JUDGMENT S.P. Mehrotra, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for quashing the Judgment and order dated 2.5.1997 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) and the judgment and order dated 24.1.2003 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition).
2. The dispute relates to a shop situated in Molalla Kot West, Main Market, Hasanpur, district Moradabad, the details whereof have been given in the release application referred to hereinafter. The said shop has, hereinafter, been referred to as "the disputed shop".
3. From the allegations made in the writ petition, it appears that the respondent filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short 'the Act') against the petitioner for the release of the disputed shop.
4. It was, inter alia, alleged by the respondent in the said release application that the petitioner was tenant in the disputed shop since 1989 at a monthly rent of Rs. 500 and that the disputed shop was bona fide, required for establishing the younger son of the respondent, namely, Sanjiv Kumar in business ; and that the need of the respondent for establishing the said Sanjiv Kumar in business was bona fide, and that in case, the release application was allowed, the petitioner would not suffer any hardship, while the respondent would suffer much greater hardship in case the release application was rejected. The said release application was registered as P.A. Case No. 15 of 1992. A copy of the said release application has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition.
5. The petitioner contested the said release application, and filed written statement. A copy of the written statement filed by the petitioner has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. In the said written statement the petitioner denied the allegations of the respondent regarding bona fide need and comparative hardships.
6. It was, inter alia, further alleged in the said written statement that the rate of rent of the disputed shop was Rs. 200 per month.
7. Evidence was led by both the sides.
8. The learned Prescribed Authority/ Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hasanpur by the judgment and order dated 2.5.1997 allowed the said release application, subject to the payment of Rs. 600 as compensation to the petitioner at the time of vacating the disputed shop.
9. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The said appeal was registered as Rent Control Appeal No. 12 of 1997. By the judgment and order dated 24.1.2003, the learned XIth Additional District Judge, Moradabad, has dismissed the said Rent Control Appeal No. 12 of 1997.
10. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking reliefs mentioned above.
11. I have heard Sri Pramod Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.G. Hasnain, learned counsel for the caveator-respondent.
12. Sri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a kothari and a room behind the disputed shop were also in the tenancy of the petitioner, but the same were vacated by the petitioner sometime in the year 1991.
13. It is submitted that the authorities below have not considered the availability of the said kothart and the said room with the respondent while passing the impugned judgment and orders.
14. In reply, Sri S.G. Hasnain, learned counsel for the caveator-respondent submits that the said kothari and the said room behind the disputed shop were never let out to the petitioner. In any case, it is submitted, the availability of the said kothari and the said room has been considered by the authorities below while passing the impugned judgment and orders.
15. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
16. A perusal of the impugned judgments and orders passed by the authorities below shows that the authorities below have considered the accommodation available with the respondent including the said kothari and the said room behind the disputed shop on the ground floor.
17. The appellate authority in the said judgment and order dated 24.1.2003 has pointed out that the elder son of the respondent, namely, Sunil Kumar was living and keeping his luggage in the back portion on the ground floor of the house in question, and was using the bathroom and latrine on the first floor. It has been further pointed out by the appellate authority that younger son of the respondent, namely, Sanjiv Kumar was now married, and he had two children. The said Sanjiv Kumar with his family and the respondent was residing in one room available on the first floor of the house in question. Therefore, the submission made by Sri Jain that the authorities below have not considered the availability of the back kothari and the back room with the respondent cannot be accepted.
18. Sri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to assail findings recorded by the authorities below on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardships.
19. Having considered the submission made by Sri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, I find myself unable to accept the same. The authorities below have considered the material on record and recorded findings on the questions of bona Jide need as well as comparative hardships.
20. It is well established that the findings on the questions of bona fide need and comparative hardship are findings of fact. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the authorities below unless such findings are shown to be patently illegal or perverse. No illegality or perversity has been shown in the findings recorded by the authorities below on the questions of bona fide need and comparative hardships. No interference is, therefore, called for with the findings recorded by the authorities below on the said questions.
21. Reference in this regard may be made to certain judicial decisions.
In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 45, it was laid down by the Apex Court that the conclusions of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The findings on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord recorded by the courts below by appreciating the entire evidence cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
22. In Munni Lal and Ors. v. Prescribed Authority and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 29, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that the finding on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord was finding of fact, and the same cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
23. In Ashok Kumar and Ors. v. Sita Ram, 2001 (3) AWC 1997 (SC) : 2001 (2) ARC 1 : 2001 (43) ALR 783 : (SC). the Apex Court held as follows (Paragraphs 9 and 15 of the said ARC) :
"9. The position is too well-settled to admit of any controversy that the finding of fact recorded by the final court of fact should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The High Court should not interfere with a finding of fact simply because it feels persuaded to take a different view on the material on record.
15. The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the appellate authority. The order passed by the appellate authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter, which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi-judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another appellate court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case."
24. In my opinion, the writ petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
25. Sri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner then submits that the prescribed authority ought to have awarded two years' rent as compensation in view of the second proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act.
26. It is submitted by Sri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner that Rs. 600 which has been awarded as compensation by the prescribed authority in the said judgment and order dated 2.5.1997 is wholly inadequate.
27. Sri S.G. Hasnain, learned counsel for the caveator-respondent fairly states that reasonable compensation may be awarded to the petitioner.
28. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that two years' rent ought to have been awarded to the petitioner, as compensation in view of the second proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act. Rate of rent as admitted by the petitioner himself is Rs. 200 per month. Therefore, two years' rent determined at the rate of rent Rs. 200 per month, i.e., Rs. 4,800 will be paid as compensation by the respondent to the petitioner within eight weeks from today.
29. Sri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that some reasonable time may be granted for vacating the disputed shop.
30. I have heard Sri Pramod Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.G. Hasnain, learned counsel for the caveator-respondent on this question also.
31. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is directed that the petitioner will not be evicted from the disputed shop till 31st July, 2003, provided the petitioner gives an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority, Moradabad, on his personal affidavit within eight weeks from today incorporating the following conditions :
(1) The petitioner will vacate the disputed shop on or before 31st July, 2003 and will hand-over peaceful vacant possession of the same to the respondent.
(2) The petitioner will continue to pay rent to the respondent with effect from January, 2003 till the date of vacating the disputed shop.
32. In case, the aforesaid requisite undertaking is not given by the petitioner within the time granted or the petitioner does not comply with any of the aforesaid conditions incorporated in the undertaking, this order granting time to the petitioner for vacating the disputed shop will stand automatically vacated, and it will become open to the respondent to execute the release order forthwith.