1. Heard learned counsel for the parties on admission of second appeal as well as on framing of substantial question of law and perused the records.
2. Original Suit No. 1003/1996 Satyadev & Anr. v. Mohan Lal & others, was dismissed by judgment dated 6.2.2007 passed by the Court of Additional Civil Judge (J.D.), Mathura, against which Civil Appeal No. 25/2007, Satyadev & Anr. v. Mohan Lal & others, was preferred. Said appeal was dismissed by the judgment dated 19.11.2014 of the court of Additional District Judge, Court No.-3, Mathura. Against these judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court, this second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs of the original suit.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that first appellate court had not complied with the mandatory provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and dismissed the appeal without considering the fact and legal points.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that only point of determination between the parties during trial was as to whether the written document executed for relinquishing rights of plaintiff-appellants needs registration or not. He further contended that this was not transfer deed nor any consideration was paid for writing this deed. Said deed was only relating to description of family arrangement, which do not require any registration. Therefore the judgment of trial court was not erroneous. He further contended that learned first appellate court had considered the facts, circumstances and arguments of the parties and after appreciating them, find that there is no error in the judgment of trial court, so appeal was dismissed. There is no error in judgment of first appellate court. Therefore, appeal should not be admitted and should be dismissed in limine.
5. A perusal of record reveals that when trial court had dismissed the appeal, then first appeal was preferred by plaintiff. After hearing, it was incumbent upon the appellate court to comply with directions mentioned in Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and frame points of determination and then pass the reasoned decision on it. But first appellate court had neither complied with this direction of Rule-31 of Order-41 CPC nor made any point of determination in its impugned judgment dated 19.11.2014.
6. The purpose of framing point of determination is selecting the points on which decision has to be made and then judgment should be passed. But in present matter the first appellate court had not framed any point of determination, which is not only inappropriate but legally erroneous.
7. Apart from it, it is legally incumbent upon the first appellate court to give decision, which requires appreciation of facts, evidences, arguments and the judgment after application of mind of the court. But a perusal of judgment of first appellate court reveals that its Presiding Officer had started judgment by description of facts, then he gave detailed description of arguments advanced by the appellant and respondent side; then all of his sudden, it was mentioned in last lines of the judgment that on the basis of available facts, there is no illegality in the judgment of lower court and on the basis of acquiescence appellant cannot deny the consciousness of the parties. The ''judgment' always includes appreciation of facts, arguments and application of mind of court. But in present case, after noting description of facts of the case and arguments of the parties, total alleged decision of the first appellate court is mentioned in judgment by following words:-
"i=koyh ij miyC/k leLr rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij fo}ku voj U;k;ky; ds vkns'k esa dksbZ voSZ/kkfudrk ughsa gSA ;|fi ewd lgefr ds dkj.k Hkh vihykFkhZ mDr rF; dks ugha dg ldrk gS D;ksafd fu.kZ; mudh lgefr ls fd;k x;k FkkA vihy fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS A"
8. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. 'The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such art order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge."
"For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision."
9. In Paul George v. State, 2002 Cri.L.J. 996, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"We are only considering the question as to whether the revision should have been disposed of by means of bald and non-speaking order. We feel that whatever be the outcome of the pleas raised by the appellant on merit, the order disposing of the matter must indicate application of mind to the case and some reasons be assigned for negating or accepting such pleas. We find total absence of the same in the order passed by the High Court quoted in the earlier part of this judgment. As a matter of fact, says nothing except that no illegality, impropriety or jurisdictional error was found in the judgment of the Courts below. Then abruptly order "Dismissed" is passed. It is submitted that probably the revision has been disposed off by the High Court having the provisions of Section 115, C.P.C. in mind since the order observe about "no jurisdictional" error having been committed by the Courts below.
It is submitted that the language of Section 397, Cr.P.C. is different and it does no speak of jurisdictional error which it is there all pervading under Section 115, C.P.C. The submission further is that the scope of the two provisions is different. It is narrower under Section115, C.P.C. Suffice is to observe that question of error in exercise of jurisdiction may arise sometimes in criminal revisions as well. Be that as it may, the submissions made on behalf of the appellant could not be negated without examining them on merit. The order impugned however does not indicate any trace of application of mind on the facts or the pleas raised before the Court. We would like to point out that we come across with such orders quite frequently as of now. There is no need to emphasize that the reasons, howsoever brief they may be, are to be indicated in an order disposing of any matter, moreso when such orders are subject to appeal or review before the higher forum. In many decisions of this Court, no doubt while dealing with orders passed in exercise of administrative or quasi-judicial power in those cases, it has been observed that so as to indicate application of mind, the orders should contain some reasons which also helps to the appellate or revisional authority to appreciate the merit of the orders passed and the way the decision has been arrived at."
"It is true that it may depend upon the nature of the matter which is being dealt with by the Court and the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised as to in what manner the reasons may be recorded e.g. in an order of affirmance detailed reasons or discussion may not be necessary but some brief indication by the application of mind may be traceable to affirm an order would certainly be required. Mere ritual of repeating the words or language used in the provisions, saying that no illegality, impropriety or jurisdictional error is found in the judgment under challenge without even a whisper of the merits of the matter or nature of pleas raised does not meet the requirement of decision of a case judicially."
10. In State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Singh, AIR 2008 SC 2026, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made."
11. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable, particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is the principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision-making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected."
12. The presiding officer of any court of law is expected to decide the case before it by a proper ''decision' or ''judgment'. In Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396 the Apex Court had held :
" "Judgment" as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds for a decree or order. What a judgment should contain is indicated in Order 20 Rule 4(2) which says that a judgment "shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision". It should be a self-contained document from which it should appear as to what were the facts of the case and what was the controversy which was tried to be settled by the court and in what manner. The process of reasoning by which the court came to the ultimate conclusion and decreed the suit should be reflected clearly in the judgment.
- - - -
A Judge cannot merely say "suit decreed" or "suit dismissed". The whole process of reasoning has to be set out for deciding the case one way or the other. This infirmity in the present judgment is glaring and for that reason also the judgment cannot be sustained."
13. In present case no reason was given in the judgment of first appeal as to why it is proper to dismiss the appeal or why such judgment was passed. A perusal of impugned order shows that nothing has been written in it that may reflect that learned first appellate Court had understood facts or circumstances of the case to reach decision of dismissing the appeal. Nothing is there which may show that learned presiding officer, before passing of the order under challenge had considered facts of the case or law. Such order cannot be accepted as a proper legal judicial order passed after following due procedure of law. Apparently such order is liable to be quashed on this count also.
14. Therefore, apparently judgment of first appellate court appears to have been passed erroneously without following procedure established by law and without judicial application of mind, which may have effect of depriving the plaintiff-appellant's right of hearing in first appeal. Therefore, these points need re-consideration in second appeal by hearing. Therefore, this appeal is admitted.
15. Following substantial questions of law are framed:-
"(1) Whether the judgment of first appellate court is erroneous for non-compliance of provision of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC ? If so, its effect?
(2) Whether the judgment of first appellate court is erroneous as being non speaking and therefore perverse? If so, its effect?"
16. Summon the original lower court records.
17. List on 02.03.2016 for hearing of appeal.
18. As held above, it appears that first appellate court and its Presiding Officer had committed manifest error in writing the judgment dated 19.11.2014 in first appeal. It appears that said Presiding Officer lacks the proper knowledge of procedural law and also the ability to write proper speaking and reasoned judgment. He is expected to be more careful in writing the judgments, especially in civil appeal. Therefore, a copy of this order be communicated to the officer concerned through the District Judge, Mathura.
Order Date :- 22.1.2016 SR