ORDER D.K. Seth, J.
1. The petitioner case in the writ petition, inter alia, was that the route Muzaffarnagar Mawana-via Kukra Singha-wali Mansoorpur Nawia Khatauli Falawade, is about 52 Kms. The petitioners along with several others had applied for grant of permit for stage carriages on the said route Muzaffarnagar Mawana via Kukra Singawali Mansoorpur, village Mansoorpur, Nawala Khatauli Falawada.
2. Such application of the petitioners along with others were considered by the Regional Transport Authority (herein after-referred to as R.T.A.) in its meeting held on 26-9-1994. The R.T.A. granted permits to all the applications, who had applied till 26-9-1994. Since the petitioner has also applied within 26-9-1994, they were also intimated about the grant of Permits in their favour and were asked by letter dated 10-10-1994 to left their permits within fifteen days. It was contended by the petitioners that before granting permits, the strength of the route was fixed as 35 buses on the basis of report of the Assistant Regional Transport Officer (Enforcement), Muzaffarnagar, who had conducted a survey of the route.
3. The R.T.A. imposed conditions that since the strength of buses was ficed at 35, therefore, 35 permits would be granted on the basis of 'first come first serve.' The petitioners had made application on 25-10-1994 before the R.T.A. issuing the permits but the respondent No. 2 refused to entertain the said application on the ground the 35 permits have already been granted. It is alleged that till 25-10-1994 '35' permits were not issued by the R.T.A.
4. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents relied on the record, copy whereof has since been enclosed along with the writ petition, while supporting the action of the R.T.A. However, no counter-affidavit could be aserted in support of the allegation that till 25-10-1994 all the '35' permits were issued. However, this can very well be asserted by verification of the record.
5. In support of the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, he had relied on the judgment delivered by Lucknow Bench of this Court on 30-3-1994 in Writ Petition No. 145(M/B) of 1994, Ram Sewak v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. The said writ petition appears to have been disposed of by a common judgment delivered in Writ Petition No. 1756 (M/ B) of 1994, Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. He has relied on the Judgment reported in 1994 (24) ALR 246, Shyam Lal Gupta v. Regional Transport Authority. He has also relied on the passage in para 14 of the judgment reported in AIR 1992 SC 443 : (1991 All LJ 1167, Mithlesh Garg v. Union of India.
6. The question involved in the case of Mithfesh Garg (supra) was confined to the question, whether the existing operators have any right to oppose the grant of permit in view of the changes effected in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which has introduced liberalised policy for the grant of permit. While considering the said question Hon. Supreme Court was pleased to hold, after discussing aims and object of the said Act in liberalising the policy of grant of permits that rival operator does not have any locus-standi to question the grant of permit on the ground that his rights under Aticle 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India, is affected or that these might affect his income or otherwise.
7. No question as to whether the Transport authorities had any right to refuse grant of permit on a particular route on any gorund, as may be encompassed within the ambit of the said Act, was ever raised. On the other hand the said question was left open for consideration of the Transport authorities, as has been embodied in para. 14 of the said judgment in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) in the following manner.
"The petitioners have further contended that the conditions of roads, social status of the applicants, possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators, conditions of hilly routes fuel availability and poullution control are some of the important factors which the Regional Transport Authority is bound to take into consideration while taking a decision on an application for grant of permit. These are the matters which are supposed to be within the comprehension of the transport authorities. The legislative policy under the Act cannot be challenged on these grounds, it is not disputed that the Regional Transport Authority has the power under the Act to refused an application for grant of permit of giving reasons. It is for the authority to take into consideration all the relevant factors at the time of quasi judicial consideration of the applications for grant of permits. The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of power in granting permits under the liberalised policy."
8. Therefore, the Transport authorities, considering the question of grant of permit, may take into consideration all the relevant factors at the time of exercising their jurisdiction, which is quasi-judicial in nature. It has to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of power in granting permits under the liberalised policy.
9. Liberalised policy was never intended to mean that the route would be converted into a racing ground for stage carriages by introducing innumerable permits, as has been held in the case of Surendra Rao v. Regional Transport Authority Gorakhpur, reported in AIR 1992 All 211 : 1992 All LJ 695 and in par a 4 of the said judgment, in which one of us (Hon R. A. Sharma, J.) was a member, it was laid down :
"But while granting permits the transport authoriteis have to take into consideration certain relevant factors to some of which have been highlighted by the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 of its judgment in the aforesaid case of Mithlesh Gag. In view of the provisions of Section 71(2) of the Act the authorities have also to keep in mind while granting permits that the provision of the Act relating to the speed at which the vehicles may be driven are not contravened. The area or route cannot be permitted to be converted into a racing ground for heavy vehicles in order to pick up more passengers enroute and thereby exposing both the person and property of the public to great danger. Transport authorities while granting permits exercise quasi-judicial powers and have to apply their minds to each applicant before granting him permit. They are not to exercise their statutory of granting permits in a mechanical manner."
10. In fact, the object of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly, the purpose for grant of permit, is mainly for providing transprot to the travelling public. The prin-cipal aim or object for the grant of permit was never intended to enable persons to earn profit by carrying on the business of transport. The same are ancillary in providing facility of transport to the people and has been made subject to open market force by liberalising the policy for grant of permit. Therefore, question of economics cannot be a factor to be taken into account.
11. In the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1756(M/B) of 1994 Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. and others delivered on 30-3-1994 by Hon'ble S.H.A. Raza and Hon'ble B. K. Singh, JJ. reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of Surendra Rao (supra). The said Judgment proceeded to observe that in the case of Mithilesh Garg, in para 14 the consideration which ought to be taken into account by the Transport Authority while granting permit were highlighted. Their Lordships were pleased to lay down:
"Some of the Writ Petitions have been filed on the basis of apprehensions that such orders would be passed by regional authorities ignoring the aforesaid directions, but in some petitions it has been stated that while granting permit the RTAS/STAS have not followed the aforesaid directions.
RTAS/STAS under the provisions of the Act discharge quasi judicial duty, it is expected from the RTAS/STAS to keep in mind the dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the High Court and the directions of the state Transport Appellate Tribunal while granting permits, but it is unfortunate that in spite of the aforesaid orders often the RTAS/STAS pass orders in a mechanical and cursory manner.
We are of the view that while granting permits the RTAS/STAS should take into account the dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) as well as of this Court in Surendra Rao's case (supra) and the directions of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the matter of grant of permits. It is further provided that in case the RTAS/STAS have granted any permit after considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) and Surendra Rao (supra) and the directions of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the matter of grant of permit the RTAS/STAS would allow the permit holder to lift the permit.
12. Therefore, as indicated in the said judgment, the directions of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal must not contradict the dictum of the Hon'ble Courts. There should be a rational harmonisation with the aims and objects of the Act as interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra). Therefore, in the light of the ratio laid down in the case of Anil Kumar Garg (supra), it is to be seen as to how far the six directions or guidelines given by by State Transport Appellate Tribunal as enumerated in paragraph 13 hereinafter satisfies the rest of the ratio decided in the said case. In the said case, no attempt was made to scrutinise each of the guidelines separately and elaborately though it was expressed to mean that the same was subject to the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as enunciated in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra).
13. The petitiones have filed a supplementary affidavit annexing therewith a copy of the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. in the case of Mohammad Ahmad v. The Regional Transport Authority, Deharadun, being Revision No. 46 of 1992 along with that of Revision No. 73 of 1992, both of which were disposed of by a common judgment. In the said case, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, remanded the case to the Regional Transport Authority, Deharadun, with the following directions :
"(1) That the Regional Transport Authority, Deharadun shall get a survey of the route in question carried out.
(4) That the Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun shall work draw a time table for plying the buses on the route in question at such intervals as the requirement of the flow of traffic may warrant. The said time table shall be exihibited on the notice board on the office of its secretary so that various applica-tions may incorporate the same in their applications.
(5) That the Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun, shall determine the requirement of Additional buses and permits, over the route in question after determining the frequency with which the buses shall be plied and the hours during which they shall be plied.
(6) That the Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun, shall investigate into the social and economic status of the various applicants and after affording a fresh opportunity of being heard to the various applicants, shall proceed to grant such number of permits and to such persons as it may deem proper having due regard to the objects of the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988."
14. In our opinion the direction No. (6) cannot be the factor for consideration while granting permits. The same, in our view, would affect the principle of equality in the eye of law. Social and economic status does not make a man different from any other person in the matter of grant of permits. Similarly, since the policy of grant of permit has been liberlised to attract open market force the question of economics indirection No. (3) cannot be a factor to be taken into account. At the same time we also hold that in the garb of direction Nos. (4) and (5) the Regional transport, has no authority to limit the number of permits on the particular route.
Though, however, the Regional Transport Authority, may refuse to grant permit on the said route on any ground, which are factors for consideration while granting permits.
15. In the judgment reported in 1994 (24) ALR 246 Shyam Lal Gupta v. Regional Transport Authority, Ghaziabad and others in which one of us (Hon. R.A. Sharma, J.) was a member, it was held that "the factors enumeratred by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra), has not issued any direction to the transprot authority. It has laid down the law while considering the validity of the new Act. This judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding on every authority and courts. So far as the order of this Court, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure 'III' to the writ petition is concerned, it is an interim order passed by Division Bench of this Court, whereby the concerned authority was directed not to act mechanically in granting permits and have due regard to the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithlesh Garg (supra) as also the guide lines set up by the state Transport Appellate Tribunal in Revision No. 46 of 1992, decided on 19-10-1992. State Transport Appellate Tribunal has by its judgment referred to above, required the transport authorities to work out the economics of the transport service and to determine the requirement of additional buses and permits on the route before granting permits and further to investigate into the social and economic status of the applicants before they are granted permits. These directions, issued by the Tribunal are contrary to and inconsistent with the object of the new Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case.
16. The above observations made in the judgment in the case of Shyam Lal Gupta (supra) supports the view we have expressed in para '14' hereinbefore.
17. The question of limiting the number of 35 permits in the route cannot be sustained in view of Section 71(3) of the said Act. However, if a harmonised interpretation is to be arrived at on the basis of the provisions contained in the Act and the judgments referred to above, it cannot be denied that the transport authority has the discretion and power to refuse permit on the ground that no more permits can be issued on the route in consideration of the relevant factors en umerated hereinbefore.
18. We also cannot subscribe to that the permit shall be granted on the 'first come first serve' principle. In fact every one has a right to apply for a permit from amongst whom the choice has ot be made by the transport authority in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act itself and only suitable candidate in order of suitability or merit is to be selected.
19. Therefore, the resolution impugned in the present writ petition, so far as the fixation of limit of permit is concerned, is quashed. We direct the transport authority to consider the question or issue of permit in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
20. Order accordingly.