ORDER N.S. Gupta, J.
1. This is a criminal revision against the judgment and order dated 27-7-1992 passed by Sri Krishna Kumar, the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kannauj, district Farrukhabad in criminal revision No. 26/92 (Mool Chand Gupta v. Shashi Bhushan Gupta) whereby the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kannauj, district Farrukhabad directed the City Magistrate, Farukhabad not to stay the proceedings of Criminal case No. 26 of 1992 under Section 145 Cr. P.C. but to dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of Section 145 Cr. P.C.
2. It appears that there existed an apprehension of breach of peace over the possession of a house situate in Mohalla Haji Ganj Khurd. Kasba Kannauj, P. S. Kannauj, district Farrukhabad in between Sanjeev Kumar Gupta son of Mool Chand and Ram Lal Gupta and 5 others. Proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. were initiated on an application being moved by Sri Sanjeev Kumar Gupta son of Mool Chand Gupta. The learned Magistrate after hearing the parties found that a civil suit with regard to the possession of the house in dispute was pending before the Civil Court Farrukhabad. The learned Magistrate accordingly directed that the proceedings of the case under Section 145 Cr.P.C. pending before him be stayed during the pendency of the civil suit. The first party Mool Chand Gupta went up in revision against the said order passed by the learned Magistrate before the Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad. The said revision was decided by Sri Krishna Kumar, Additional District and Sessions Judge Farrukhabad as per his judgment dated 27-7-1992. The second party feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad have, therefore, come up in revision before this Court.
3. I have heard Sri. U. C. Misra, learned counsel for the revisionist the second party and Sri Daleep Gupta Advocate for the O.P. first party; considered their contentions and have gone through the facts and circumstances of the case.
4. It was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist before this court that when the matter was pending for adjudication before the Civil Court at Farrukhabad and when, in fact, the civil court had passed an order directing the maintenance of the status quo of possession over the property in dispute, the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge directing the Magistrate to proceed under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was wholly improper and was bad in law.
4A. Reliance was placed upon the proposition of law laid down in Ranjit Sigh v. Motilal Katiyar reported in 1988 All Cri C 26:(1988 All LJ 489) and in Padam Ravindar Jeet Singh v. Jagat Singh reported in 1988 All Cri C 136 (SC).
5. It was laid down by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Padam Ravinder Jeet Singh v. Jagat Singh that the criminal courts have to honour decisions rendered by the civil courts. Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. P. Shukla in 1988 All Cri C 26: (1988 All LJ 489) has held that when an injunction order of the civil court was in operation the order of the Magistrate was abuse of the process of the court. In the instant case before this Court, I find that although even a civil suit with regard to the property in dispute was pending before the civil court at Farrukhabad yet the civil court did not pass any effective order in the said case. A photostat copy of the order dated 22-10-92 passed by the civil court, Kannauj district Farrukhabad was filed before this Court. It shows that in the said order the parties were directed not to interfere into the possession of each other and to maintain status quo over the property in dispute. It would, thus, be seen that the civil court did not adjudicate upon the point as to which of the parties was prima facie in possession of the property in dispute. The order regarding the maintenance of status quo and prohibiting both the parties to the suit not to interfere into the possession of each other was too vague order to be appreciated.
6. It was held by Hon'ble Mr. Justice I.S. Mathur of this Court in Harpal v. State of U. P. reported in 1995 All Cri C 316 that merely because a civil suit was pending relating to the property in dispute jurisdiction of Magistrate to proceed under Section 145 Cr. P.C. is not taken away.
7. Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. L. Sharma in Raju v. State of U. P. reported in 1994 All Cri C 537 had observed that when the interim order does not clearly specify the possession of either of the party and directed the maintenance of the status quo, it was too vague order, the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate to proceed under Section 145 Cr. P.C. can therefore be invoked.
8. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. P. Singh in Abdul Gafoor v. State of U. P. reported in 1992 All Cri C 87 had observed that in every case in which a civil suit is pending proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. are not bound to be dropped. The order of civil court to maintain status quo was an innocuous order. The proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. will, therefore be no bar.
9. In the instant case before this Court, I find that the civil court at Farrukhabad did not adjudicate as to which of the parties was in actual physical possession of the property in dispute. In the absence of a proper adjudication about the rights of the parties for possession over the property in dispute by the civil Court, I am of the opinion that the Executive Magistrate would be perfectly within his jurisdiction to decide as to which of the parties was in possession of the house in dispute on the date of passing the preliminary order or two months before the same.
10. I should state here that when the proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. were initiated by the Executive Magistrate with regard to the house in dispute it was his bounden duty to decide as to which of the parties was in possession over the house in dispute.
11. I should state here that the pendency of the civil suit was no bar to the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. The provisions of Section 145 Cr. P.C. do not empower the Executive Magistrate to put off the adjudication of the matter i.e. possession of the property in dispute on the date of passing the preliminary order on two months before the same. Further the provisions of Section 145(4) Cr. P.C. which read as under cast a duty upon the Executive Magistrate to adjudicate upon the said point without waiting for the verdict of the civil court.
"145(4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under Sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute :
Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the dated on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under Sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under Sub-section (1)."
12. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the order passed by the Magistrate was an interlocutory order. It was not a final order and therefore, the learned Sessions Judge grossly erred in interfering with the same. I am unable to agree with the contention of the revisionist. When the learned Magistrate stayed the proceedings before him and when he directed the parties to get their claim adjudicated by the civil court, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the learned Magistrate was final order and was revisable by the Court of Sessions.
13. I am, of the opinion that there was no illegality or impropriety on the part of the learned Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad to direct the Executive Magistrate to adjudicate upon controversy of possession of the house in dispute in between the parties in accordance with the provisions of Section 145 Cr. P.C. There is no force in the revision. It is hereby dismissed.