JUDGMENT S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. Petitioner has instituted this petition aggrieved by the judgment/order of the Addl. Commissioner dated March 3,2005 passed in revision which was preferred against the judgment and order of the trial court dated 3.11.2004 by which restoration applications dated 19.1.2004 and 14.9.2004 were allowed and exparte decree passed by the trial court dated 28.10.2003 was set aside.
2. The factual matrix is this. The property in dispute consists of Plot no. 208/2 admeasuring 63 acre and plot no. 208/6 admeasuring 5 decimal situated in village Ruppanpur alias Paigambarpur, Pargana Shivpur Tahsil and District Varanasi, This land was initially recorded in the name of Sri Sita Ramji Trust Situated in village Pul Kuhna Pargana Shivpur Tahsil and District Varanasi. The plaintiff-petitioner instituted suit under Section 229B of the U.P.Z.A, & L.R.Act before Sub Divisional Officer Varanasi for the relief of declaring him as bhumidhar over the land in suit, to the exclusion of Sri Sita Ramji Trust aforestated. The claim of the petitioner was founded on the premises that he had acquired rights by adverse possession; that Sri Sita Ramj Ji Trust was impleaded as defendant No. 1 through Shanker La Kapoor and Jitgendra Lal Kapoor both sons of Panna Lal Kapoor resident of CK 8/100 Garhwasi Tola Chowk City Varanasi that the defendant No. 1 did not appear and the suit proceeded exparte and it culminated in decree on 2.8.10.2003. It would appear from the record that an application was moved by Defendant Sri Sita Ram Ji Trust through Smt. Shanti Devi widow of late Sri Jangi Lal Kapoor, former Manager of the Trust on the ground that Jangi Lal Kapoor was the manager of the Trust and the applicant was his widow also stating that the property vested in the trust and that the plaintiff filed the suit in collusion with Shanker Lal and Jitendra Lal Kapoor; that the plaintiff was not in possession over the land and further that the Trust never entered into compromise admitting the adverse possession of the plaintiff over the land, nor plaintiff. It was further stated therein that the order was obtained behind the back of the actual Manager in collusion with the persons impleaded as managers. The objection was filed by plaintiff in which he has admitted that Jangi Lal Kapoor was the manager of the Trust who died on 2.12.90. He further submitted that Smt. Shanti Devi was not elected in any capacity after the death of Jangi Lal Kapoor and she thus was not a party and therefore, no right to file recall application accrued in her favour. It was further stated that there was compromise between Shanker Lal Kapoor and Jitendra Lal Kapoor on one hand and plaintiff on the other hand, in which possession of plaintiff was admitted. It was also alleged that two restoration-applications were filed in the matter and by means of order dated 3.11.2004, the restoration application was allowed and exparte decree was set aside and suit was restored to its number.
3. Initially, Sri Shashi Nandan, Learned Senior advocate argued the case in this matter and subsequently Sri Sankatha Rai, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Manish Kumar Srivastava argued the case at prolix length.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed that the Trust cannot be represented through Shanti Devi as Shanti Devi was not a party to the proceeding and no application to restore the suit could be filed by her. It was further canvassed that adverse rights also accrued in favour of petitioner against the Trust and Deity and as such the suit was rightly decreed. The learned counsel further canvassed that Smt. Shanti Devi claimed herself to be Sarvakar of the Trust but there is not an(sic) of evidence on record that she was ever admitted as Sarvakar of the Trust and as such the impugned order is liable to be quashed.
5. Sri S.P. Lal learned counsel who represented caveators i.e. the persons who alleged themselves to be the signatories to the compromise pertaining to plots in suit under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. L.R.Act against the interest of the Trust, contended that the restoration application was rightly allowed and Sri Shanker Lal and Jitendra Lal are the real Managers of the Trust and further that the suit was rightly restored to its number. He further contended that no adverse rights could accrue to the Trust as property vested in Sri Sita Ram Mandir.
6. I have considered the arguments made across the bar. In the conspectus of facts on record and arguments made across the bar, following questions crystallise-
(1) Whether any person who feels affected by the order and exparte decree may prefer application to recall under Section 151 of the C.P.C and get the exparte decree set aside.
(2) Whether in view of the findings of the courts below that no summons were served even on Sarvakar of Sita Ram Trust through whom the Deity was represented in the suit, any adverse rights could accrue in property vested in Deity and any person can claim bhumidhar on the basis of adverse possession,
7. From a perusal of the record, it clearly transpires that the land in suit was recorded in the revenue records in the name of Sita Ram Jai Maharaj Virajman Mandir. It further transpires that suit filed by the petitioners impleading the Trust through Shanker Lal Kapoor and Jitendra Lal Kapoor major sons of Panna Lal Kapoor for declaration as Bhumidhar on the basis of adverse possession spanning over 30 years. It also transpires from the record that suit proceeded exparte as Opposite parties were not represented contest not having been made by the State, the suit culminated in exparte decree.
8. It is also eloquent from the record an application was filed by Smt. Shanti Devi claiming herself to be in actual control over the affairs of Management of Sri Sita Ramji Trust after the death of her husband namely Jangi Lal Kapoor stating therein that in suit no. 4 of 2000 filed by Smt. Shanti Devi in the court of Addl. Civil Judge, some orders were passed in her favour, It was further stated in the application that Shanker Lal Kapoor and Jitendra Lal Kapoor were not Sarvakar of the Trust and they made a collusive combination with the plaintiff and appear to have entered into a compromise, which by all reckoning was forged one. It was further prayed that delay if any may be condoned. In opposition to it, opposite parties admitted that Jangi Lal Kapoor was the manager of the Trust who died on 2.12.1990. It was further urged that after the death of Jangi Lal Kapoor, Shanker Lal and Jitendra Lal stepped into his shoes as Manager and that Smt. Shanti Devi was neither a necessary party nor a formal party and therefore, she was not an aggrieved party and had no right to institute the suit in question. It brooks no dispute from a perusal of the record that application seeking to set aside the decree was also filed attended with an affidavit by Shanker Lal Kapoor on the ground that notices were not served.
9. The trial court after reckoning with entire evidence on record in the matter of appointment of Sarvakar of the Trust in another proceeding before the civil court converged to the conclusion that notices were seized to the defendants only by affixation. It is also revealed from the finding that the trial court found that there was an order for service by publication but no publication was made with regard to Jitendra Lal Kapoor. The trial court further found that land in dispute belonged to the Trust and in suit no. 239 of 1990 Shanker Lal had already impleaded Jangi Lal and Smt. Shanti Devi wife of Jangi Lal present applicant and Smt. Shanti Devi also filed an affidavit in execution case no. 4 of 2000 which she instituted in the capacity of Trustee and therefore, it was concluded, she was an interested part/ in the suit. Since she claimed herself to be Manager of the Trust after the death of her husband and also regard being had to the fact that litigation was underway between Shanker Lal and Jitendra Lal on one hand and Smt. Shanti Devi Opp. party on the other hand in relation to appointment of Savakar, and in case any order was passed exparte in relation to property vesting in Deity, she was found to be adversely affected party and after considering this the trial court allowed the restoration application. A revision preferred by petitioner was dismissed and decree of the trial court was affirmed.
10. In the above perspective the first question whether a person who feels adversely affected may file application to recall the order of Exparte decree begs to be answered first being the pivotal question having bearing on the other questions to be answered in this case.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed credence on a number of judgments to prop up his stand that Shanti Devi was not Sarvakar or Manager of the Trust further urging that a person having mere right of worship had no right to sue on behalf of Deity. He further canvassed that a person who is not party to the proceeding is not bound by a decree therefore the petition instituted by Smt. Shanti Devi was not maintainable and to vindicate his stand, the learned counsel relied upon 1982 A.L.J. 99 and 2002 RD 109. The learned counsel also relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1970 All. 509 in support of his case in which it has been held that the title vests in the Deity and not in Mutawalli and also in support of the argument that a right of Bhumidhari does not accrue either in his favour or in favour of Mutawalli. The quintessence of what has been held by the Full Bench may be excerpted below as contained in para 9 of the said decision.
"A review of the authoritative judicial pronouncements on the subject will show that the consensus of judicial opinion, is overwhelmingly in favour of the proposition that the wakf property vests in God Almighty and not in the Mutwalli."
It is eloquent from a further perusal of the decision that the Full Bench copiously relied upon a decision of Privy Council reported in AIR 1922 PC 123. The decision of the P.C. may be referred to being of pivotal importance on the subject. The Full Bench in its decision was seized of the matter in the perspective of the controversy pertaining to Wakf property and in connection with the controversy; it relied copiously on the decision of Privy Council (supra). The decision of Privy Council on the other hand related to a dispute of Mutt property and while dealing with the dispute, the Privy Council held as, under;
"It is to be remembered that a "trust" in the sense in which the expression is used in English Law, is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency. Called by whatever name, the agent is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution. In no case is the property conveyed to or vested in him; nor is he a trustee in the English sense of the term, although in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for mal-administration."
12. The Full Bench while adopting the principles laid down in its decision by the Privy Council held that the wakf property vests in God Almighty and not in the Mutwalli. In its decision the Privy Council held that the agent is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution and in no case property is conveyed or vested in him.
13. In reply to the above argument that a person who is not a party to a suit cannot move an application for restoration of proceeding, Sri S.P. Lal representing the Opp. parties contended that applicants were interested in the matter and as no notice was served to the Sarvakars, the exparte decree was rightly set aside. He further contended that no adverse right accrued to a person against a Deity which in law is to be treated as minor incapable of giving any consent and as such even if the plaintiff claims herself to be in possession it cannot be without the consent as required under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R.Act. In view of the above, the question that now arises is whether in the facts stated above, where admittedly husband of Smt. Shanti Devi, Opp. Party was a Manager of the Trust and lady claims herself to be the Manager after death of her husband and civil litigation was going on between them who claimed themselves to be the Managers. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, where admittedly, it is established that Shanti Devi had interest in the suit, she had right to defend the interest of Sri Sita Ram Jia Maharaj Virajman Mandir established by the Trust which is in the nature of Public temple open for worship of the entire society. In connection with the point at issue, decision reported in 1982 Vol 8 ALR 22 Suraj Deo v. Board of Revenue may be referred to. In that case, an exparte decree was passed against Gaon Sabha. A person having interest in the property of Gaon Sabha filed an application for setting aside the exparte decree on the ground that no Bhumidhari rights could accrue and property in dispute was property of Gaon Sabha covered by water used by the villagers and all these thing were not brought to the notice of the court decreeing the suit the applicants claimed to be adversely affected by the decree;. This court entertained the application and held that petitioner being vitally interested and right of Gaon Sabha was adversely affected by the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff had a right to seek for setting aside decree under Section 151 C.P.C. In rendering the decision, the Court relied upon various decisions on the point and ultimately concluded as under:
"Placing reliance upon the aforesaid observations, I think that in the present case the petitioner was vitally interested in the decree passed in favour of the contesting opposite parties which he wants to be vacated. If the decrees in favour of the contesting opposite parties remain intact, the petitioner's right of irrigating his fields from the disputed land shall be vitally affected. In such circumstances even if the petitioner is assumed to have no locus standi to move the application for setting aside the exparte decrees in favour of the contesting opposite parties, it cannot be said that the trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside the exparte decrees which were against the provisions of law and were result of collusion and fraud practised by the plaintiff and the defendants in the suits in which decrees recognizing the claim of the contesting opposite parties in the disputed land as Sirdari were passed. I have a strong feeling that the trial court while passing decrees I favour of the contesting opposite parties had blatantly ignored the provisions of Section 132 read with Section 195 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, hence it acted rightly in setting right its own wrong through the order dated 10.6.1969."
14. The Apex Court in AIR 1967 SC 1044 was also seized of similar question in which the Apex Court held in para 10 as under:
"The question is, can such a person represent the idol when the Shebait acts adversely to its interest and fails to take action to safeguard its interest. On principle we do not see any justification for denying such a right to the worshipper. An idol is in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in a lurch a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interest.
The above principles can be called in for application to the present case wherein the Deity or Trust is defendant and as such if the so-called Manager of the Trust and Sarvakar of is not able to defend or had colluded with the plaintiff, it is the right of other persons who are interested to defend the property of the Deity and may be adversely affected in case the property is grabbed or occupied through the process of judicial proceeding.
15. In the present case, from a perusal of the record, it is explicit that according to the plaint allegations, Shanker Lal and Jitendra Lal sons of Panna Lal filed a suit for eviction which they compromised on 28th Dec 1980 in favour of petitioners. Annexure 3 to the writ petition may also be referred to which is a compromise from a perusal of which it would appear that on behalf of Trust, Shanker Lal and Jitendra Lal admitted the possession of the defendants since 1977. In this compromise, it was also admitted by Shanker Lal and Jitendra Lal that petitioner was bhumidhar further admitting that right of trust had come to an end. It is also spelt out in the compromise that petitioner would make sufficient contribution. in the worship of Mandir established by Trust. It would thus transpire that admittedly, Sharker Lal and Jitendra Kumar were working to the detriment of the interest of Trust arid Deity and therefore, the application moved by Smt. Shanti Devi representing Sri Sita Ram Ji Maharaj Virajman Mandir established by Trust was rightly made to protect the interest and application was rightly allowed in the above perspective. In taking the above view, there appears to be no error of law apparent on the face of the record.
16. Now I proceed to deal with the case-laws cited across the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The decision cited is Puwada Venkateswara v. C.V. Ramana, AIR 1976 SC 869. The quintessence of this decision is that registered notice sent by registered post shall be presumed to be correct. From a scrutiny of this decision, it would appear that it was a case pertaining to dispute between landlord and tenant and the question revolved round service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Having considered this decision from all ramifications, I am of the view that the decision cited by the learned cannot be called in aid for application to the facts of the represent and is quite distinguishable inasmuch as in the present case the court below did not accept the sending of notice by registered post as sufficient service and directed notice to be served by publication and admittedly according to the finding of the court below the notices were not published for service on Jitendra Kumar.
17. The present petition has been preferred against two orders passed by authorities below whereby exparte decree had been set aside. I have scrutinized the entire materials on record and findings of the courts below. The impugned orders do not suffer from any error of law apparent o the face of the record. The findings of facts were recorded after careful consideration of evidence in correct perspective and therefore, the order does not call for any interference.
18. So far as question whether petitioner may acquire any bhumidhari rights against a Deity, the learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed that the petitioner may acquire bhumidhari rights even if the property is recorded in the name of Deity on the basis of possession otherwise than in accordance with law. I am not inclined to enter upon this controversy at this stage as the impugned orders in the present writ petition are orders setting aside the exparte decree and the trial court will proceed anew to decide the suit itself on merits in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the parties referred to various case-laws and the relevant provisions contained in different enactments in this regard. As stated supra, since I do not propose to enter upon controversy, and instead, am relegating the matter to the trial court, the case laws and the relevant provisions contained in different enactment such as Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, Sections 209 and 210 of the U.P.Z.A. & LR. Act relied upon by the learned counsels before: this Court may be canvassed before the trial court which may consider the: same also taking into reckoning that according to the settled position in law, discussed above, the Deity which is recorded as Bhumidhar of the land in dispute, is in the capacity of a minor and thus incapable of giving any consent. It will also take into consideration that even if the plaintiff succeeds to establish his possession, whether such possession could be construed to be without consent of the Bhumidhar as required under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. & LR. Act. The trial court while trying the suit on merits, may also take into account all other provisions including Sections 133, 157, 21 (h) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act along with other provisions which may be brought to the notice of the court in the course of trial of the suit.
19. In the above perspective, the petition being devoid of merits fails and is dismissed accordingly.