JUDGMENT Pramada Charan Banerji and Gokul Prasad, JJ.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by Musammat Shahzadi Begam for recovery of her legal share in the estate of her deceased father Baqar Ali. The defendants to the suit were her brother Muhammad Ibrahim and her sisters or their legal representatives. The suit was mainly defended by the brother, who alleged that part of the property claimed was waqf property, that part was property which exclusively belonged to him, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain any share in the waqf property. A document was produced, alleged to have been executed by one Wilayat Ali, who was the ancestor of Baqar Ali, and under which certain property was declared to be waqf. In the course of the trial the parties came to terms, and a compromise was filed on 13th of September, 1917. This compromise is printed at page 27 of the paper book. The compromise dealt with all the property in dispute, which consisted of house property, shops, some government securities and money deposited in a bank, and other property of a similar description. As to part of the property, which was claimed to be waqf, the compromise provided as follows: "With regard to the remaining properties, which defendant No. 1 says in his written statement to be waqf properties, the court may find with reference to the documentary evidence produced by the parties in this case whether they are waqf properties or not and the parties uill be bound by such a finding." The court in accordance with the terms of this. compromise came to a finding as to whether some of the property was waqf property or not, and accordingly directed a preliminary decree for partition to be prepared. It is against the finding of the court below as regards some properties claimed by one party to be part of the estate of Baqar Ali and by the other as waqf property that the present appeal has been preferred. A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that under the terms of the compromise, as quoted above, the parties undertook to be bound by the finding of the court and that consequently it is not open to the appellant to question the correctness of that finding. In our opinion this objection is well-founded. As we have stated above, the parties under the compromise came to an understanding as to all the various items of property claimed in the suit. They made arrangements in regard to all the property with the exception of certain properties referred to in the passage which we have quoted above, and they agreed that on the basis of the documentary evidence alone the court should come to a finding and such finding would be binding on the parties. The words which we have italicized above would be meaningless unless we hold that by those words the parties agreed to accept the finding as a correct finding and not to appeal against it. There was a clear implication in the agreement not to appeal against the finding, but to be bound by it whatever it might be. As all the terms of the compromise were agreed upon in view of this condition also, the plaintiff in our opinion is estopped from disputing the correctness of the finding. We think that this case is similar to the case of Bahir Das Chakravarti v. Nobin Chunder Pal (1901) I.L.R. 29 Calc. 306 (310). In our opinion it is not open to the plaintiff to dispute the correctness of the court's finding and this appeal must fail. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.