JUDGMENT Binod Kumar Roy and M.L. Singhal, JJ.
1. In this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the claimants-appellants, out of whom claimant-appellant Nos. 2 to 8 are minors and the remaining appellant No. 1 is their mother under whose guardianship they had filed their claim and this appeal, assail validity of the order dated 16.3.94 passed by the District Judge, Bijnor which reads thus:
Today this motor accident claim has been put up. Heard the counsel for the claimant. It is ordered that as the claim is beyond the period it stands rejected. (Translation from Vernacular)
2. No one appears on behalf of the respondents.
3. The learned Counsel for the appellants made two-fold submissions: (i) The impugned order is not a speaking order. (ii) The submissions made before the learned District Judge that the claim of the minor claimants could not be rejected as they were entitled for extension of time even on the ground of their minority and the ratio laid down by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Vijay Gopal v. Nanak 1981 ACJ 529 (Allahabad), not having been considered, the case be remitted back.
4. From the record the following facts transpire:
Claimant Nos. 2 to 8, aged 14 years, 12 years, 10 years, 8 years, 6 years, 4 years and 2 years respectively along with their widowed mother filed the claim petition in question under Sections 140 and 166 of the Act on 7.3.1994. The D.J. asked the office to report. The suit clerk made the following report dated 7.3.1994:
Sir, Claim petition under Section 166(1) is barred by jurisdiction as the Court is not empowered to condone the delay over one year under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Submitted.
According to the appellants (vide affidavit dated 16.5.1994 of appellant No. 1) the claim petition was moved with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act explaining delay; that she is an illiterate lady who can hardly sign and cannot read and write, and that she was very much upset on account of sudden demise of her husband in the accident and thus not in a position to seek any legal consultation from any person.
5. Section 166(3) of the Act, omitted with effect from 14.11.1994 reads as follows:
No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within 6 months of the occurrence of the accident:
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.
In Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya 1996 ACJ 1013 (SC), the Supreme Court has observed thus:
(6) Before the scope of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, which came into force w.e.f. 14.11.94. The effect of the Amending Act is that w.e.f. 14.11.1994, there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident of the bread-earner of the family in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escape death, some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and he was being treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in its wisdom Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition.
(7) In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act, it does not appear that the said Sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of Sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose, an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994 when Sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994, in respect of such accident? Whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994, can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994, by substituting Sub-section (6) of Section 158, which provides:
As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer.
In view of Sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer incharge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information/report regarding the accident to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of Sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of said sub-section by Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer the claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, in view of the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation.
(8) The matter will be different if any claimant having filed a petition for claim beyond time which has been rejected by Claims Tribunal or the High Court, the claimant does not challenge the same and allows the said judicial order to become final. The aforesaid Amending Act shall be of no help to such claimant. The reason being that a judicial order saying that such petition of claim was barred by limitation has attained finality. But that principle will not govern cases where the dispute as to whether petition for claim having been filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of accident is pending consideration either before the Tribunal, High Court or this Court. In such cases, the benefit of amendment of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 should be extended.
6. It is settled law that appeal is continuation of the Us. The appellants have come up before this Court challenging the order rejecting their claim petition on account of limitation. They have not allowed the said order to become final. Thus, as per the aforesaid ratio, laid down by the Apex Court, they are entitled to the benefit of the deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act and adjudication of their claim on merits by the Tribunal.
7. Apart from the aforesaid legal position, we find substance in contention No. 2 of the learned Counsel for the appellants. The Division Bench of our Court in Vijay Gopal v. Nanak 1981 ACJ 529 (Allahabad), after considering a number of decisions rendered by Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pritpal Singh v. New Suraj Transport Co. (P) Ltd. 1974 ACJ 277 (P&H); Delhi High Court in Bishan Dass v. Ramesh 1971 ACJ 203 (Delhi); and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. v. Chhotibai 1973 ACJ 365 (MP); has clearly laid down, after applying Section 6 of the Limitation Act, that a minor claimant is entitled for extension of time on the ground of his minority.
8. For the reasons aforementioned, we set aside the impugned order and remit back Misc. Case No. 69 of 1994 for adjudication by the learned District Judge, Bijnor on merits.
9. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents we make no order as to cost.
10. The office is directed to send a copy of this order to the Court below for an expeditious follow-up action.