JUDGMENT Ryves, J.
1. In this appeal the short point is whether the letter sent by the defendants on the 20th of January, 1917 is an admission of liability within the meaning of Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. The suit was one for balance of account and admittedly was time barred unless limitation was extended by this letter.
2. Both Courts have found that it was a clear admission of liability within the meaning of that section. The decisive words are that the writer admitted the existence of a running account between the parties and went on to say that his representatives would in Phagun or Chait compare accounts and pay what was found to be due.
3. The learned Counsel for the appellants has relied on the case of Jageshwar Roy v. Raj Narain Mitter (1904) 31 Cal. 195. In every case of this kind the document in question has to be interpreted by its own language and it is not very helpful to cite rulings as to the meaning to be attached to a document in another case unless the wording is the same. The case of Jageshwar Roy v. Raj Narain Mitter is entirely distinguishable from this case. That was not a case of accounts between the parties and the wording of that letter is very different from the present one. In our opinion the matter is really concluded by the Privy Council case, Mani Ram Seth v. Seth Rup Chand (1906) 33 Cal. 1047.
4. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but without costs as the respondents are not represented.