JUDGMENT O.P. Garg, J.
1. By means of this writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is prayed that the order dated July 4, 1994 passed by the respondent No. 1 Committee of Management, Madarsa Hanfia Able Sunnat Bahrul Uloom, Mau Nath Bhanjan, District Mau be quashed and the respondents be commanded to pay full salary to the petitioner w.e.f, July, 1993 along with all consequential benefits.
2. The facts leading to the present petition are that there is an institution, namely, Madarsa Hanfia Ante Sunnat Bahrul Uloom, at Mau Nath Bhanjan, Mau. The said institution is in the list of grants-in-aid of the State Government and imparts education from Tehtantia to Alia, i.e., Primary to B.A. The teachers and other employees of the institution are being paid salary through the State fund. The petitioner, Shamshad Ahmad, was initially appointed on March 1, 1980 as an Assistant Teacher in Tehtantia. On March 1,1986, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Teacher, Alia. He had worked up to June, 1993 on the said post and had been paid salary till that period. On April 3, 1993, the petitioner was suspended by the Committee of Management - Respondent No. 1 as a disciplinary enquiry was contemplated against him. A charge sheet, dated September 16, 1993 (Annexure 12) was served on the petitioner, who submitted his reply dated October 11, 1993, Annexure 13. An additional charge sheet dated February 19, 1994, Annexure 14 was also served on the petitioner and due reply was also given by the petitioner to the said supplementary charge-sheet. Since the petitioner had some grievance about the conduct of enquiry and the manner in which it was proceeding, he had to institute Civil Misc. Writ No.7705 of 1994 before this Court, wherein certain directions were issued. The Committee of Enquiry, which consisted of S/Sri Mohd. Muslim and Akhtar Hasan submitted report on May 28, 1994 (Annexure 21). The Committee of Management - Respondent No. 1 after taking into consideration the report of enquiry adopted a resolution on July 4, 1994 (Annexure 20) to terminate/remove the petitioner from service. It is this order of termination/removal from service, which has been challenged in the present writ petition on various grounds, including that the enquiry has not been conducted fairly and impartially and since it is tainted, the report of enquiry is liable to be set aside and that the copy of enquiry report was never supplied to the petitioner and, therefore, the order dated July 4, 1994 removing/terminating him from service is vitiated.
3. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged in the present case and, therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for both the parties, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage.
4. Besides the validity, or otherwise of the report of enquiry, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Prakash Padia urged that the impugned order of removal/termination of services of the petitioner, dated July 4, 1994 is illegal, as it has not been approved by the Inspector, Arabic Madarsas, U.P., Allahabad. Learned Standing Counsel urged that no approval of the Inspector, Arabic Madarsas, U.P., is required in the instant case and as contemplated by Rule 34 of the U.P. Recognition of Non-Governmental Arabian and Persian School Rules, only transmission of the proceedings of enquiry was to be made to the Inspector by the Management Committee. Rule 34 is at page 46 of the writ petition. Translated into English, it would read as follows:
"34. In case the Committee of Management decides to terminate the services of any teacher or employee it will be necessary to take legal proceedings before termination/removal. Complete details of proceedings shall be forwarded to the Inspector Arabic Madarsas, U.P., Allahabad. In case there is any irregularity in the proceedings, the Inspector shall have the power to make his suggestions to the Committee of Management. "
A bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the order of termination/removal would be effective without the approval of the Inspector, Arabic Madarsas. The rule does not envisage that the termination/removal order should be approved or disapproved by the Inspector. The Inspector has been authorised only to make suggestions, if any. The learned counsel or the petitioner made a reference to an order dated December 2,1991 issued by the Director, Urdu, U.P., Lucknow to Basic Shiksha Adikari and the order dated December 17, 1991 addressed by the Inspector, Arabic Madarsas, U.P., Allahabad to Managers of all Arabic Madarsas in U.P. who are in the list of grants-in-atd, in which the provisions of Rule 34 have been interpreted to mean that the order of termination/removal shall not be acceptable or effective till it is approved by the Inspector, Arabic Madarsas, U.P., Allahabad. Learned counsel further urged that where the rule is silent or is not clear, the departmental orders should be given due precedence, In support of his contention, he placed reliance on State of Sikkim v. DorjiTsheringBhutia,(l993-Ill-LU(SKLpp\.)-47)(SC), in which it was observed that where the statutory provisions are unworkable and inoperative, Government can exercise its executive power. Reference was also made to Lalit Mohan Deb and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1972 SC 995, Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab (1975-I-LU- 228) (SC). According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the administrative instructions following a Government decision specifying particular mode of exercise for implementation of such Government decision cannot be said to be an exercise in futility.nor it can be ignored or overlooked. The Government decision, it as urged, has to be implemented and the modalities of such implementation may be exercisced through the guidelines laid down by the administrative instructions. In the view of the learned counsel, the administrative instructions, which follow a Government decision, cannot be ignored. I have given thoughtful consideration to the matter. Dorji's case (supra) is applicable only in those cases where the statutory provisions are either unworkable or inoperative. There is no controversy that Rule 34, 'quoted above, is either unworkable or inoperative. The other two rulings, referred to above, are also of no help to the petitioner for one simple reason that there is a specific rule consciously made to deal with the procedure for termination/removal of the employees, including the teachers working in Arabian/Persian Madarsas. The only requirement under the rule is that the Committee of Management shall proceed against an employee according to procedure prescribed by law and that after completing the enquiry, the complete record of the proceedings shall be. transmitted to the Inspector, Arabic Madarsas, U. P., Allahabad, who, if he notices any illegality, may make certain suggestions to the Committee of Management. This does not require the Inspector either to affirm or reverse, i.e., to approve or disapprove the order of termination/removal passed by the Committee of Management. The instructions issued in the two letters, referred to above, dated December 2, 1991 of Director Urdu, U.P., Lucknow are obviously based on the misreading of Rule 34, and consequently a wrong interpretation, contrary to statutory provisions, has been put by the authorities. These instructions are not legally sustainable and have to be ignored. In the instant case, it is not averred that the Inspector, Arabic Madarsas, U.P., Allahabad, after receiving the complete details of the enquiry proceedings, has made any suggestion to the Committee of Management with the result it would be deemed that the Inspector was in agreement with the decision of Committee of Management to remove/terminate the services of the petitioner, as he had no suggestions to make.
5. Now comes the question whether the enquiry has been properly conducted against the petitioner and the procedure adopted in conducting the enquiry is according to law or not. The various submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner in attacking the impartiality of the members of the Enquiry Committee and challenging the procedure adopted by them are wide off the mark. The jurisdiction of this Court in sifting the matter relating to enquiry is quite limited. If the procedure prescribed for enquiry has been adopted, principles of natural justice followed, and reasonable view of the evidence has been taken in arriving at the particular conclusion, the writ Court would be slow enough to interfere with the finding recorded by the enquiry committee or to re-appraise them.
6. I have perused the enquiry report and found that the findings recorded against the petitioner cannot be said to be perverse or based on no material or such as no reasonable man of ordinary prudence can arrive at. The charges against the petitioner were serious. To quote a few, he did not attend Republic Day celebrations in the year, 1993; he resorted to groupism against the teachers; levelled wild allegations against the Principal and management; engineered baseless complaints besides remaining absent in an unauthorised manner and disobeying the orders of his superiors. All the above charges were found to be correct on enquiry.
7. A faint suggestion was made by Shri Prakash Padia, learned counsel for the petitioner that no reasonable opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner to place his point of view before the enquiry committee and that: the findings of the enquiry committee are virtually ex-pane. This submission has been stated to be rejected. The record of enquiry indicates that the enquiry committee has, time and again, intimated the petitioner to participate in the enquiry. After receiving the orders passed in Civil Misc. Writ No.7705 of 1994, filed by the petitioner, the enquiry committee took the precaution of informing the petitioner at every stage but on some occasions, it was the peti-: tioner who himself failed to appear before the inquiry committee inspite of due notice to him. In these circumstances, the enquiry committee had no option but to proceed with the matter. The petitioner had submitted his reply to the; charge sheet as well as supplementary charge' sheet. He was afforded due opportunity to lead evidence in support of his defence but it was not availed by the petitioner. After taking into-con-sideration the material collected by the enquiry committee, findings were recorded. The enquiry report cannot be said to be tainted or partial on any count.
8. The only point with which the petitioner would either swim or sink is the legal question whether it was necessary to supply a copy of the report of enquiry before passing the order dated July 4,1994 terminating the services of the petitioner. The fate of this petition would turn one way or the other only on the finding on this point. Admittedly report of the enquiry was never supplied to the petitioner before passing of the order of termination/removal on July 4, 1994. The report of enquiry, for the first time was annexed with the order of termination of the services of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that supply of the enquiry report with the termination order is not sufficient compliance of the well established principles of natural justice and consequently in the absence of providing the copy of enquiry before passing the order of punishment has the effect of vitiating the entire enquiry or at least the final order of punishment. To fortify his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991-I-LU-29) (SC), in which the effect of not providing the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent before the passing of the order of punishment has been elaborately discussed. It was held that the delinquent employee is entitled to a copy of the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer to the disciplinary authority and to make representation against it. This rule, however, is inapplicable where the disciplinary authority itself is the enquiry officer. It was further held that non-furnishing of the report of enquiry would amount to violation of principles of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter. Reliance was also placed on Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad and others v. B.Karunakar and others (1994-I-LLJ-162) (SC). In this case, it was authoritatively held that denial of right to get copy of the enquiry report amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity and violation of Articles 14 and 21 and principles of natural justice, and that, this rule of providing the copy of enquiry report before passing the order of punishment extends to all establishments, Government, public and private sector undertakings. It operates irrespective of whether statute provides for or delinquent asks for the same or not.
9. On the basis of the seminal decisions of the Supreme Court, it is now well settled proposition of !aw, which admits of no doubt or controversy that a delinquent employee, as of necessity, has to be provided with a copy of enquiry report in order to enable him to make a representation before the passing of the order of punishment, if any. in the instant case, the order of punishment was straightaway passed on the basis of the report of enquiry submitted to the Managing Committee and that the report of enquiry was never supplied to the petitioner before terminating his services by order dated July 4, 1994. As said above, the report of enquiry i was annexed only with the impugned order by which the service of the petitioner was terminated. The petitioner has been seriously prejudiced in making a representation against the report of enquiry. There has been flagrant violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, the requirement of supply of the copy of the enquiry report is the integral part of trie procedure established by law in cases in which the delinquent employee is proceeded against departmentally. The order dated July 4, 1994, Annexure 20 to the writ petition, therefore, stands vitiated on account of non-compliance of the essential requirement of supplying a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner before passing the order of termination.
10. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated July 4, 1994 (Annexure 20 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. Since a copy of enquiry report has been supplied to the petitioner along with the impugned order of punishment, he shall now make a representation, if any, within one month from today before the Committee of Management - Respondent No.l, which in its turn, shall pass fresh appropriate orders after taking into consideration the representation made by the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the representation of the petitioner. The question of payment of salary to the petitioner for the period from July, 1993 onwards, as claimed by him, shall be subject to final decision/order that is to be taken/passed by the Respondent No. 1 - disciplinary authority in pursuance of this order.