Hon'ble Umesh Chandra Tripathi,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)
1. This writ petition has been filed by a Housing Society, namely, Saumya Co-operative Housing Society, Allahabad through its Secretary Sanjeev Kanodia (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner-Society") seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing order dated 30th September, 2014 (Annexure-'8' to the writ petition), passed by Principal Secretary, Revenue Department, State of U.P., Lucknow, rejecting petitioner's representation dated 17.2.2014.
2. Dispute in present writ petition relates to Plots number. 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122 and 123, measuring 9 acres 1 Rod and 211 Sq. yards (equivalent to 36,807 Sq. meters) situated at Mauja Bhawapur, Mustarkharja, Pargana and Tehsil Chail, District Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as "disputed land"). The aforesaid land belong to the then Government (British Government) as a State owned land. On 5th July, 1930, Secretary of State for India in Council executed 8 separate sale-deeds in respect of above land in dispute in favour of M/s Allahabad Bank Limited, a Company registered under Indian Companies Act, 1857, having its registered office at Calcutta in the Province of Bengal (now West Bengal). Subsequently, it was agreed that a consolidated lease in respect of entire land be executed, consequently, on 29th May, 1940, a consolidated lease was executed between Governor of U.P. and M/s Allahabad Bank Limited. The tenure of lease was 30 years commencing from 1st April, 1930. Annual rent agreed between the parties was Rs. 348/-. It also contains a clause that after expiry of tenure, new lease may be granted by Lessor by way of renewal of a term of 30 years. Maximum period of lease could not have exceeded 90 years.
3. It is said that M/s Allahabad Bank Limited, original Lessee, assigned all its rights in disputed land in favour of M/s News Paper Limited. Lease was renewed in 1965 for a period of 30 years and lastly it was renewed vide Lease deed dated 5th December, 1989 with effect from 1st April, 1990 and liable to end on 30th March, 2020.
4. M/s News Paper Limited executed a deed in favour of M/s Saumya Co-operative Housing Society, i.e., Petitioner, on 10th July, 1990, registered on 8th October, 1992. M/s News Paper Limited assigned all its right, title and interest, in disputed property, in favour of Petitioner-Society.
5. State Government, however, by order dated 22nd May, 2012, cancelled lease on the ground that there is violation of terms of lease. This order was challenged by Petitioner-Society in Writ Petition No. 42825 of 2012 (Saumya Co-operative Housing Society Vs. State of U.P. and others). Vide judgment dated 31st August, 2012, order dated 22nd May, 2012 was quashed and Court remanded the matter to concerned authority to give opportunity of hearing to Petitioner-Society and then pass a reasoned order.
6. Another order was passed by State Government on 27th September, 2012, whereby it has held that there was violation of conditions of lease and consequently lease was cancelled.
7. Petitioner-Society again came to this Court in Writ Petition No. 51919 of 2012. A Division Bench of this Court found that State Government's order was not sustainable being in violation of principles of natural justice and also otherwise bad on merits. However, it did not find appropriate to remand the matter to State Government for the reason that in the meantime, State Government has repossessed disputed land and Collector, Allahabad transferred the same to High Court for constructing residences of Judges and there had only seven years left in expiry of lease. Consequently, writ petition was allowed vide judgment dated 28.11.2013 with following directions:
"We allow the present writ petition by providing as follows :
(i) The order of the State Government dated 27.09.2012 cancelling the lease is quashed being unsustainable in the eyes of law but the petitioner would not be entitled to possession over the property.
(ii) Repossession by the State Government through Collector and lease granted in favour of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under notification dated 31.08.2012 shall remain unaffected.
(iii)The petitioner shall be entitled to compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- (rupees twenty lacs) for the reasons recorded above, which shall be paid by the State Government within 3 months from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before respondent no.1 (Secretary, Department of Revenue, State of U.P., Lucknow).
(Emphasis added) We further provide that the petitioner can always approach the State Government for enhancement of the compensation and it is left open to the State Government to consider the matter in accordance with law.
Writ petition is allowed with aforesaid observations."
8. The matter was taken in appeal by State of U.P. and other before Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal No. 10797 of 2014 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 21.7.2014.
9. Petitioner-Society then filed a claim for enhancement of compensation vide representation dated 17th February, 2014, but the same has been rejected by State Government vide order dated 30th September, 2014.
10. Heard Shri P.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Prashant Mishra, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for State-respondents and perused the record.
11. Petitioner-Society claimed that mere fact that compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- was allowed by this Court, ought not to be sufficient to deny further compensation for various reasons, namely:-
(i) Government Order dated 5th June, 1981, which provides that land-holders under Government Grant Act, whose land is acquired under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred as "Act, 1894"), shall be provided full compensation for the land as Bhumidhar thereof.
(ii) Government Order dated 21st February, 1981 provides that if remaining period of lease is more than 7 years, Lessee would be given compensation at market rate.
(iii) As per Collector, Allahabad's report dated 25th May, 2012, market-value of disputed land was Rs.1,13,92,50,000/-. Government has falsely made distinction between Nazul Land and Government Estate land but no such distinction actually exist. In respect of Nazul land, management vests in Local Bodies and in respect of Government Estate Land, management vests in Board of Revenue but in both cases, title vests with Government and there is no real distinction.
(iv) In the present case, Petitioner-Society has been denied right of enjoyment of lease property for remaining period of seven years, therefore, entitles for compensation on market-value.
12. Learned counsel for Petitioner argued that taking away land of petitioner-Society without following procedure prescribed in law, i.e., payment of compensation, is violative of Article 300-A of Constitution of India, hence, denial of compensation to Petitioner-Society at market-value is patently illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. In support of the aforesaid submissions, he placed reliance on Supreme Court's judgment in LIC of India and another Vs. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 482; S.R. Ejaz Vs. Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd. 2002 (2) AWC 1337 as well as judgments of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Begum Saleha Hadi Hasan 1986 All.LJ 1244; Santosh Kumar Tiwari Vs. District Magistrate, Deoria & Ors. 1999 (1) AWC 661; Laxmi Narayan and others Vs. Nagar Palika Shamli and others 2004 (2) AWC 1438 and U.P. Shaskiya Adhivakta Kalyan Samiti, 8, Mustafa Market, SI Vs. State of UP 2012 (5) ADJ 271 (DB) (LB).
13. The first question, which has to be examined in this matter, whether petitioner can place reliance on Government Orders dated 21st February, 1991, and 5th June, 1991 to contend that land in question having been taken by State Government from Petitioner-Society amounts to acquisition of petitioner's land.
14. Admittedly, Government is owner of land in dispute. The question, whether any acquisition is involved when land belongs to State and taken back exercising right of re-entry, has been considered time and again and issue is no more res integra having already been considered in plethora of authorities some of which may be referred to hereinbleow:
15. In Secretary of State Vs. Narain Khanna AIR 1942 Privy Council 35, it was held:
"where Government acquires any property consisting of land and buildings, and where land was the subject matter of Government grant, subject to power of resumption by Government at any time on giving one month's notice, then compensation was payable only in respect of such buildings as may have been authorized to be erected and not in respect of land. (Emphasis added)
16. A Division Bench of Judicial Commissioner in Md. Wajeeh Mirza vs. Secretary of State for India in Council, AIR 1921 Oudh 31, said as under :
"when Government itself claims to be owner of the land, there can be no question of its acquisition and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applicable. This opinion expressed by Judicial Commissioner has been approved in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar and another (supra). Court reiterate in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar and another (supra) that land or an interest in land pre-owned by State cannot be subject-matter of acquisition by State. If the land in question is Government land, there is no question of initiating proceedings of acquisition at all. Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it.
(Emphasis added)
17. In Sharda Devi Vs. State of Bihar and another, 2003 (3) SCC 128, Court has said as under:
"the State does not acquire its own land for it is futile to exercise the power of eminent domain for acquiring rights in the land, which had already vests in the State. It would be absurdity to comprehend the provisions of Land Acquisition Act being applicable to such land wherein ownership or the entirety of rights already vests in State. In other words, land owned by State on which there are no private rights or encumbrances is beyond the preview of provisions of Land Acquisition Act."
(Emphasis added)
18. In Collector of Bombay Vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri (1996) 10 SCC 150, it was held:
"under the provision of Land Acquisition Act, Government acquires the sum total of all private interests subsisting in them. If Government has itself an interest in land, it has only to acquire other interest outstanding thereof so that it might be in a position to pass it on absolutely for public user."
(Emphasis added)
19. In State of U.P. and another Vs. Lalji Tandon (dead) through Legal Representatives (2004 (1) SCC 1) referring to the decision in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar (supra), court said as under:
"the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the land i.e. the site below the bungalow are meaningless. It would have been different if the State would have proposed the acquisition of lease hold rights and/or the superstructure standing thereon, as the case may. But that has not been done."
20. In Ahmad Brothers Vs. State of M.P. And another 2005 (1) SCC 545, Court said as under :
"if the state was owner of the land in question, there was no reason to acquire its own land".
21. In Harish Tandon Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in 2006 (4) ADJ 415(All)(DB), this Court has referred to definition and meaning of 'Nazul' as contained in 'Nazul' manual which is a compilation of Executive Orders dealing with 'Nazul' and said as under:
"Nazul means any land or building which, being the property of Government is not administered as a State property under the control of the Land Reforms Commissioner, or the forest, or the Irrigation Department, or is not under the control of the Military, Postal, Telegraph, Railway or other purely Central Government Department."
22. Court has relied on Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar and another (supra) to observe that Government cannot acquire its own land or the land which already vests in it.
23. Since land in dispute admittedly belongs to State Government, in view of exposition of law, discussed above, there is no question of its acquisition by State Government, hence re-entry by State does not amount to acquisition of land by State.
24. Next contention of learned counsel for petitioner is that without due compensation, State Government could not have taken land in dispute. In this regard our view is that at the best it is a case where lease rights have been cancelled premature. Now Court has to examine, if cancellation of lease right is bad, then the person, whose lease is cancelled premature, whether he is entitled to any compensation or not and in what circumstances and from which Forum.
25. Stand taken by State is that there was violation of terms of lease-deed, therefore, lease was cancelled. Copy of lease has been filed as Annexure-'1' to the writ petition. Some conditions of lease-deed, as borne out from bare reading are:
1. Lessee at its own cost erect a building within five calendar years from the date of lease-deed for habitation and use on such parts of said premises as are marked out on plan annexed with lease-deed, a dwelling house with suitable outbuildings according to a plan and elevation to be approved by Collector.
2. No part of external elevation or plan of such dwelling house or outbuildings shall at any time be altered or varied from original elevation or plan without written consent of Collector of Allahabad.
3. No other building shall be erected on lease premises without consent of Collector of Allahabad.
4. Lessee will at all time repair support and keep in good and substantial condition and repair such dwelling house and outbuildings both externally and internally and also boundaries and other walls, sewers, drains, rails, gates, fences and fixtures of or connected with the same.
5. Lessee will not at any time carry on or permit to be carried on upon the Lease premises any trade or business whatsoever or use the same for any other purpose than as a private dwelling without consent in writing of Collector of Allahabad is obtained. Any assignment shall be informed to Collector of Allahabad through a written notice within one calendar month setting forth names and description of parties to such assignment and particulars and effect thereof.
6. If, there shall be breach or non-observance of any of covenants by Lessee, in such case, Lessor (notwithstanding the waiver of any previous cause or right of re-entry) may re-enter upon said premises and expel Lessee and all occupiers and lease-deed shall absolutely determine.
7. Lessee shall forfeit all right to remove or recover any compensation for any building erected by Lessee on said premises.
26. It is not the case of petitioner nor there is any averment in entire writ petition that no trade or business was permitted on land in dispute and assignments by original Lessee to M/s News Paper Limited and thereafter to Petitioner-Society were with consent of Collector.
27. Learned counsel for petitioner, during course of argument, could not dispute that lease in question relating to Government land amounts to grant of Government land under the Provisions of Government Grants Act, 1895 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1895').
28. Provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1882") are not applicable in respect of land whereof grant is made by Governor in view of Section 2 of Act, 1985 and, therefore, provisions of lease in Act, 1882 would be inapplicable in the case in hand.
29. Sections 2 and 3 of Act, 1895 have been substituted by U.P. Act 13 of 1960 and Section 2(1) and (2) as well as Section 3 as applicable in the State of U.P. in Act, 1895 as substituted by U.P. Act 13 of 1960 read as under:-
"2.(1) Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government Grants.- Nothing contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein, heretofore made or hereafter to be made, by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of any person whomsoever; and every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed.
(2) U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 not to affect certain leases made by or on behalf of the Government.- Nothing contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, shall affect or be deemed to have ever affected any rights, created, conferred or granted, whether before or after the date of the passing of the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960, by leases of land by, or on behalf of, the Government in favour of any person, and every such creation, conferment or grant shall be construed and take effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926.
3. Certain leases made by or on behalf of the Government to take affect according to their tenor.- All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such creation, conferment or grant referred to in Section 2, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor; any decree or direction of a Court of law or any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature, to the contrary notwithstanding:
Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent, or deemed ever to have prevented the effect of any enactment relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the imposition of ceiling on agricultural lands." (Emphasis added)
30. We have no manner of doubt, having gone through aforesaid provisions, that Government Grant of its own land would be governed by terms and conditions of grant and Act, 1882, to that extent would have no application. Such grant would be regulated only by terms of grant even if same is inconsistent with the provisions of Act, 1882 or any other statute.
31. Learned Senior counsel for petitioner also could not dispute that under Act, 1895, provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are not applicable. Relations between lessor and lessee have to be governed by terms of lease granted under Act, 1895 as per the provision of Act, 1895.
32. We are also of the view that grant of Government land, even if covered by provisions of Act, 1895, does not render said grant or lease as statutory grant or lease. It remains to be an agreement between two parties and the mere fact that one of the parties to agreement is State Government or its authority, by itself, would not make such grant/lease different than that entered between two private parties and is governed by common Law of the Land. The purpose of Act, 1895 is to make it clear that grant of Government Land will exclude provisions of Act, 1882 and/or in respect of certain leases made by or on behalf of State Government, provisions of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 inapplicable. When an agreement in respect of immoveable property is executed between two parties and is governed by stipulations contained in such agreement, in case of breach, remedy available to the party who complains about such breach, is also such as admissible in common Law and no additional right can be claimed by such party merely on the ground that breach has been committed by the party, who is State. When State enters into arena of contract, no special status is enjoyed by it unless there is any statutory provision regulating its action.
33. In the present case, while canceling Lease, opportunity of hearing was not afforded to petitioner and, therefore, Lease was not validly cancelled. This issue is not to be re-considered but as it has already been re-considered and decided in Writ Petition No. 51919 of 2012 vide judgment dated 28.11.2013 and for the fault on the part of Government, compensation has also been awarded to petitioner.
34. Petitioner, however, has claimed damages on the ground that he his lease-rights have been curtailed premature in contravention of his terms of lease, therefore, entitled for damages.
35. Aforesaid question required first of all adjudication of an issue whether there was any breach of terms of Lease on the part of original Lessee; whether assignment of lease-right by original lessee to subsequent lessees including petitioner was valid and in accordance with terms of lease-deed and lastly, whether there is any other breach of terms of lease or not, as claimed by State. It is only when all the three aforesaid questions are adjudicated and decided in favour of petitioner only then question of determination of compensation would arise. It will also require investigation of disputed questions of fact and assessment of evidence.
36. Entire claim of petitioner for damages is founded on the liberty granted by this Court in Judgment dated 28.11.2013, passed in Writ Petition No. 5191 of 2012, wherein it has been observed that petitioner can always approach State Government for enhancement of compensation and it is left open to State Government to consider the matter in accordance with law. In our view, aforesaid observations of this Court will not result in creating any otherwise right in petitioner to claim higher compensation and a corresponding obligation upon State Government to provide enhanced compensation to petitioner. The observations only show that this Court did not close the door of petitioner for approaching State Government and claim enhanced compensation, if it is permissible in law and that is why, Court has clearly said that State Government may consider the matter in accordance with law. It cannot be construed as if some law was made by this Court putting State Government in an obligation to pay enhanced compensation to petitioner, if it is not otherwise provided in law.
37. Even if, there is no statutory provision, State Government may provide a higher compensation to petitioner being a party to a lease-deed, which has been cancelled premature. We have no manner of doubt, when two parties have entered into an agreement, for example, lease-deed in the present case, and one party cancels such document premature, it can always agree to pay compensation to other party and the quantum of compensation may be such, as agreed between the parties or as adjudicated by any competent Forum but certainly observations made by this Court, by no means, can be read as if an obligation is cast upon Government to pay higher compensation to petitioner.
38. In the present case, State Government has not found itself agreeable for payment of higher compensation to petitioner than what has already been directed to be paid by this Court vide judgment dated 28th November, 2013. That being so, it is always open to petitioner to avail such remedy in common law and claim damages if according to petitioner any wrong has been done by other party, i.e., State, by cancelling an agreement between them, premature.
39. State Government has justified non-payment of higher compensation on the ground that there was non-compliance/breach of term of lease-deed on the part of petitioner. In our view, determination of compensation involves various issues of facts, some of which are noticed above and, therefore, remedy for damages in common law is always available in a Civil Court, which can go into disputed questions of facts and after recording evidence can adjudicate the same. Therefore, it would not be proper on our part to examine the question of non-observations/breach of lease-deed as claimed by State Government and record any final opinion in this regard, at this stage. We find that there is an apparent non-compliance/non-observance/breach of terms of lease-deed but in our view, this question can be better adjudicated in common law proceedings by Civil Court where all these issues involving investigation into disputed questions of facts can be examined. Therefore, we are not expressing any final opinion on this aspect.
40. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner contended that judgment dated 28.11.2013, passed by this Court left it open to petitioner to approach State Government for enhancement of compensation that has been declined by State Government for administrative side, therefore, its correctness can be examined in writ jurisdiction. This submission is miss-conceived. As it has already been said, this Court did not create any right in the petitioner to claim enhanced compensation nor corresponding obligation upon State Government and, therefore, said observation cannot be read as a declaration of entitlement of petitioner for claiming higher compensation. Moreover, when questioned, under which provision State Government could consider the matter of payment of compensation for the reason that here is not a case where acquisition of land in dispute is referable Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is now substituted by a new Act, i.e., Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, Resettlement Act, 2013 and, therefore, aforesaid statutes are not applicable in the case in hand, no statutory provision could be shown by learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner where-under State Government is empowered or compelled to determine question of compensation when lease-rights of Lessee are determined, premature.
41. A lease-right, founded on a lease-deed, is a matter of contract between Lessor and Lessee. If determination of lease-rights by Lessor is not in terms of lease-deed and there is any breach, question, whether any of the parties is entitled to claim damages/compensation, and if so, what quantum of damages/compensation would be, are to be decided, in absence of any other forum provided under any statute, by Civil Court in common law proceedings.
42. As already said, this Court did not confer any jurisdiction upon State Government to determine compensation, if, it was not vested in it under any statutory provision. This Court only left it open to petitioner to approach State Government for enhancement of compensation meaning thereby if between two parties, voluntarily, an arrangement can be arrived upon such settlement, the State Government was free to pay any amount of compensation, in addition to what was directed by this Court. Observations of this Court in judgment dated 28.11.2013 cannot be construed as if it conferred a jurisdiction on the State Government for determination of compensation/damages, which otherwise did not vest in it, under any statute. We need not refer to a catena of authorities on the subject that a jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon an authority, which is not otherwise vested, even by consent. For the purpose of Court or Tribunal also, it has been repeatedly held that a jurisdiction cannot be conferred even by acquiescence or consent.
43. As early as in 1951 in United Commercial Bank Limited versus Their Workmen AIR 1951 SC 230 Court held:
"No acquiescence or consent can give a jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction which it does not possess."
44. In Kiran Singh versus Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340, Court said:
"A defect of jurisdiction ... strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties."
45. In Benarsi Silk Palace Vs. Commr. of Income Tax [1964] 52 ITR 220 (All), this Court held:
"Jurisdiction could be conferred only by statute and not by consent and acquiescence. Since jurisdiction is conferred upon Income Tax Officer to proceed under Section 34 (1) only if he issues a notice an assessee cannot confer jurisdiction upon him by waiving the requirement of a notice because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or acquiescence."
46. In Kali Das Wadhwani & Anr. Vs. Jagjiwan Das and another 1985 (2) ARC 533, this Court observed as under:
"It is well settled that a jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by consent, acquiescence or waiver where there is none, nor can it be ousted where it is. Acquiescence, waiver or consent of the parties may be relevant in objections relating to pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction of the Court, but these factors have no relevance where the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction which strikes at the very root or authority of the Court to pass any decree and renders the decree, if passed a nullity."
47. In Sardar Hasan Siddique Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1986 All. 132, a Division Bench of this Court observed:
"A Tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. No approval or consent can confer jurisdiction upon such a tribunal. No amount of acquiescence waiver or the like can confer jurisdiction of a Tribunal is lacking, the doctrine of nullity will come into operation and any decision taken or given by such a Tribunal will be a nullity."
48. In Karnal Improvement Trust Vs. Prakashwanti, (1995) 5 SCC 159, Court observed that acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction and an erroneous interpretation equally should not be perpetuated and perpetrated defeating of legislative animation. A similar view has been taken in U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. Vs. Indure Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 1373.
49. In S. Sethuraman Vs. R. Venkataraman and Ors. AIR 2007 SC 2499, Court observed that if jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, it cannot clothe the authority to exercise the same in an illegal manner. The above authority has been referred to and relied on in AIR 2012 SC 1239 Collector, Distt. Gwalior and another Vs. Cine Exhibitors P. Ltd. and another.
50. Thus, if State Government otherwise had no authority to adjudicate on the question of damages/compensation, none was conferred by this Court. This Court only permitted State Government that it may agree to pay much higher compensation to petitioner if it so decides. Therefore, observation of this Court in order dated 28.11.2013, neither conferred any right upon petitioner, enforceable in law, nor corresponding statutory obligation upon State Government to do something which otherwise it did not have any jurisdiction under any statute. In the matter of acquisition of land, there is a statute, which provides a complete machinery for determination of compensation but when there is a dispute whether a contractual right or contract has been breached or not entitling either party to claim compensation or damages, in absence of any machinery provided by the statutes, the same can be determined by a Court of law entitled to determine common law rights.
51. In view of above, we find no reason to interfere with order of State Government.
52. Writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
Order Date :- 07/09/2018 LN Tripathi