JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner-tenant, by means of present writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has challenged the order dated 19th January, 1995, passed by the prescribed authority and the order dated 24th September, 2004, passed by the appellate authority under the provisions of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, copies whereof are annexed as Annexures-4 and 11 to the writ petition.
2. The facts of the present case, in brief, are that the petitioner is the tenant of the accommodation in question and the respondents are the landlord. The landlord filed an application Under Section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, before the prescribed authority for release of the accommodation i.e., House No. 38/107, Gilish Bazar, Kanpur on the ground that the landlord-respondent is an employee of Indian Air Force, who was posted out of Kanpur and since his retirement is due in the month of April, 1991, he was posted at Kanpur, so that he can arrange his future with a view that he may pass peaceful retired life. In the accommodation in question, where the landlord is residing, there is no kitchen at all and the cooking is being done in one of the room of the first floor, which is used as kitchen-cum-house. The landlord further stated in his application Under Section 21(1)(d) of the Act that the landlord has large family, as against this the opposite party-tenant has got only four members in his family. The landlord has set up the need that the landlord requires one bedroom for landlord No. 1 and his wife ; one bedroom for his son Sudhir Kumar Upadhyaya and his wife ; one drawing room for visitors and one room for guests who stay overnight. The landlord further, stated that his other sons, namely Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Sanjay Kumar Upadhyaya have also grown up adult and are of marriageable age and their marriages are postponed due to paucity of residential accommodation at the disposal of the landlord, therefore, two bedrooms will be required for these two sons, mentioned above and one room for kitchen and one room for poojaghar. These requirements can be met only with the release of the accommodation in question, which is occupied by the tenant-petitioner. The petitioner-tenant contested the aforesaid release application and denied the allegations made by the landlord stating that the contesting respondents-landlord in fact do not have any bona fide requirement.
3. The prescribed authority after exchange of the pleadings and the affidavits have found that the need of the landlord is bona fide and further that the tilt of the comparative hardship is also in favour of the landlord. The prescribed authority therefore vide its order dated 19th January, 1995 allowed the application filed by the landlord Under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act and directed the release of the accommodation in question in favour of the landlord by evicting the tenant-petitioner.
4. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant-petitioner preferred an appeal Under Section 22 of the Act before the appellate authority. During the pendency of the appeal before the appellate authority, the petitioner-tenant filed an amendment application bringing certain new facts on record to the effect that one tenant Ram Shanker Gupta has vacated the tenanted accommodation, situated at the first floor as well as at the second floor, which consists of three rooms, kitchen, latrine and bathroom in premises No. 38/99, Nariyal Bazar, Kanpur on 2nd November, 1997, it was therefore stated that due to the vacation of the premises, as stated above, in the Nariyal Bazar the need, if any, of the landlord for additional accommodation stood satisfied and it is not necessary to release the accommodation in question, which is occupied by the tenant-petitioner in the present building at Gilish Bazar.
The appellate authority has dealt with this aspect of the matter and held that since both the accommodation are in different place, therefore it will not meet the requirement of the additional accommodation of the landlord. Furthermore the landlord alleges that after the vacation of the accommodation at Nariyal Bazar, the said accommodation which is a part of the building of the first and second floor has fallen down due to the rains and therefore is in fact not available to the landlord, as suggested by the tenant-petitioner. On the question of bona fide requirement, the appellate authority considered the arguments advanced on behalf of learned Counsel for the tenant-petitioner and after discussing the evidence on record has affirmed the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority to the effect that the requirement of additional accommodation is bona fide which can be met by release of the accommodation in question. The appellate authority also endorsed the order passed by the prescribed authority on the question of comparative hardship. Thus, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant and maintained the order passed by prescribed authority.
5. Before this Court, learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant tries to assail the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority without demonstrating that the findings so affirmed by the appellate authority suffer from any error, much less error apparent on the face of record, which may be corrected by this Court in exercise of power Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. So far as the new facts which came into existence during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate authority has considered the same and have discussed elaborately vide its order dismissing the appeal relying upon the law laid down by this Court that "it will be the choice of the landlord to select as to which accommodation he requires for his personal requirement. Learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner then contended that the requirement of the guest room and drawing room as applied for by landlord is mere luxury and cannot be taken to be a ground for release of the accommodation in question, which will result into uprooting of the petitioner-tenant. The appellate authority has discussed the aforesaid arguments in the light of the law laid down by this Court, which says that the bona fide requirement would be judged in the light of the status of the landlord. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant submitted that the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority are perverse findings, but without demonstrating as to how the aforesaid findings are perverse. This court in the case of Baboo Lal v. Dakhini Din, AIR 1978 All 547 has held :--
"A perverse finding is that which is not sustainable on the evidence on record and to which no reasonable person would arrive."
6. The Apex Court in a recent decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors., . Paragraph 38, sub-paras 5, 6 and 7 of the aforesaid case, referred to above, which is relevant, is reproduced below :
"38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent.
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character."
7. In view of what has been stated above, since it has not been demonstrated by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority are perverse. This Court has no jurisdiction to re-appraise the evidence on record in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, 2004 (2) AWC 1721 (SC). No other arguments have been advanced on behalf of learned Counsel for the tenant-petitioner.
8. As discussed above, this writ petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.