JUDGMENT Mukerji, J.
1. The sole question to be determined in this appeal is one of law and arises under the following circumstances. The property now in suit is a piece of land on which originally stood a house. The house and other properties belonged to one Gayadin. He was succeeded by his wife Mt. Parbati. Mt. Parbati died and her daughter Mt. Rajwanti succeeded to a life-estate, The appellant in this appeal is a male agnate of Gayadin and is the actual roversioner to his estate on the death of Mt. Rajwanti which happened before the institution of the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen. On the 20fch of September, 1915, Mt. Rajwanti and the appellant entered into an agreement by which Mt. Rajwanti was declared to be the absolute owner of the house and it was definitely stated that she could do anything she liked with the property. Mt. Rajwanti, before her death on the 16th of January, 1922 disposed of the house by way of sale in favour of the present respondent. The present respondent instituted the suit to obtain a declaration that he was the owner of the site by virtue of his purchase.
2. The appellant contended inter alia that Mt. Rajwanti had only a life-interest and she could not make a valid alienation. To this the respondent replied that the appellant having himself bean a party to the agreement of the 20th of September, 1915, ho could not reprobate the contract and is estopped from denying the plaintiffs' title.
3. The respondents' contention on this point has found favour with the Courts below and the only question to be determined is whether the appellant is not estopped from contending that Mt. Rajwanti was the absolute owner of the property and could sell it.
4. There is a vast amount of literature on the question of estoppel in cases arising under circumstances, more or less similar to the present ones. No useful purpose would be served by examining all the cases on the point. Each case was decided on the peculiar fasts under which it arose. The principle, however, was definitely laid down in the Privy Council case of Kanhai Lal v. Birj Lal A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 70 The principle therein laid down was that where a man, who became ultimately a reversioner, had entered into a compromise in the lifetime of a holder of life-interest, he was precluded from disputing the validity of the compromise. This case was followed in this Court in the case of Bahadur Singh v. Ram Bahadur A.I.R. 1623 All. 204. A similar view was taken in the Full Bench case of Fateh Singh v. Rukmini Rawan A.I.R. 1923 All. 337. In my opinion the principle applies with full force to the case before me and I am clear that the Courts below were right in holding that the appellant was estopped from denying the plaintiffs' title.
5. The appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs which will include Counsel's fees in this Court on the higher scale.