JUDGMENT George Knox and Richards, JJ.
1. This was a suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act. It appears that an application was made for the registration of a deed, dated the 22nd of August 1904, which purported to be executed on behalf of one Musammat Sundar, by one Makhan Lal as her mukhtar-am, in favour of one Sardar Singh, plaintiff in this suit. The document was not presented for registration within the four months prescribed by the Act. The document was in fact presented for registration on the 15th of April 1905, at which date Musammat Sundar was dead. The appellant, however, does not in any way support the appeal by reason of the fact of the death of Musammat Sundar before the deed was presented for registration. The Registrar refused to register the document, first on the ground that there was no proof that the deed was in fact the deed of Musammat Sundar, and, secondly, that the delay in presenting the deed for registration had not been sufficiently explained. The present suit was then brought under Section 77 of the Registration Act. The appellant contends, first, that the suit cannot be maintained. This contention is based on the fact that there was no refusal by the Registrar to order the document to be registered under Section 76, and that Section 77 limits the power to bring suits in the Civil Court to orders of the Registrar refusing to order documents to be registered under Sections 72 and 76. Section 76, Clause (a). is as follows: "Every Registrar refusing (a) to register a document except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situate within his district or that the document ought to be registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar," omitting Clause (6), "shall make an order of refusal, etc." Section 77 then provides for a suit where the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered. It is quite clear that some word or words has or have been accidentally omitted immediately after the words "district or" in Section 76, Clause (a) and that the clause should read: "Every Registrar refusing to register a document except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situate within his district, or to order that the document ought to be registered, etc." In the present case the Registrar did refuse to order that the document should be registered, and in our opinion he did in fact refuse under the provisions of Section 76 to order the document to be registered and accordingly the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court. The view we take is supported by the ruling in Kudrathi Begum v. Najib-un-nessa (1897) I.L.R., 25 Calc., 93.
2. The second point urged was that, inasmuch as the deed was not executed by Musammat Sunder, it was necessary not only to ascertain whether or not she had given the mukhtarnama to Makhan Lal, but also to ascertain whether or not she as a pardanashin lady had understood the contents of the mukhtarnama and had the same explained to her before she executed it. Neither in the Court of first instance nor in. the grounds of appeal has any point been taken as to the evidence by which the execution of the mukhtarnama was proved. The mukhtarnama was duly registered and a certificate of its registration was given in evidence, but it was not proved that the mukhtarnama was fully explained and understood by Musammat Sundar. In our judgment this was not a matter which the Registrar or the Civil Court in a suit brought under the provisions of Section 77 of the Registration Act should take into consideration. The Registrar and the Court in such a suit ought to concern themselves with the genuineness of the deed and not its validity. This view is supported by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Raj Lakhi Ghose v. Debendra Chundra Mojumdar (1897) I.L.R., 24 Calc., 668. Accordingly the second ground of appeal also fails and we dismiss the appeal with costs.