1. Heard Sri R.U. Ansari, Advocate, for petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for respondents.
2. After departmental inquiry, petitioner has been imposed punishment of dismissal by order dated 21.06.2000 whereagainst his appeal has also been rejected as barred by limitation by appellate order dated 27.12.2000 and both these orders are under challenge in this writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that evidence in departmental inquiry was recorded in his absence and petitioner was denied opportunity of cross examination. However, in the punishment order it is mentioned that despite repeated opportunities, petitioner did not participate in the departmental proceedings. The relevant extract of the punishment order in this regard reads as under:
^^vkjksih ds dFku esa dksbZ cy ugha gS D;ksafd vkjksih ckj&ckj cqyk;s tkus ij rFkk ;qfDr;qDr leLr mik;ksa dks djus ds ckn Hkh vkjksih tkap vf/kdkjh ds le{k mifLFkr ugh gqvk vkSj u gh ftjg fd;k] tkap vf/kdkjh ds le{k u gksus ds dkj.k gh vkjksih u gh c;ku fn;k vkSj u gh ftjg dh D;ksafd vkjksih vius vki dks tku&cw> dj vuqifLFkr j[kk bl izdkj bl dFku esa dksbZ cy ugha gSA^^ "The statement of the accused lacks substance because the accused, despite being summoned many a time and all reasonable steps being taken, did not appear before the inquiry officer, nor did he advance his pleas. As the accused did not appear before the inquiry officer, he neither gave his statement nor argued his case, having kept himself deliberately absent; hence, this statement lacks merit."
(English Translation by Court)
4. In the memo of appeal, it has not been stated anywhere that petitioner was not given any information and finding recorded in punishment order that despite repeated informations petitioner did not participate in the proceedings is perverse or incorrect. In the writ petition also, there is no challenge to the said findings. Therefore, the submission that evidence was recorded in absence of petitioner cannot be accepted and thus it cannot be said that any prejudice has caused to petitioner.
5. Apex Court in Union of India Vs. B.K. Srivastava AIR 1998 SC 300 held as under:
"We have been taken through the enquiry proceedings and we find that numerous adjournments were granted to the respondent and on many dates of hearing, he was stated to be on leave on account of ill-health. The respondent was given opportunity to inspect the record which he did. It cannot be said that ... he had been prejudiced in the defence of his case. After examining the evidence on record, the enquiry officer came to the conclusion that the charges stood proved against the respondent. It is not that there was no evidence before the enquiry officer."
6. It is further contended that punishment is wholly disproportionate and excessive inasmuch charge is only that petitioner was found in drunken condition and misbehaved creating a scene in public and therefore punishment of major penalty of dismissal could not have been imposed.
7. However, I find no force in the submission. Petitioner was a member of a disciplined force and he was expected to remain in a strict code of conduct so as to maintain law and order. Here petitioner himself has shown a conduct which was highly objectionable inasmuch the charge levelled against him is that showing indiscipline attitude he indulged in hooliganism in public after taking liquor while in uniform. This conduct of petitioner cannot be said to be justified in any manner and when the same has been found proved, punishment imposed cannot be said disproportionate.
8. Moreover, time and again, Apex Court has considered the scope of judicial review in the matter of quantum of punishment. Such power of judicial review is limited. It cannot be done in a routine manner.
9. In Chairman and M.D. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And Others Vs. T.K. Raju, 2006 (3) SCC 143 referring to earlier decisions in V. Ramanna Vs. APSRTC and Others (2001) 5 ALD 427 and State of Rajasthan and another Vs. Mohammad Ayub Naz JT 2006(1) SC 162, Court said that interference with the quantum of punishment should not be done in a routine manner.
10. In Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli Vs. Gulabhia M. Lad, 2010 (5) SCC 775, Court held:
"In the matter of imposing of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons there for. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review."
11. In Charanjit Lamba Vs. Commanding Officer, Southern Command and Others, AIR 2010 SC 2462, Court held:
"... the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is something that rests primarily with the disciplinary authority. The jurisdiction of a Writ Court or the Administrative Tribunal for that matter is limited to finding out whether the punishment is so outrageously disproportionate as to be suggestive of lack of good faith. What is clear is that while judicially reviewing an order of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee the Writ Court would not assume the role of an appellate authority. It would not impose a lesser punishment merely because it considers the same to be more reasonable that what the disciplinary authority has imposed. It is only in cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of charge that no reasonable person placed in the position of the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a punishment that a Writ Court may step in to interfere with the same."
12. In the above caution, restriction and limitation, as also the expositions of law, it is clear that the Court can have judicial review on the quantum of punishment which it is so outrageous and so excessive as to shock the conscience of a person of ordinary prudence. In my view, in the case in hand, conduct of the petitioner cannot be said so as to make punishment disproportionate to the charges proved against him. It has been held repeatedly that if the quantum of punishment is found to be shocking or so disproportionate as to no person of ordinary prudence would have come to such conclusion, only then the Court may interfere and not otherwise. This Court in Veerpal Singh Vs. Senior Superintendent of Police, Agra & others 2006 (5) ADJ 318 has held as under:
"Lastly the petitioner contended that the punishment is harsh and not commensurating to the offence and therefore, is liable to be set aside. Once the misconduct of the petitioner has been found proved, the scope of interference in the matter of punishment is extremely limited. It is only when the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the act or omission constituting misconduct that it shocks the conscience of the court or a person of ordinary prudence, only then the court may interfere and not otherwise. In any country where bigamy is an offence, a government servant guilty of committing an offence cannot ask to continue in service after award of minor or lesser punishment. Therefore, I do not find any reason to hold that the punishment imposed in the present case is arbitrary or so disproportionate to the act of misconduct so so as to warrant interference by the Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the constitution."
13. In view of above, I do not find the orders impugned in this writ petition liable to be interfered on this score.
14. No other point has been argued.
15. The writ petition lacks merits. Dismissed.
Dt. 24.01.2019 PS