JUDGMENT A. K. Yog, J.
1. Shanti Tyagi. petitioner has filed this petition claiming writ of certiorari to quash order dated 6th February. 1985 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) whereby the District Judge (acting as revisional authority under Section 18, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (for short called 'the Act') allowed the revision and set aside the order of allotment dated 10th September. 1980 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) passed by the Delegated Authority under Section 16 of the Act in favour of the petitioner.
2. One Nawab Singh tenant was allotted present accommodation in question (a residential accommodation in the city of Meerut).
Nawab Singh vacated the said accommodation. Landlord exercised his right to nominate an allottee. Some other persons also applied for allotment of the said accommodation. The rent control authority passed allotment order in favour of Shalender Kumar Saxena and Mahabir Prashad Saxena. The said allottees did not have nomination in their favour from the landlord. Landlord filed Revision No. 309 of 1976, He pleaded that the accommodation of ground floor and first floor could not be treated as independent accommodations and, therefore, Section 17 (2) of the Act, which conferred a right of nomination, was not attracted. The revisional court allowed said Revision No. 309 of 1976 vide Judgment and order dated 27th September, 1977 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition). The matter being considered by the delegated authority, allotment order dated 16th December, 1977 was passed in favour of one Pradeep Kumar, who was posted in Meerut as Sales-tax Officer (Annexure-2 to the writ petition).
3. It appears that a release application under Section 21 of the Act was filed by the landlord. Prescribed Authority decided release application on the basis of a compromise executed by landlord and aforesaid Pradeep Kumar vide order dated 18th January, 1980 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition).
4. It appears that aforementioned Pradeep Kumar was transferred. Address of said Pradeep Kumar, after transfer, has not been disclosed.
5. Allotment order dated 16th December, 1977, aforementioned (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) shows that accommodation was allotted to Pradeep Kumar in his personal name and not in his official capacity as Sales-tax Officer. It is also admitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the order of compromise recorded by the Prescribed Authority dated 18th January. 1980 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) has not been challenged. The learned counsel for the petitioner has proceeded on the basis that notwithstanding said application for compromise, the present petitioner has 3 right to rely upon an order of delegated authority wherein it held that Rule 17 (2) was not applicable as the accommodations on ground floor and first floor were independent accommodations.
6. Apparently, Pradeep Kumar having left the accommodation, applications for allotment were filed. Rent Control Inspector submitted his report dated 3rd July, 1980 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition] and mentioned that one S, N. Pandey, Sales-tax Officer, who has come from Faizabad was living in the accommodation in question.
7. Vacancy was declared on 5th July, 1980. An allotment order dated 10th September, 1980 was passed in favour of the petitioner (Annexure-5 to the writ petition). Revision filed by landlord has been allowed by means of judgment and order dated 6th February. 1984 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition).
8. In the very beginning, it may be stated that the delegated authority itself passed an order dated 30th November, 1978 and held that provisions of Rule 17 (2) were not applicable to the case because premises in dispute was partly in possession of the landlord and the staircase for going to the first floor was common and the same could not be used independently. This order stands and holds good.
9. The main thrust of the petitioner is that the order of compromise dated 18th January, 1980 and order dated 30th November, 1978 (Annexures-3 and 7 to the writ petition respectively) were obtained in collusion with the landlord.
10. Mere fact that allottee entered into compromise with landlady cannot lead to the inference that the same is collusive. Moreover, the petitioner ought to have challenged or applied for recalling of the said order. Unless these orders stand, they cannot be ignored. Moreover, the petitioner has not disclosed the date of transfer of Pradeep Kumar. Whole record of the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act nor relevant material is available to appreciate of the proximity of dates and draw an irresistible inference or collusion.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in 1982 ARC 322. Paragraph 5 of the said decision shows that outgoing tenant had intimated vacancy which was actually notified and thereafter compromise entered into. This Court held that a person who had no interest in the accommodation in question, had no right to enter into compromise. The facts of the present case are entirely different. Apart from above, the petitioner has failed to aver that in the instant case compromise was entered after intimation of the vacancy and/or declaration of vacancy.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner then referred to Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and others, AIR 1978 SC 22. In the said case, question was regarding the fact of compromise decree.
13. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, compromise order between Pradeep Kumar and the landlady is being sought to be challenged by the petitioner who was a stranger to the proceedings in the compromise so recorded. The case referred to above Smt. Nai Bahu is clearly distinguishable on fact.
14. On behalf of the petitioner, reference has been made to AIR 1975 SC 915. In the said decision. Supreme Court observed that requirement of satisfaction by authority in the manner prescribed by rule is the substance of the matter and not an empty formality. Supreme Court held that requirement as to the recording of its satisfaction by the authority in the manner prescribed by Rule, is the substance of the matter and not an empty formality. In the present case, it cannot be said that there has been even substantial compliance with statutory requirement. In the instant case, petitioner has neither pleaded in the petition nor pointed out in his argument as to the statutory requirement which has not been fulfilled while compromise order dated 18th January, 1980 was passed.
15. I have already noted above, the petitioner ought to have challenged the order of compromise dated 18th January, 1980 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition). This not having been done, the said order dated t8th January, 1980 cannot be allowed to be challenged collaterally and the said order of compromise cannot be ignored.
17. I fail to see the expediency or justification of obtaining said ex parte interim order. Impugned order dated 6th February. 1984 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) shows that no proceedings were contemplated to be taken in pursuance to the said order. On 9th August. 1984 another order was passed, which shows that eviction of the petitioner was stayed. The said interim order incorporate undertaking of the counsel for the landlady that he shall not evict the petitioner for a period of two months and no interim order as such was passed in favour of the petitioner. Record shows that an application was filed by the petitioner and this Court on 9th January, 1985 passed following order :
" K. P. Singh, J.--Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The petitioner shall not be evicted from the disputed accommodation until further orders of this Court,"
18. In paragraph 15 of the counter-affidavit, landlord has contended that relevant dates have been concealed by the petitioner in the writ petition. In paragraph 18, it is further stated that petitioner with the help of anti-social elements illegally and forcibly broke locks of the premises and removed household goods of the deponent and occupied the disputed accommodation without complying with the provisions of Section 16 (4) of the Act read with Rule 14 of the Rules and possession was thus taken on 15th September, 1980. Landlord also states that he filed a First information Report (Annexure-C.A, 5 to the counter-affidavit).
19. It is clear that petitioner was not in possession when he filed the petition and that is why he did not press for obtaining interim order to protect his dispossession. Order dated 21sl March, 1984 (whereby this Court directed that no further proceedings be taken in pursuance of order dated 6th February, 1984, Annexurc-6 to the writ petition) was apparently meaningless,
20. Evidently the landlord took law in his own hands and without resorting to the procedure contemplated under law took forcible possession and committed criminal offence. After entering into the accommodation in an unscrupulous manner, petitioner obtained interim order from this Court for protecting his illegal and unauthorised possession.
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner made submission with reference to Section 21 (3) proviso which places a statutory obligation on District Magistrate to exercise right to oppose application for release in case where a tenant, being a servant of Government or local authority or of public sector corporation does not contest the application.
22. I have already observed that in the instant case allotment order was in favour of Pradeep Kumar and not in favour of an officer of Government by designation. Allotment order was not with reference to "office" or "designation".
23. There is nothing in the petition to show that such application was not contested by Pradeep Kumar. As already mentioned, date of transfer (of Pradeep Kumar) has not been disclosed to enable this Court to find out what was the proximity of events so as to infer collusion or ulterior. The petitioner has also not brought on record sufficient material to show that Pradeep Kumar did not contest the case at all. In case release application was contested but on a subsequent date the tenant felt that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine and then entered into a compromise, no exception can be taken to ignore it.
24. The averment in paragraph 19 of the writ petition (which contains relevant legal ground--giving rise to the aforementioned legal submission of the petitioner) cannot be appreciated in absence of relevant material.
25. New set of pleas cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction. The Judgment and order dated 6th February, 1984 passed by revisional court does not show that such a plea was urged and pressed. This plea cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in writ proceedings.
26. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this Court passed interim order quite some time back in the past and, therefore, no exception can be taken at this stage by the Court. I fail to appreciate the argument. Interim orders are passed under different circumstances on different consideration. But normally they do not lay a precedent nor do they have evidentiary value. This Court has jurisdiction to appreciate entire record and adjudicate issues without any fetter on its power for the reason that this Court took certain view while deciding interim application.
27. The facts on record clearly show that petitioner took law in his own hand and unlawfully entered into accommodation in question by taking undue advantage of interim order in writ petition. The petitioner now seeks protection of his possession taken in unauthorised and illegal manner. It is certainly not permissible, particularly when he seeks remedy from this Court under Article 226. Constitution of India.
28. Considering the case from all aspects. I come to the conclusion that impugned order dated 6th February, 1984 does not suffer from manifest error apparent on the face of record. Writ petition is devoid of merits. Petitioner has also disentitled himself to seek reliefs from this Court under Article 226, Constitution of India as demonstrated above, by virtue of his own conduct.