JUDGMENT D. K. Seth, J.
1. In a suit for partition, the plaintiff had claimed title on the basis of Will executed by one Raseeda Khatoon. The parties did not dispute the title of Raseeda Khaloon. The petitioners sought to get themselves impleaded in the suit being O. S. No. 838 of 1995 pending before the learned Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gorakhpur, on the strength of Hibanama, Memorandum or Will as the case may be, as pleaded in the application under Order 1, Rule 10. of the Code of Civil Procedure- The plaintiff had filed an application for direction upon the petitioner-applicant for addition of parties to produce the documents on which they had based their claim. By an order dated 18th November, 1997, the said application was allowed and the applicants were directed to produce the documents.
Subsequently, the application for addition of parties was dismissed by an order dated 6th April, 1998 on the ground that despite having been given sufficient time, no documents were filed and that on the date 6lh April.
1998. the applicant had absented himself. This order was challenged in revision being Civil Revision No. 160 of 1999. By an order dated 21st July.
1999. the revision was also dismissed. These orders have since been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition.
2. Mr. K. A. Qayyum. learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the trial court had acted illegally and with material irregularity in rejecting the application on the date when the petitioner was absent. The petitioner had explained the reason why he was absent on the said date. But the same was not taken into consideration by the revisional Court. On the other hand, it had affirmed the order passed by the learned trial court on an erroneous view. He further contended that a photocopy of the document was produced before the trial court which was also on record on 6th April, 1998 which was overlooked by the learned trial court. Whereas the revisional Court had proceeded on the basis that the trial court had directed production of the original documents and that was not produced and production of photocopy was not sufficient. Mr. Qayyum contends that there was no order directing the petitioner to produce the original documents. The order was a simple order directing production of documents. Therefore, the order passed by the revisional court suffers from perversity and should, therefore, be set aside.
3. Ms. Sudha Pandey holding brief of Mr. A. N. Bhargava, learned counsel for the opposite party contends that there is no infirmity in the order and that the petitioner was directed to produce the documents. The document denotes the original. Unless the Court permits secondary evidence the photocopy is not permitted. The photocopy cannot be treated to be the document unless it is admitted as a secondary evidence following the provision laid down in the Evidence Act. Since the claim is based on the basis on such documents, it is incumbent upon the applicant to show that the right claimed by him is genuine. The genuineness cannot be ascertained from a photocopy. She further contends that even if it was not possible to produce the original there should have been explanation before the learned trial court. She further contends that even if no explanation was available before the trial court, it was incumbent on the revisionist-petitioner to explain the same in the revision itself and it was also open to him to produce the original before the revisional court. She further contends that the applicant could have even produced the original in this Court. The petitioner cannot claim that production of document couid be complied with by production of a photocopy. The question of non-appearance on 6th April. 1998 cannot be explained before the revisional court. It should have been explained if an application for recalling the order dated 6th April, 1998 was filed. Be that as it may, according to her, since the applicant had not produced the documents and has not complied with the direction despite having obtained sufficient time and the Court having not accepted the photocopy sufficient for corning to the conclusion that the petitioner has a genuine case for being added as a party to the proceedings, this Court sitting in revisional Jurisdiction should not interfere with the findings arrived at by both the Courts below.
4. 1 have heard both the counsel at length.
5. It appears that the petitioner had claimed to be added as a party in a suit for partition on the basis of its title based on certain documents namely, Hibanama, Memorandum or Will as the case may be. On an application filed by the plaintiff, by an order dated 18th November, 1997, the learned trial court had directed production of the documents. A perusal of the order dated 18th November, 1997 which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition shows that the plaintiff was required to produce the documents on which the applicant had based his claim. Allowing the said application, the learned trial court had directed production of the documents.
6. The document in generic sense means the original document-Section 61 of the Evidence Act prescribes that the contents of a document may be proved either by primary evidence or by secondary evidence. According to Section 62 thereof primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Explanation 2 to Section 60 provides that copies of a common original are not primary evidence.
7. Thus, the alleged photocopy cannot be a primary evidence. As such, it cannot be classified as document. Now let us see whether it can come within the definition of secondary evidence.
8. As prescribed in Section 63 of the Evidence Act, secondary evidence includes (1) certified copies ; (2) copies made from original by mechanical process which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy and copies compared with such copies : (3) copies made from a compared copy and compared with the original. These have been illustrated thereunder as (a) a photograph of an original even if not compared wllh original may be a secondary evidence if what was photographed was the original : (b) a copy compared with a copy made by a copying machine from the original is a secondary evidence ; (c) a copy transcribed from a copy and compared with original is a secondary evidence, but the copy not so compared with the original, though copied from a copy so compared with the original is not a secondary evidence ; (d) either an oral account of a copy compared with the original, nor an oral account of a photograph or machine copy of the original is secondary evidence of the original.
9. In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the alleged photocopy was prepared from the original or that it was not prepared from a copy of the original, or that it was compared with (he original if prepared from a copy compared with the original. In the absence of any material, it cannot be treated to be a secondary evidence. It is only orally being claimed to be a photocopy without claiming that what was photographed was the original or that it was compared with the original. Admittedly, it is not a certified copy.
10. Now secondary evidence is permitted only in certain circumstances. It cannot come in automatically as in the case of primary evidence. In order to allow secondary evidence, certain tests as provided in Section 65 and procedure as provided in Section 66 of the Evidence Act are to be satisfied and complied with, as the case may be. Inasmuch as Section 64 of the said Act prescribes that documents must be proved by primary evidence. Exception to this rule is permitted only in cases as provided in Section 65 read with Section 66 of the said Act.
11. Section 65 of the Act permits secondary evidence (a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of (i) the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or (ii) any person out of reach of, or not subject to. the process of the Court, or (iii) any person legally bound to produce it. and when after the notice mentioned -in Section 66 such persons mentioned in (i), (ii), (iii) does not produce it ; (b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest ; (c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the parly offering is unable to produce it in reasonable time for reason not arising from his own default or neglect ; (d) when the original is such that it is not easily movable ; (e) when the original is a public document Within the meaning of Section 74 ; (f) when the original is a document of which certified copy is permitted to be given in evidence either by Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India : (g) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be conveniently examined by the Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.
12. The present case does not fit in clause (d). (e), (f) and (g). It. however, could come within clause (a), (b) and (c). But as observed earlier. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it does neither fit in clause (a) nor (b) nor (c). The applicant has not made out any case which could come within the scope and ambit of either of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 65 of the Act. Therefore, the photocopy cannot be relied upon even as a secondary evidence.
13. Then again in order to come within clause (a) of Section 65. the procedure for notice under Section 66 is to be followed and complied with. Section 66 prohibits admission of secondary evidence unless the party proposing secondary evidence given previous notice to the person in possession or power to produce as prescribed by law, and if not prescribed then as the Court may think reasonable. As many as Six exceptions are provided in this case.
14. However, in the present case clause (a) of Section 65 not being attracted. Section 66 may not be relevant. The alleged photocopy therefore, cannot be relied upon.
15. Rule 53 of the General Rules (Civil)1957 provides as follows :
"The Court shall Inspect and consider all documents as soon as practicable after they have been produced and deal with them as follows :
(a) Documents which are proved or admitted by the party against whom they are produced in evidence shall be admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits in the manner prescribed in Rule 57 and the fact shall be noted in the record.
(b) Documents which are not proved (or admitted by the party against whom they are produced in evidence) shall be kept on the record pending proof and shall be rejected at the close of the evidence, if not proved or admitted.
(c) Documents that are found to be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible in evidence shall be rejected forthwith."
16. The above rule prescribes the manner how the Court is supposed to deal with documents filed in suit. When a document is produced, as soon as possible, the Court shall inspect, consider and deal with them according to clauses (a) and (b) of the above Rule or reject the same under clause (c), if it cannot be dealt with under clauses (a) and (b).
17. The above proposition goes to show that no reliance can be expected on a document which is otherwise inadmissible in a Court and. that whenever "document" is referred in an order or is required to be produced, it must satisfy the test of admissible documents viz. original or secondary as provided in Sections 64, 65 and 66 of the Evidence Act.
18. The production of photocopy, therefore, does not satisfy the order dated 18th November. 1997 by which document was directed to be produced. Even if the original document could have been produced either in the revisional Court or before this Court, tt..could have been presumed that the applicant had a genuine case. Even when asked for today by this Court, Mr. Qayyum insisted that the Court had never directed the applicant to produce the original document. He did not ask for any accommodation or adjournment to produce the original before this Court. Both the Courts below had found that, the photocopy was not sufficient for the purpose of ascertaining that the applicant had a genuine case for being added as a party. Since the applicant was asked to produce the document, it was incumbent on him to produce the original document. Since it was held by the learned revisional court that the original was not produced and the photocopy was not sufficient, the petitioner could have produced the original before this Court to show that he has a genuine claim. This withholding of document, in view of Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, gives rise to a presumption adverse to that of the claim of the petitioner. Be that as it may, unless something is shown that the petitioner has a prima facie claim to the property to be added as a party in a partition suit, the applicant is not supposed to add himself as a party in the suit, in order to establish that he is a necessary and proper party, he has to show prima facie that he has a title to the property. Such title having been claimed by reason of a document executed by Raseeda Khatoon, the applicant ought to have produced such document. The photocopy of the alleged memorandum cannot be sufficient proof with regard to the acquisition of title which can be considered to be a prima facie evidence to show that the applicant is a necessary and a proper party in the proceedings. Admittedly, the applicant had obtained several adjournments and instead of producing the original documents, had produced the photocopy which were not relied upon by both the courts below. The learned trial court and the revisional court had come to a finding of fact which this Court is not supposed to disturb unless there is any perversity.
19. Mr. Qayyum had also contended that the revisional court had rejected the revision on the ground that on the date fixed, the document could not be produced. It was not the ground thai the original document was not produced. But the text of the order shows that the revisional court had found that the original document was not produced despite direction and had obtained time successively. Then again, it was also not filed on the date fixed. This is also an admitted possession. But then it is admitted possession that the applicant did not produce the original document either before the revisional court or before this Court,
20. As discussed above. I have not been able to find out any perversity or infirmity in the orders impugned. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the orders.
21. The writ petition therefore, fails and is accordingly, dismissed.
22. However, there will be no order as to costs.
23. After this order is dictated and the application was dismissed. Mr. Qayyum then submitted that he may be permitted to verify as to whether the petitioner is in a possession of the original document or not which presupposes that he has no instruction to that extent that the petitioner is in possession of the original document which he wants to verify even now. Despite having put the question twice where is the original document and unless the original is produced, no case could be made out. Mr. Qayyum on both occasions had insisted before this Court that there was no direction of the production of the original by the learned trial court. Therefore. I do not find any reason to accede his prayer after the order is dictated.