5. On perusal of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, it is apparent that he has set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer whereby discretion exercised by him granting benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been interfered in exercise of revisional power. The Deputy Director of Consolidation also allowed an amendment made in the garb of correction proceeding after the village was de-notified by the Consolidation Officer. The revisional court tried to interfere on these questions of fact on the basis of a compromise entered between the parties in a criminal proceeding before the S.H.O., which admittedly was subsequent to the impugned order dated 7.7.1977 which effected the valuation of the chak of the petitioner.
6. In the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the revisional court could not pass the impugned order. Besides, I am sitting in writ jurisdiction and can not overlook the equities which clearly tilts in favour of the petitioner. The rights of the petitioner stands considerably hampered, in case the impugned order is not quashed besides it is an order passed behind his back and without an opportunity of hearing. This can not be allowed as it will amount to violation of principles of natural justice. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 28.8.1981 is quashed. There shall be no order as to cost.