1. The petitioner has assailed the award passed by the Lok Adalat in this writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Shesh Kumar Srivastava submits that the award is beyond jurisdiction. The Utter Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable to the facts of this case. He relies on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. Vs. Addl. Labour Commissioner and others1, and the judgment of this Court rendered in Sikta Mahoogarh Sadhan Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Vs. Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and others2.
3. Shri Saroj Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent contends that the respondent no.5 is a workman within the meaning of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
4. The facts material to the adjudication of this case lie in a narrow compass and are undisputed.
5. The respondent no. 5 was appointed as Class IV employee in the petitioner Institution. The petitioner Institution is an intermediate college which is under the grant-in-aid of the Government of U.P. The conditions of service and payment of salary of all employees and staff of the Institution including the petitioner are governed and regulated by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 as well as the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees) Act, 1971.
6. The aforesaid enactments are a complete code. The enactments are special legislations covering a specific field of law.
7. I see merit in the contention of Shri Shesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners that the labour court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining the industrial dispute even though its jurisdiction was ousted by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees) Act, 1971.
8. The ouster of jurisdiction of the labour court and the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in matters governed by special laws fell for consideration in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra).
9. The issue in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra) was whether the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, being a special enactment ousted the jurisdiction of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in matters covered by the former enactment. Invoking the well settled principles of interpretation of statues which contemplate that a special Act shall prevail over a general Act was held:
"61. The general legal principle in interpretation of statutes is that "the general Act should lead to the special Act". Upon this general principle of law, the intention of the U.P. Legislature is clear, that the special enactment U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 alone should apply in the matter of employment by cooperative societies to the exclusion of all other labour laws. It is a complete code in itself as regards employment in cooperative societies and its machinery and provisions. The general Act, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as a whole has and can have no applicability and stands excluded after the enforcement of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. This is also clear from necessary implication that the legislature could not have intended head-on conflict and collision between authorities under different Acts."
10. The narrative in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra) placed reliance on the judgment rendered in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and others Vs. The Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others3, wherein it was observed:
"7. Applying these tests, we have no doubt at all that the dispute covered by the first issue referred to the Industrial Tribunal in the present cases could not possibly be referred for decision to the Registrar under Section 61 of the Act. The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute. The Registrar, it is clear from the provisions of the Act, could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed under this issue because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself. It is true that Section 61 by itself does not contain any clear indication that the Registrar cannot entertain a dispute relating to alteration of conditions of service of the employees of a registered society; but the meaning given to the expression "touching the business of the society", in our opinion, makes it very doubtful whether a dispute in respect of alteration of conditions of service can be held to be covered by this expression. Since the word "business" is equated with the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society, and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects, such as laying down the conditions of service of its employees, can be said to be a part of its business, it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the society. Further, the position is clarified by the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 62 of the Act which limit the power to be exercised by the Registrar, when dealing with a dispute referred to him under Section 61, by a mandate that he shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and bye-laws. On the face of it, the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws could not possibly permit the Registrar to change conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society. For the purpose of bringing facts to our notice in the present appeals, the rules framed by the Andhra Pradesh Government under the Act, and the bye-laws of one of the appellant Banks have been placed on the Paper-books of the appeals before us. It appears from them that the conditions of service of the employees of the Bank have all been laid down by framing special bye-laws. Most of the conditions of service, which the workmen want to be altered to their benefit, have thus been laid down by the by-laws, so that any alteration in those conditions of service will necessarily require a change in the bye-laws. Such a change could not possibly be directed by the Registrar when, under Section 62(4) of the Act, he is specifically required to decide the dispute referred to him in accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws. It may also be noticed that a dispute referred to the Registrar under Section 61 of the Act can even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator by the Registrar. Such person or arbitrator, when deciding the dispute, will also be governed by the mandate in Section 62(4) of the Act, so that he will also be bound to reject the claims of the workmen which is nothing else than a request for alteration of conditions of service contained in the bye-laws. It is thus clear that, in respect of the dispute relating to alteration of various conditions of service, the Registrar or other person dealing with it under Section 62 of the Act is not competent to grant the relief claimed by the workmen at all. On the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd., therefore, it must be held that this dispute is not a dispute covered by the provisions of Section 61 of the Act. Such a dispute is not contemplated to be dealt with under Section 62 of the Act and must, therefore, be held to be outside the scope of Section 61"
11. Elaborating further exclusion of the jurisdiction of a general Act in matters covered by the special Act in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra), it was concluded:
"63. Also if we refer to the general principles of statutory interpretation as discussed by G.P. Singh, in his treatise on Principles of Statutory Interpretation, we can observe that, a prior general Act may be affected by a subsequent particular or special Act if the subject-matter of the particular Act prior to its enforcement was being governed by the general provisions of the earlier Act. In such a case the operation of the particular Act may have the effect of partially repealing the general Act, or curtailing its operation, or adding conditions to its operation for the particular cases. The distinction may be important at times for determining the applicability of those provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (the Interpretation Act, 1889 of UK, now the Interpretation Act, 1978) which apply only in case of repeals.
64. A general Act's operation may be curtailed by a later special Act even if the general Act will be more readily inferred when the later special Act also contains an overriding non obstante provision. Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956) provides that when the winding-up order is passed or the Official Liquidator is appointed as a provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of winding-up order shall be proceeded with against the company except by leave of the court. Under Section 446(2), the Company Court, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force is given jurisdiction to entertain any suit, proceeding or claim by or against the company and decide any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding-up. The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (Act 31 of 1956) constituted a tribunal and Section 15 of the Act enabled Life Insurance Corporation to file a case before the tribunal for recovery of various amounts from the erstwhile Life Insurance Companies in certain respects. Section 41 of the LIC Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal in these matters. On examination of these Acts, it was held [Damji Valji Shah v. LIC of India, AIR 1966 SC 135] that the provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal being provisions of the special Act i.e. the LIC Act prevailed over the aforesaid provisions of the general Act viz. the Companies Act which is an Act relating to companies in general and, therefore, the tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with a claim of Life Insurance Corporation against a former insurer which had been ordered to be wound up by the Company Court. This case [Damji Valji Shah v. LIC of India, AIR 1966 SC 135] was followed [(2000) 4 SCC 406] in giving to the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (the RDB Act) overriding effect over the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The RDB Act constitutes a tribunal and by Sections 17 and 18 confers upon the tribunal exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts (defined to mean any liability which is claimed as due). The Act also lays down the procedure for recovery of the debt as per the certificate issued by the tribunal. The provisions of the RDB Act, which is a special Act, were held [(2000) 4 SCC 406] to prevail over Sections 442, 446, 537 and other sections of the Companies Act which is a general Act, more so because Section 34 of the RDB Act gives overriding effect to that Act by providing that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.
65. We are therefore of the view that the Assistant Labour Commissioner's (ALC) jurisdiction was wrongly invoked and his order dated 15-3-2003 under Section 6-H, U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is without jurisdiction and hence null and void and it can be observed that, in view of the said general legal principle, it is immaterial whether or not the Government has enforced Section 135 (U.P. Cooperative Societies Act) because, in any case the said provision (Section 135) had been included in the Act only by way of clarification and abundant caution."
12. Similarly, the jurisdiction of the prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, to entertain the claims of an employee of the Co-operative Society who is governed by the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, was ousted in Sikta Mahoogarh Sadhan Sahkari Samiti Limited Vs. Prescribed Authority under the Payement of Wages Act, 1936 and others4, in view of the law laid down in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra), this Court opined as under:
"19. Be that as it may, I am clearly of the opinion that issue in question stands covered by judgment of Apex Court in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra) and therefore, since no Labour Laws would be applicable in respect to service dispute of an employee and cooperative society inter se, Prescribed Authority, under Act, 1936, had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 15 and therefore, impugned orders are patently illegal and without jurisdiction."
13. In this case the services and rights of the respondent no. 5 are governed exclusively by the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees) Act, 1971. Both the enactments are comprehensive in nature and squarely cover the dispute before the labour court. The law laid down in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank (supra) as well as Sikta Mahoogarh (supra) will be squarely applicable to the facts to this case. The jurisdiction of the labour court and the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the facts of this case was ousted by virtue of the operation of the UP Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees) Act, 1971.
14. In wake of the preceding discussion, the labour court exceeded its jurisdiction by passing the impugned award dated 27.04.2015. The award dated 27.04.2015 and the consequential proceedings taken out under Section 6H(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are liable to be set aside and are set aside.
15. The writ petition is allowed.
Order Date :- 17.8.2021 Dhananjai