ORDER Brijesh Kumar, J.
1. It is noticed, more often than not, that human mind tries to hide or subvert the truth or to cover it up, as and when it suits him or may serve his purpose best. It has never been easy to find out the correct and true facts but the task is becoming more and more difficult with growing social complexities.
2. Various ways and means have been explored and deployed for the purposes of finding out the true facts, at different levels for different purposes. The commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 is one of such legislations through which the effort is made to find out the true facts. But this Act and appointment of a Commission under it, does not ensure that the machinery is necessarily set in motion to achieve its object. There may still be many unforeseen hurdles which often come in the way retarding the progress of the enquiry. The present one is one of such cases where the Commission was appointed, though on 1-8-1991 but, it could hardly function that instant proceedings were initiated challenging the appointment of Mr. Justice K.P. Singh as Commission of Enquiry, besides a few orders passed by the Commission about place of its sitting and the sequence in which the evidence was to be led i.e. on the question as to who should lead the evidence first.
3. We have expressed the above feeling, which is certainly not accusatory in nature, but in anguish. Ten human lives have been lost. Human lives are precious. The Government considering it a matter of public importance appointed commission of Enquiry to find out the real facts. It would have been ideal if the Commission had got the fullest co-operation to act fast to achieve its object to find out the true facts, so that the Government could get the benefit of the report of the Commission and if necessary to initiate proper action against the erring parties. If such matters are allowed to get stale, the purpose of setting up Commissions of Enquiry is mutilated to a great extent.
4. The State Government, by Notification dated August, 1991, appointed Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.P. Singh, a sitting Judge of the Allahabad High Court, as then he was, as a single Member Commission of Enquiry, to enquire into the killing of ten persons in the night intervening 12/13th July, 1991 in police action, at the Pattabhoji, Police Circle Pooranpur, Phagunas Ghat, P.S. Bilsanda and Mahoph, P. S. Neuria in district Pillibhit.
5. It is said that the son of petitioner No. 1 namely, Talvinder Singh and brother of petitioner No. 2, Lakhvinder Singh, were amongst those who are said to have been killed by the Police. Killing of ten persons does not appear to be in dispute. However, according to the averments made in the writ petition, the petitioners' version of the incident is that these ten persons were the pilgrims, who were returning to Pilibhit after pilgrimage, but the bus was intercepted by the police party at Kachla Ghat in District Badaun. The ten persons were asked to get down and were shifted to a police mini bus. They were taken to Pilibhit, where they were taken out of the bus, subjected to torture by the police and ultimaterly they were done to death in false and fake encounters at three different places, namely, Phagunae Ghat, Pattabhoji jungle and Dhamoli Kuwa Mahooph Jungle in district Pilibhit.
6. The other version, namely, the version as given by the Police appears to be that the 10 persons killed, were the terrorists and the killing had taken place as a result of encounter in the night between 12th and 13th July, 1991 with the terrorists.
7. A perusal of the petition shows that the issue of killing of 10 persons was taken up by - different political parties as well as by other bodies and organisations. Thus, as in evident from Annexure-6, the Government took a decision to set up a high level judicial Commission of Enquiry and for that purpose, it was decided to request the High Court to nominate a sitting Judge for the purpose. Annexure-6 further mentions that some political and religious organisations had reacted adversely to the incident and had claimed that those who had been killed were not the terrorists. Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.P. Singh, then a sitting Judge of the Allahabad High Court, as indicated earlier, had been appointed a Single Member Commission of Enquiry under S. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952, with headquarters of the Commission at Allahabad. The Notification provided that the Commission shall enquire into and report in respect of the entire series of the said incident with a view to:--
(i) ascertaining the facts regarding the said incident including the causes thereof.
(ii) ascertaining the antecedents of the persons killed in the said incident and to determine as to whether the deceased persons were the terrorists, and
(iii) assessing the role of the officers and the employees concerned with regard to the said incident.
8. The petitioners have prayed for issue of a writ of quo warranto against Mr. Justice K.P. Singh. It has also been prayed that the Commission be restrained from proceeding with the enquiry. The petitioners are also aggrieved by the order dated 22-2-1992 passed by the Commission requiring the affected persons to lead their evidence first in support of their case as burden was upon them to show that the persons killed were the pilgrims and that they were arrested at Kachla Railway Bridge, district Badaun, and were killed but a false encounter was shown. The order dated 3-3-1992 refusing the request to hold proceedings at Pilibhit instead of Allahabad has also been impugned.
9. We may first take up the point relating to appointment and continuance of Mr. Justice K. P. Singh as Commission of Enquiry. According to the petitioners, it was clearly given out that a sitting Judge of the High Court would be appointed to enquire into the entire incident, which was obviously found to be a matter of public importance. The decision of the Government is amply evidenced by Annexure-6 to the writ petition. Mr. Justice K.P. Singh, when appointed on 1-8-1991, Was no doubt, then a sitting Judge of the Allahabad High Court, but within a couple of days thereafter, he had reached the age of superannuation. It is further submitted-that according to the notification annexure-3 to the writ petition itself, the Commission was required to submit its report within a period of three months. The report, therefore, could not obviously be submitted by Mr. Justice K.P. Singh as a sitting Judge. The appointment of the Commission was, therefore, not in accordance with, rather it was in breach of, what had been given out by the State Government. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it amounts to acting with malice in law. Sri Umesh Chandra, appearing for the petitioners, has very fairly submitted that the petitioners have nothing personally against the Hon'ble Judge who has been appointed as commission of Enquiry, nonetheless the action of the Government suffers from legal malice and is liable to be set aside.
10. In support of the above contention, reliance has been placed upon AIR 1967 SC 295, Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board. It was held in this case that if it is shown that the circumstances do not exist of that they are such that it is impossible for anyone to form any opinion therefrom, suggestive of conditions under which an order can be passed, such an opinion is challengea-ble on the ground of non-application of mind or perversity or on the ground that it based on collateral grounds. Next, reliance has also been placed upon AIR 1967 SC 483 : (1967 Cri LJ 520), Jaichand Lal Sethia v. State of West Bengal, holding tat if the statutory power is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended, the exercise of the power becomes mala fide. It does not necessarily imply any moral turpitude. Next, reliance has been placed upon a case reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505; (AIR 1989 SC 997), State of U. P. v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh. It has been held that discretion must be exercised with due application of mind and uninfluenced by and without surrendering to the dictates of extraneous body, authority or power. Biased exercise of discretionary, power is vitiated.
11. Yet another case referred to is AIR 1979 SC 49 : (1978 Lab IC 1641). Smt. S.R, Venkataraman v. Union of India, for the proposition that if the discretionary power is exercised for an unauthorised purpose, it renders the order bad. In such a situation, it is immaterial whether the authority was acting in good faith or bad faith. The Court, in para of the judgment, has referred to a decision reported in(1914) AC808, Shearer v. Shields, and quoted the passage dealing with the question of legal malice, wherein it was observed." Thus malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause.
12. On the basis of the cases referred to above, it is submitted that even though the State Government may have exercised the discretion vested in it, in appointing Mr. Justice K.P. singh as Single Member Commission of Enquiry, but the appointment is bad for the reason that the order of appointment cannot be said to be in consonance with what had been given but by the Government, for it can be said that mind was applied to the fact that a "sitting Judge" was to be appointed. The Hon'ble Judge appointed was no doubt a sitting Judge but he retired within a few days of the appointment. The order is not suggestive of such circumstances and conditions under which the order could be passed. It does not serve the purpose of appointing a "sitting Judge" as Commission of Enquiry. The order is thus vitiated.
13. In the short counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the State, it has been stated that there is no illegality or infirmity in the order appointing Hbn'ble Mr. Justice K.P. Singh as Commission of Enquiry and it is further stated that the Hon'ble Judge was appointed on the recommendation of Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court. It is also the case of the opposite party No. 1 that retirement of Mr. Justice K.P. Singh does not invalidate his appointment as Commission of Enquiry, having been appointed under S. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act.
14. The main question to be considered is whether the-appointment of Mr. Justice K.P. Singh as commission-of Enquiry can be said to be illegal on suffering from any infirmity or malice in law so as to be liable to be set-aside. In our view, the answer should be in-negative. The appointment is neither in breach of any law, nor that of the provisions of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952. It is also not the case of the petitioners. The main thrust has been that the action of the State Government in appointing Mr. Justice K.P. Singh as Commission of Enquiry suffers from malice in law, as purpose sought to be achieved by appointing a sitting Judge would not be served by the appointment in question. The appointment should have been made of an Hon'ble Judge, who had at least to be a sitting Judge for a period of three months since the Commission was required to submit its report within three months. We are afraid the cases relied upon, as referred to in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment, do not help the petitioners. We may have to see as to what was given out by the Government regarding appointment of the Commission under the Act. A perusal of Annexure-6 to the writ petition would show that the purpose was to appoint a high level judicial enquiry to probe into the incident in question. This was the purpose to be achieved by the notification. It cannot be said that the main purpose was that it must be conducted by a sitting Judge. It was no doubt so mentioned but it cannot be said to be the sole purpose. There is nothing to indicate how purpose of instituting a high level judicial enquiry would not be served by appointing a sitting Judge of the High Court who was due to retire a little while after his appointment. Some other relevant facts and circumstances can also not be ignored. In the short counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it has been clearly stated that the appointment was made on the recommendation of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. There may have been good reasons for Hon'ble the Chief Justice to recommend the name of a sitting Judge who was going to retire shortly, may be for the reason of pressure of work, it may not have been thought feasible to spare an Hon'ble Judge who had to continue in office for a longer-period. But it is not necessary for us. to dwell upon that arid to find put reasons justifying such recommendation. The fact remains that on the request made by the Government, Hon'ble the Chief Justice Recommended the name of a sitting Judge, who had been appointed by the State Government as Commission of Enquiry. The purpose of instituting a high level judicial enquiry would definitely be served by such an appointment and this alone was the main purpose. Therefore, it cannot be said that for the above reason, the order of appointment suffers from malice in law.
15. If at all, at best, it could be said that it would have been better if an Hon'ble Judge, who had to continue in office for a longer period had been appointed, for the reason that it was so given out by the State. Raising of such an objection, as raised, could have than been avoided. But, by not doing what might have been better, would not render the order passed, invalid, nor it could be said to be suffering from malice in law. As observed earlier also, the cases relied upon by the petitioners do not support the contention raised on their behalf. We are of firm view that the order of appointment of Mr. Justice K.P. singh as Commission of Enquiry suffers from no illegality, nor from vice of malice in law. The purpose sought to be achieved by instituting a high level judicial enquiry into the incident in question is completely fulfilled by the order of appointment of Commission of Enquiry impugned in this case. We, therefore, repel the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners.
16. "We find no substance in the next contention too that as soon as the Hon'ble Judge retired as Judge, he ceased to be commission of Enquiry for the reason that he was appointed as such leaving a sitting Judge -of the High Court. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon a case reported in, AIR 1968 SC 453, Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S. N. Sarma, where it has been held that on appointment as commission of Enquiry, one does not cease to be a Judge of the High Court and is fully competent to act as a judge whenever he is not working as Commission of Enquiry. The said case was decided in a different context, where it was objected that being a Commission of Enquiry, the Judge could not act as a Judge of the High Court. This contention was repelled observing that he continues to be a Judge of the High Court and can act as such. That analogy does not apply in the present case. By retirement, it cannot be said that any disqualification had been incurred, rendering the appointment or continuance of the appointee illegal or inoperative. Mr. Justice K.P. Singh was appointed as Commission of Enquiry who was then a sitting Judge of the High Court. His retirement as a Judge or being in office is immaterial. It has no bearing on his appointment as Commission of Enquiry. Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.P. Singh was appointed Commission of Enquiry who has been described as sitting Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The appointment as Commission of Enquiry was not dependent upon his continuance as a Judge of the High Court. The appointment was made in exercise of power vested under S. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act. It does not provide that the appointee must be a sitting Judge of High Court. We find no substance in the argument raised and repel the same.
17. After recording a finding that the appointment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.P. Singh suffers from no illegality, we may next examine as to whether the orders passed by the Commission contained in Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition are valid or not. Let us examine Annexure-2 first. It is an order dated 22-2-1992, by which the Commission required, the affected persons, who allege that ten persons were killed in fake encounters, to lead evidence in support of their contention. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Commission should have required the police officers to lead their evidence first and not the affected persons. In this connection he has drawn our attention to the observation made by the Commission in the order to the effect, "since the burden is on the affected persons to show that the affected persons were pilgrims....... Therefore, it is but necessary that the affected persons should lead evidence in support of the contentions raised by them." The submission is that the commission has required the affected persons to adduce their evidence first on the assumption that burden of proof is upon them to establish their case. It is submitted that normally the police is not supposed to resort to firing and to kill persons. Even if it becomes necessary to open fire, it should not be more than what may be just necessary ten persons have been killed by the police. The Government has considered it to be a matter of Public importance. In these circumstance the police officers are required to explain their conduct and the above facts, first.
18. In connection with the above contention, it will be necessary to find out the nature of enquiry, that is held under the Commissions of Enquiry Act. It is well settled and not in dispute that such an enquiry is only a fact finding enquiry. It is "inquisitorial" and not accusitorial. The findings are not enforceable. After a report of fact finding is submitted to the Government, it takes a decision on the report. It is equally settled and also not in dispute that the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply to these proceedings, hence the law relating to burden of proof does not apply.
18.1. As a matter of fact, the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the commission also states in para 27 that the Commission has not adopted the provisions of the Evidence Act and that they do not apply to the proceedings under the Commissions of Enquiry Act. It has also been stated in para 28 that the scope of enquiry by the Commission is only that of enquiry to find out the facts. It is also averred that there is no question of placing burden of proof of any fact upon any party.
19. In support of his contention that the police officers should be required to adduce their evidence.-- first, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon a case reported in AIR 1973 Bombay 171, Sarjerao kondiba Sagar v. P. G. Karnik. In some incident of violence, the police had also taken resort to firing. That matter was to be inquired by a Commission of Enquiry. The Division Bench took the view that all relevant facts justifying firing and that it was not excessive, would be and should be within the knowledge of the officers involved in the incident, so they must justify the same in their examination-in-chief. Thus the officers were required to lead their evidence first.
20. In matters of enquiries before a Commission of Enquiry, what weight and importance can be attached to the fact of leading evidence first, is a question which need be considered at this stage. It is needless to refer case law on the question of inapplicability of the Evidence Act in such proceedings. However, a reference has been made to a case reported in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, holding that in domestic enquiries and enquiries before the administrative tribunals etc., strict and sophisticated rules of the Evidence Act are not applicable. The legal position is also not in dispute between the parties. Both sides agree that the Evidence Act does not apply, nor any question of placing burden of proof on any party arises. So far the observation made by the Commission in the order, Annexure-2, observing "Since the burden is on the affected persons to show that....." is concerned, it is true, the word "burden" has been used in the order, but it does not mean that the Commission has placed the burden of proof upon the petitioners or upon the affected persons. Enquiry by a Commission under the Commissions of Enquiry Act does not culminate into any decision. There are no parties before it, nor there is any "list between the parties. The above position in law has been clearly laid down in the case reported in, AIR 1988 SC 1883, Kehar Singh v. State. The relevant observations are to be found in para 234 of the judgment. It is, also observed that the enquiry is "inquisitorial" rather than "accusitorial". Thus in a proceeding where there are no parties to the proceedings having any lis between them which is to be decided, in our view, question of burden of proof loses its importance. Both parties are aware of the matter. Whatever facts both parties place before the Commission in the shape of evidence including affidavits and statements etc., the Commission of Enquiry has to consider that material, and record its findings. These findings are neither a 'decision' nor they are enforceable. This position of law is evident from the decisions, namely, AIR 1958 SC 538, Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and AIR 1967 SC 122, the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Sulam Mohammad. In the above circumstances, the mere use of the word "burden" in the order Annexure-2 passed by the Commission is of no significance or consequence.
21. The Commission has also been given power to frame its own rules and procedure. It has discretion to require any party to adduce evidence first. The opposite party No. 2 has also framed its rules of procedure in exercise of power under S. 8 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 read with S. 4 and 5 of the said Act, Rule 10 of the Rules aforesaid provides as follows:--
"10. Oral evidence after examination of the Statement/affidavit of the parties received in response to the public notice, the Commission may in its discretion call upon any person to give oral evidence in addition to the witnesses, a list of which would be filed by the respective parties. The Commission will decide the order in which the evidence will be recorded. On the request of the state or any party connected with the enquiry, the Commission may recall any witness already examined or summon any new witness, if it is established that it is necessary for the determination of a fact".
22. From the above rule, it is clear that it is the discretion of the Commission to decide, in which order the evidence shall be recorded. Another aspect of the matter which may be taken note of is that admittedly affidavits from both sides, namely, from the side of police officers as well as from the side of affected persons have already been filed, i.e. to say, both sides have disclosed their cases and they are quite aware of the cases of each other. It is now immaterial as to who leads the evidence first.
23. The case reported in AIR 1989 SC714 : (1989 Cri LJ 903). Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh v. Committee of Enquiry has also been referred: It mainly relates to the question of opportunity of hearing which an office is entitled to, under S. 8B of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, but the question of sequence in which the evidence is to be produced was also considered; It appears that on behalf of the police officers it was submitted before the Commission of Enquiry that since serious accusations were made by the lawyers against Smt. Kiran Bedi, the lawyers should be called upon to lead their evidence to substantiate their allegations. This submission did riot find favour with the Court for the reason that the stress seemed to be more on the question of burden of proof. The questions for consideration have been formulated in para 15 of the judgment, question No. (i) reads as follows--"whether the procedure adopted by the Committee with regard to the sequence in which witnesses were to be examined was legal? "The answer to this question No. (i) has been given in para 16 of the judgment which reads as follows:--
"With regard to point No. (i) we are of the opinion that apart from the directions contained in paragraph 4 of our order dated 18th August, 1988 reported in AIR 1988 SC 2252 regarding the stage at which persons falling under S. 8B of the Act were to be examined and also what has been observed in para 2 of the said order, we do not find it expedient to lay down any particular rigid procedure to be followed by the Committee with regard to sequence in which witnesses were to be examined by it.
24. In the case reported in AIR 1988 SC 2252, the Supreme Court had directed that Delhi Administrastion had to examine its witnesses first in view of the provisions of Rule 5(51)(a) of the Commission of Enquiry Central Rules, 1972. In the present case, no rule has been shown requiring the Administration to adduce its evidence first. On the other hand, the last part of para 16 quoted above, keeps it open for the Commission to decide the question as to who would lead evidence first. The Supreme Court did not think it expedient to lay down any rigid procedure in the matter. The mere fact that the Commission has used the word "burden" in its Order, Annexcure-2, or has required the affected persons to lead their evidence first, does not in any manner vitiate the order. Each of the participants or set of participants in the proceedings, has to place its facts before the Commission. It has to be in one or the other sequence. Any one of the parties has to adduce evidence first. Much. significance cannot be attached to order in which the facts are placed before the commission by different parties. Such things have relevance in judicial proceedings where there are contesting parties, one seeking relief against the other and the court has to pass an enforceable decree against one of them. The nature of proceeding before the Commission of Enquiry is entirely different. The Commission of Enquiry has to look into the facts that are put by different parties and members of the public etc. and it has only to ascertain the facts in the matter and forward its report containing findings to the Government. It is for the Government to decide what measures or action it has to take, if at all. In case, judicial proceedings are initiated in any court of law, in pursuance of the report, then question of proof and burden of proof etc. will arise in the judicial proceedings and the persons proceeded against will have all benefits, if any of the procedural law, or that of the provisions of the Evidence Act. For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners and we feel that no good ground has been made out to interfere in the order passed by the Commission requiring the affected persons to lead their evidence first even though the word "burden" may have been used in the order. For the same reasons and in view of what has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kiran Bedi (supra), we feel unable to persuade ourselves to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sarjerao Kondiba Sagar (supra).
25. We then come to the question of place of sitting of the Commission. According to the petitioners, the Commission of Enquiry should hold proceedings at Pilibhit and not at Allahabad. It this connection, Rule 4(a) of the Rules framed by the Commission has been brought to the notice of the Court, which provides that the Commission shall generally hold its sitting in civil court, Pilibhit or at any other place as may be notified from time to time. It further provides that if necessary, the Commission shall hold its sitting at Allahabad. It is submitted that initially the Commis-sion had fixed the place of sitting at pilibhit but later it fixed dates-of hearing at Allahabad. It is submitted that most of the witnesses to be produced on behalf of the petitioners are residents of Pilibbit or adjoining districts of Rampur and Shahjahanpur. The witnesses are not very affluent or rich so as to afford travelling to Allahabad leaving their vocation at Pilibhit. It is also not convenient to go directly to Allahabad from Pilibhit which takes about eighteen hours. Apart from the above factors, it was also contended that their counsels at Pilibhit had been rendering free service without charging any fee. Therefore, the counsels would not be in a position to be at Allahabad for any long time. Yet another submission made on behalf of the petitioners is that the witnesses do not feel safe in going V from Pilibhit to Allahabad as they have apprehension from police. It is further submitted that the distance between Allahabad and Pilibhit is about 500 Kms. All the above facts and circumstances coupled with Rule 4(a) only lead to the conclusion that the sitting of the Commission should take place at Pilibhit and not at Allahabad. It has then been stated in para 51 of the petition that in case the Commission feels that Pilibhit may not be a safe place, the enquiry may be held at Bareilly which is about 55 kms. from Pilibhit and is the Divisional Commissioner's head-quarter as well.
26. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties, reference to S. 8 of the Commission of Enquiry Act has been made which provides that the commission shall, subject to any rules that may be made, have power to fix places of its sittings. R. 4(a) framed by the Commission has also been relied upon to show that the said rule also provides that if necessary, the Commission shall hold its sitting at Allahabad. It has, therefore, been contended that the Commis-
sion is legally quite competent to fix place of hearing at Allahabad. Thus, there is no illegality in the order passed by the Commission as contained in Annexure-I to the writ petition. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the Commission had at first notified its sittings at Pilibhit from 26th to 28th November, 1991 but since the atmosphere was not congenial there, on the request of the district authorities, sittings of the Commission had to be adjourned on those dates: It is further stated that the district administration had informed the Commission of an incident of blasting of a police truck of 1-12-1991, as a result of which the situation in Pilibhit has become very tense and an adjournement was sought on the above ground. In the above circumstances, the Commission did not proceed to Pilibhit but sent its staff. The staff had received the affidavits which were filed on behalf of the parties. So far question of expenditure in attending the proceedings of the Commission at Allahabad by the witnesses is concerned, it has been stated in para 15 of the counter affidavit that a provision has been made by the Commission for payment of travelling expenses incurred by any of the witnesses summoned by the Commission. In connection with feeling of insecurity which has been expressed by the petitioners, it has been stated that the witnesses could ask for adequate security for them.
27. Looking to all facts and circumstances as indicated above, one think which is clear is that the Commission of Enquiry, under S. 8 of the Act, has full power and jurisdiction to fix its own place of sittings rule in that connection, namely, Rule 4(A) has also been framed that generally sitting shall be held at Pilibhit but they can also be held at Allahabad after due notice to all concerned, from time to time, It is also evident that initially hearing was fixed at Pilibhit but at the request of the district Administration, they had to be adjourned twice because of tense situation prevailing in the area. In such circumstances, fixing of dates at Allahabad cannot be complained of, nor it can be said that it is a closed matter for ever. The Commission can pass fresh orders from time to time in different circumstances, in regard to the place of sitting etc. It is not possible to bind the Commission to fix its place of sitting at any particular place alone. The best course open to the affected persons and the Witnesses would only be to approach the Commission itself in case any difficulty is felt in production of evidence at Allahabad. So far question of expenses and security is concerned, the Commission has very categorically stated that the witnesses summoned by the Commission at Allahabad would get their expenses, and proper arrangements for security, if demanded, would also be made. In para 51 of the writ petition, the petitioners have given a list of nine witnesses and their ages, who, according to the petitioners, are quite old persons. It is submitted that it would be convenient and desirable that they are examined at Pilibhit or for that matter, sitting can be held at Bareilly. In reply to the said averment, it has been stated in the counter affidavit that in case persons mentioned in para 51 of the writ petition, make a request to the Commission, the same can be considered by it at the appropriate time. It is further stated that those persons had not made any request so far to the Commission. Even no request to summon them had been made. The reply mentioned above also makes it clear that the , Commission intends to function with an open mind. If a request is made, according to the Commission itself, such a request would be considered at the appropriate stage. The Commission has many options open before it. It can hold sitting at Pilibhit where sittings have to be generally held according to Rule 4(1) it can also consider to hold its sitting at Allahabad or at any other place if it thinks that it would be safer and convenient to hold its sitting at such a place. The only appropriate thing for the petitioners or the witness or affected persons, would, therefore, be to approach the commission instead of praying for issuance of a writ directing the Commission to hold its enquiry at any particular place.
28. For the reasons indicated above, we find no merit in the petition. It is accordingly dismissed and the order of interim relief is discharged.
There would, however, be no order as to costs.
29. Petition dismissed.