JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. Petitioner-Shashi Bhushan Asthana has filed this application for review of the order dated 15th September. 1997 passed in this Writ Petition No. 18653 of 1996, on the ground that the subject-matter involved in the writ petition was cognizable by a Division Bench and as such could not have been decided by the single Judge and therefore the order dated 15th September. 1997 passed by me sitting singly is without jurisdiction. No other ground, however, has been taken in the review application. Though, however, either in the application for review or in the affidavit in support thereof, the petitioner did not disclose that he had filed a Special Appeal before Hon'ble Division Bench against the said order dated 15th September, 1997, but in course of the arguments learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. J. P. Singh, Advocate admitted at the Bar that a Special Appeal against the said order was preferred and was dismissed by the Division Bench. He, however, could not produce the order passed by the Division Bench dismissing the Special Appeal. Mr. L. P. Naithani, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand though confirmed the statement made by the learned counsel for petitioner, but he also could not either produce a copy of the order passed by Hon'ble the Division Bench or furnish the date of disposal or number of the Special Appeal.
2. Mr. Singh was confronted with the question whether this point was taken before the Division Bench in the Special Appeal or not. In answer, he has submitted that Hon'ble the Division Bench, though the point was raised, did not think it fit to record any observation on that ground, but however was pleased to observe, without recording anything in the order itself, in the Court that the petitioner is free to approach the learned single Judge. Though such a statement is being made at the bar but the same has not been disclosed either in the application for review or the affidavit in support thereof.
3. If it were so in that event it should have been pleaded in the application for review so as to get rid of the principle, under which a review application can be made either in the case where no appeal is provided or in the case where appeal though provided no appeal has been filed. Review as provided under Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code can be applied for against a decree or order, from which appeal is allowed but no appeal is preferred or from which no appeal is allowed. The procedure for review in Order XLV1I prescribes the same process incorporating Identical expressions. Though by reason of Section 141. C.P.C, the provisions of the Code would not be applicable in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet the principle would be applicable while deciding the question in connection with the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, after having been unsuccessful in the Special Appeal, there is no scope for preferring an application for review. Then again, on admission of the learned counsel for petitioner that question was raised before the Hon'ble Division Bench in appeal but the Hon'ble Division Bench dismissed the appeal. Even If no reason is recorded in the order of dismissal, the order sought to be reviewed having stood merged in the order of dismissal, the point ought to have been considered to have been overruled by implication, therefore, it is no more open to the applicant to apply for review thereafter.
4. That apart, the ground for review have also been specified in Order XLVII, C.P.C, can also be made equally applicable as ground for review in a proceeding under Article 226. The grounds that are mentioned are :
(i) that some new and important matter or evidence which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant's knowledge has since been discovered ;
(ii) or some important matters or some new and important matter or evidence which could not be produced by the applicant When the order was passed despite exercise of due diligence when the order was passed ;
(iii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record ;
(iv) or for any other sufficient reasons.
5. In series of judicial decisions sufficient reasons have been interpreted to mean "a reason sufficient on the grounds atleast analogous to those specified immediately previously" vide Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 ; Hari Shanker v. Anath Nath. AIR 1949 FC 106 ; Moron Mar etc. u. Mar Polus, AIR 1954 SC 526. This interpretation has necessarily been followed in subsequent cases. Therefore, it is necessary to test whether the ground taken in the present review application is a ground within the meaning of Order XLV11, C.P.C. Inasmuch as in the case of Gujarat University v. Sonlal P. Shah, AIR 1982 Gill 58, it was held that the power to review a proceeding under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the following principles are settled :
(i) The provisions of Civil Procedure Code in Order XLV1I are not applicable to the High Court's power to review in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(ii) Powers are to be exercised by the High Court only to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave or palpable errors (epithet palpable means that which can be felt by simple touch of the order and not which could be dug out after a long drawn out process of argumentation and ratiocination).
(iii) The inherent powers, though ex facie plenary, are not to be treated as unlimited or unabridged, but they are to be invoked on the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII. Rule 1.
6. This decision had drawn inspiration from the decision in the case of A. T, Sharma v. A. P. Sharma. AIR 1979 SC 1047. That review is permissible in a proceeding under Article 226 was held in the case of Shiv Deo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 5C 1909, on the ground that such a proceeding is a civil proceeding. This was also so held by this High Court in the case of State of U. P. u. Jawahar Lal. AIR 1975 All. 101. The High Court of Goa in the case of Gajanan Vishnu v. Construction Material, AIR 1974 Goa 4, had held that review in a writ proceeding is permissible only on the ground referred to in Order XLVII. Rule (1). C.P.C. Admittedly the power to review by the High Court in a proceedings under Article 226 inhers in it but there are limits on exercise of the powers of review. The power can be exercised on discovery of new or important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But it cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was" erroneous on merits. This is within the province of appeal. This has been so observed in the case of A.T. Sharma (supra).
7. Thus, in the present case the ground that has been taken does not come within the purview of any of the grounds mentioned above except that the error is palpable, namely, it was wholly without jurisdiction if at all it can be so said. Admittedly, the jurisdiction of the learned Judges sitting singly or in Division Bench is assigned by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Unless a particular determination is assigned to a particular Judge sitting singly or to a Division Bench, the Court cannot assume jurisdiction. Any assumption of jurisdiction beyond the determination assigned to the Judge or to the Bench, is without jurisdiction and as such is non-est. If it can be shown that there was no jurisdiction at all in the Judge passing the order, in that event, the same is to be treated as non est.
8. In the present case, the question that has been raised by Mr. Singh is that a writ petition against an order passed by the Tribunal, is cognizable by the Division Bench. But Mr. Naithani has pointed out that this question was never urged at the time when the order was passed on 15th September, 1997. Mr. Singh has very fairly admitted the same. Mr. Singh now contends that he is drawing inspiration on the basis of the ratio laid down in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India. 1997 (1) UPLBEC 712. This case was decided on March 18, 1997 whereas the order sought to be reviewed was passed on 15th September, 1997. Therefore, this question could have been raised at the time of hearing. He also admits that except the said ratio, he has nothing to say that the subject-matter involved in the writ petition was cognizable by a Division Bench. According to him, even if there are orders contrary to the ratio laid down in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the same should have been deemed to be overruled by implication as soon the said ratio has been laid down in the said case of L. Chandra Kumar with effect from 18.3.1997.
9. Mr. Naithani, however, opposed the said contention and contended that under the order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, such matters are cognizable by single Judge. The ratio laid down in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), has no manner of overriding effect of such orders.
10. In order to appreciate the situation, it is necessary to look into the ratio that has been laid down in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra). Admittedly, the said case has proceeded in deciding the question in relation to exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Court as provided in Section 28 of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act. 1985. The consideration of the Apex Court in the said case was confined with regard to the orders of the Tribunals constituted under the said Act by the Parliament. The said fact would be apparent from the questions which were at issue in the said decision as formulated in paragraph 1 thereof which are as follows :
(i) Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or the State Legislatures, as the case may be, by sub-clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323B of the Constitution, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of 'all courts', except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes and complaints referred to in clause (1) Article 323A or with regard to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) of Article 323B, runs counter to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Courts under Article 226/227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?
(ii) Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323A or under Article 323B of the Constitution, possess the competence to test the constitutional validity of a statutory provision/rule?
(iii) Whether these Tribunals, as, they are functioning at present, can be said to be effective substitutes for the High Courts in discharging the power of Judicial review? if not, what are the changes required to make them conform to their founding objectives?
11. Thus, we see that the Apex Court was pre-occupied and confined itself within the scope and ambit of the issues Involved in relation to the Tribunals set up by the Parliament within the provisions of Article 323A(2)d) and Article 323B(3)d). This Part XIV containing Article 323A and 323B was inserted in the Constitution through Section 46 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. with effect from 1st March, 1977. Thus, without the said two articles, the jurisdiction of the High Courts could not be excluded though however Tribunals relating to Government Servants could have been enacted by reason of Entry 41 of List II of 7th Schedule of the Constitution by State Legislature. Now U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act. 1976, was enacted on 1st May, 1976 by the State Legislature. Thus, this Act was legislated before the 42nd Amendment had come into force. Then again, this Act does not contain any provision which excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court.
12. Particular ratio that has been relied on by Mr. Singh in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), is to be found in paragraphs 92, 93. 94 and 95 thereof. In the said case, it has been specifically held that :
"All decisions of Tribunals whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls.
.....In the view that we have taken, no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, but instead, the aggrieved party will be entitled to move the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
.......The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Court."
13. Thus, we see that the Tribunals mentioned In the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), are confined to the Tribunals constituted either under Article 323A or Article 323B where the Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 has been excluded. The reference to expression Tribunal' in the said case does not include any Tribunal other than those constituted either under Article 323A or 323B by the Statute excluding the Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227. Or in other words, a Tribunal constituted under legislative power of the Legislature on the basis of Entry 41 of List II of 7th Schedule of the Constitution, was not a Tribunal within the meaning of expression Tribunal' used in the said case. Inasmuch as U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act. 1976, was enacted before Incorporation of Article 323A by the State Legislature in exercise of Its legislative power within Entry 41. List II. 7th Schedule of the Constitution with effect from 1st May. 1976. Then again, U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976, does not contain any provision seeking to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, the ratio laid down in L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra), does not apply in respect of the decision by Tribunal constituted under 1976 Act.
14. Admittedly, by reason of Article 141 of the Constitution, law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all High Courts. Therefore, even if there is any order contrary to the said ratio permitting hearing of a writ petition by single Judge even from the decision of the Tribunal within the meaning that has been ascribed in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), it would be binding on the High Court. But the facts being distinguishable so far as the present case is concerned, namely, the Tribunal other than a Tribunal meant in L. Chandra Kumar's case [supra], it cannot be said to be the law so declared. Or, in other words, the law declared does not include a Tribunal other than the Tribunal as envisaged in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra).
15. Therefore, the Jurisdiction would be that of the Judge sitting singly in view of the order dated 18th September, 1981 passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice which provided that "consequent upon the U. P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 1981, the following guidelines are prescribed to regulate the fresh Institutions and listing of writ petitions in the various Division and single Judge Benches constituted by me with effect from 21.9.1981 :
1. .............
2. .............
3. .............
4. Writs against judgment, order or award passed or given by Tribunals, Courts or statutory arbitrators such as.
16. Thus, we see that the present order being an award of the Service Tribunal is to be entertained by a Judge sitting singly by reason of the order dated 18th September, 1981. Subsequently, another order was passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 24th May, 1990 which has also not altered the situation. A further order was issued on 20.10.1992 by the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice where it was provided that all writ petitions relating to services of the following categories shall also be heard and disposed of by an Hon'ble Judge silting singly :
(i) Teachers upto Intermediate Colleges ;
(ii) Employees of class 111 and IV Including those of educational institutions.
Except those category, all other writ petitions relating to service shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges.
17. Then in the order dated 24th May, 1990, all matters relating to service except "service mattes pertaining to teachers, officers and authorities of the Universities, Medical and Engineering Institutions" shall be heard and disposed of by a Hon'ble Judge sitting singly with effect from July 9. 1990 in addition to certain other kinds of cases which were to be heard by the Division Bench on earlier occasion.
18. Thus, from all this discussion, it appears that the subject-matter involved in the writ petition could be decided, heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting singly.
19. For all these reasons, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not appeal to me.
Accordingly, the review application does not merit consideration and the same is hereby rejected.