JUDGMENT Ganga Nath, J.
1. This is a defendants' appeal and arises out of a suit brought against them by the plaintiff, respondent, for a declaration that the deed of gift dated 8th January 1929, executed by the plaintiff in favour of Ibrar Ahmad, since deceased, was invalid and ineffectual. The plaintiff is the step-mother of Acchi Begam, defendant 2. Ibrar Ahmad in whose favour the deed was executed was the husband of Acchi Begam. The plaintiff succeeded to some property from her son Bazaq Yar Khan on his death, which took place in 1932. The plaintiff's case is that Ibrar Ahmad made her execute the deed in question in his favour without letting her know its real nature. It was only in November 1932, when after her second marriage, which took place in April 1932, she demanded her monthly allowance of Rs. 10 from the defendants and they refused to pay it saying that she was not entitled to get any allowance, she made a search of the papers an4 obtained copies from the Registration Department that she came to know that the defendants had got the deed in question executed by her in ignorance of the real nature of the document and its con-tents. The defendants contended that the plaintiff executed the deed with full know, ledge of its contents and real nature and that the suit was beyond time. Both the Courts below have found against the defendant. Ibrar Ahmad died during the pendency of the suit and his heirs have been brought on the record in his place.
2. Both the Courts below have found that the plaintiff executed the deed in question without knowing its contents and that it was within three years of the suit that she came to know of the real nature of the document in question. When the plaintiff came to know of the real nature of the document which, as found by the lower Court, was executed by her without knowing its contents and true nature, was a question of fact on which the finding of the lower Court is conclusive. According to this finding, the plaintiff came to know of the real character of the document within three years of the suit. Under Article 91 Limitation Act, the period of limitation to cancel or set aside an instrument, not otherwise provided for, runs from the time when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to him. The learned Counsel for the appellant relies on Deo Singh v. Mt. Dulaiya Judeo (1932) 19 A.I.R. All. 63 where it was observed:
Therefore under Article 91, the plaintiff would have boon entitled to have the instrument cancelled or set aside immediately the undue influence was withdrawn.
3. In Someshwar Dutt v. Trbhawan Dutt (1934) 21 A.I.R. P.C. 130 their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down a different rule of law as regards the time from which the period of limitation would run in case of undue influence. They have observed:
The error into which the Chief Court fell, in their Lordships' opinion, is that they thought the three years permitted by the Limitation Act began to run, not from the discovery of the plaintiff of the true nature of the deed which he had signed, but from the date when he escaped from the influence by which, according to the plaintiff, he was dominated. Whether the facts as proved bring the claim within the limitation period even on this view is a question on which their Lordships express no opinion. It suffices to say that for the doctrine of the Chief Court their Lordships are unable to find any sufficient justification.
4. According to them a suit to recover possession of property gifted by the plain, tiff to the defendants under a deed of gift which was alleged to have been obtained by undue influence must be brought within three years from the date when the plaintiff became aware of the true character of the deed and of the transaction which he had entered into. Time does not run from the date when the plaintiff escapes from the influence by which he was dominated. The present suit being within three years from the time when the plaintiff came to know of the true character of the deed is within time. Both the lower Courts have con-currently found that the deed in question was never explained to and understood by the plaintiff. It being so, the deed is invalid. There is no force in the appeal. It is therefore ordered that it be dismissed with costs.