JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J.
1. Present : Mr. Tarun Agarwal on behalf of the petitioners. Messrs. Ashok Mehta, Chief Standing Counsel. U. P., B. N. Misra. Additional Standing Counsel. U. P., Krishna Prasad, Standing Counsel. U. P.. U. K. Pandey, Standing Counsel, U. P., Sabhajeet Yadav, Standing Counsel, U. P. Ashok Mohiley, Standing Counsel, for the Nagar Nigam. Allahabad and Shishir Kumar. Additional Standing Counsel, Central Government for the respondents.
Mr. Alok Tandon. District Magistrate, Allahabad, Dr. S. K. Pandey, City Magistrate. Allahabad and Ms. Sangeeta Singh, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Allahabad.
2. All these matters which have been listed before the Court basically raise one issue on what the concept of a public road is. In answering this question, will see the resolution of all the cases. This Court is taking up Writ Petition No. 3119 of 1987 : Sanjay Agarwal v. Nagar Mahapalika. Allahabad as the leading case, as this has presented two issues. First the petitioner contends that public streets are not meant to be encroached and, secondly, now Tehbazari cannot be conducted on public roads and streets.
3. The petitioner. Sanjay Agarwal is a rate payer. He contends that he pays taxes to the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad as it was known previously (now Nagar Nigam, Allahabad). The contention of the petitioner is that he has access to every inch of his property and no one may question him from which point or place he may have access from his property, to the public road for his egress or ingress. Thereafter, he contends that the action of the respondents in setting up squatters which has taken the shape of a vegetable market is illegal. He contends that this Tehbazari which has been running paralte to his property is on the side walk of a public road. This is public nuisance. he contends, and he prays that the vegetable market in front of his property be removed or shifted. In so far as the last request is concerned, the petitioner relies on a resolution which the local administration had passed on 4th November, 1986. The petitioner contends that he normally would not have filed a writ petition before the High Court as he was under a legitimate expectation that the local administration has resolved the issue by taking a decision that the vegetable market, on which Tehbazari is being collected by the respondents, will be shifted from the present place in front of his house to another location near about the State Carpentry School towards north. In this connection, the petitioner has placed before the Court a resume of proceedings recording the minutes of the local administration of several agendas at the relevant time by which certain city problems had seen a solution. In so far as the petitioner is concerned, it is contended, that he is concerned only with Hem No. 3. For the purposes of record, item No. 3 is reproduced below :
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4. The contention of the petitioner, Sanjay Agarwal, is that once this decision had been taken, he was anticipating and had confidence that local Government will shift the vegetable vendors and the consequential Tehbazari away and elsewhere, from its present place in front of his premises and on the side walk (patri) along the public road and his boundary wall. Finding that the respondents were taking their own time in shifting this vegetable hawkers market, he was left with no option, but to approach the High Court in its prerogative writ Jurisdiction for the purposes of seeking a mandamus requiring the local administration to perform its statutory duty (a) to remove the nuisance of occupation of a public road, pathway and pavement, (b) to give him access to every inch of his property from egress and ingress and
(c) keep the public streets and roads free from any encroachments only for the purpose for which it had been laid out, that is, passage.
5. No further details need be noticed except for the fact that this matter has been pending before the Court for the last twelve years. The respondents accept the record that a resolution had been passed by the local administration on 4th November. 1986 for removing the vegetable vendors and the consequential Tehbazari collected from them in front of the petitioner's property. The contention of the petitioner is that the plan of the respondents was part of the public plan for removing encroachments from other public roads in Allahabad, also. In between submissions and the grievance of the petitioner on which he desires the local administration to perform its statutory obligation, the matter has lain dormant. By procrastinating the implementation of the plan to shift this vegetable roadside market, the local administration, apparently, has complicated the situation, compromised with its resolution and has, as of date, done nothing and the situation continued exactly as it was on the day when the resolution of 4th November, 1986 had been passed.
6. On record, there is no doubt nor issue that the vegetable vendors had to be given an alternative site at a place near and about the State Carpentry. School. This is a mailer of record. In 1992, when the matter was taken up for hearing, the record shows that while the local administration was placing a scheme before the High Court for shifting the vegetable market to the nearby State Carpentry School, simultaneously, it was permitting a television studio to be established at the same alternate site. The foundation stone of the television studio was being permitted by inviting a former Prime Minister. On this, the Court had expressed in its order of 22nd May. 1992 : "This Court has doubts whether the Prime Minister was correctly briefed by the local administration that he was laying a foundation stone of a television studio at a place reserved for shifting a wholesale vegetable market carried on by road-side vendors. This in itself shows that within the local administration, the right hand never knew what the left hand was doing, as if to suggest on record that one alternate site suggested by the local administration, itself, even prior to the filing of the petition had disappeared. The problem was made and lingered by the local administration. The petitioner now presses on his petition that the situation is further being complicated. One thing is clear that the road-side pavements cannot be occupied by any one and the purpose for the public road is for passage only.
7. When this Court took up the hearing of this case this month, another complication was placed, as if to further frustrate the decision of the local administration of 4th November, 1986 to shift the vegetable vendors from its present site to the alternative site already selected and picked by the local administration. The Court will revert to this aspect later.
8. When the order of 22nd May. 1992 was passed, the local administration suggested to the Court that near the State Carpentry School where the Tehbazari was intended to be shifted, now occupied by the recently constructed Doordarshan Television Studios, is a large public Nala or drain and that they had planned to make a permanent drainage system taking the sewerage of that part of the city through cement pipes, and land-fill the khud (ravine) and on the space, then made available by the land-fill shift the road-side vegetable vendors, here. Between 1992 and now. seven years have passed and nothing has been done on the land-fill site to bring it to the level of the adjoining land. But what has happened is that on part of the land fill three allotments were made by another local body which the Court is now being indicated had been cancelled and on another part of the land-fill, the Mumfordganj Telephone Exchange has been set up. All this only shows that for every alternate site suggested to the Court, the local administration was itself destroying its alternates. The details of how the land-fill had to be done on the Nala near by the Carpentry School and the land space which would have been available are contained in the order of 22nd May, 1992, which order in this very case forms part of this order. Suffice it to say that, between 1992 and as of now, that is seven years, the local administration did nothing to make this site ready as an alternative and permitted others including Government agencies to occupy these places.
9. As the case goes into hearing after twelve years, the Court reminded the respondents to carefully see its resolution of 4th November, 1986. The resolution is very clear in its terms in accepting that the squatters on the public road. Master Zaharul Hasan Road, commonly known as Katra Road, carrying on hawking had to stop and shifted elsewhere. Before the Court, no exercise worth the name has been shown that the local administration has been acting on its policy decision. This only shows that at every given stage on a public road nuisance within the meaning of Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was continuing as a continued wrong. In so far as the petitioner is concerned, he is personally aggrieved as his egress and ingress into his properly is being obstructed. But the Court is not taking up any aspect of any private right of the petitioner. In so far as the petitioner is concerned his grievance both in private and public law is valid and justified to sustain this writ petition.
10. In a decision of the Kerala High Court, on which reliance has been placed, the proposition is that the petitioner has a vested right to complain to the public authorities, as they have failed in the performance of their statutory duties and obligations, to remove encroachments on public roads. It is contended, he is entitled to bring his grievance by this petition. The petitioner relies on a decision of the Kerala High Court, re. Godavari v. Cannanore Municipality, AIR 1985 Ker 2, to submit that the Nagar Mahapatika, that is to say, the municipal body, has no right to encroach public streets. Further, as this has resulted in the petitioner facing consequential effect of these encroachments, he has a right to address the Nagar Mahapalika to remove this encroachment. The Nagar Mahapalika took a decision, but did not execute it. In the circumstances, the petitioner contends that he has a right of access at every point where his land adjoins the public street. He further contends that for this reason also the local municipality has no right to put up constructions obstructing the petitioner's access to the public street at whichever point it might be. It may be said that in this case of Godavari v. Cannanore Municipality (supra) several decisions of the Supreme Court are noticed which have been discussed in the matter under consideration also.
11. The issue to be answered is whether public roads can be obstructed by squatters or whether the local administration can permit Tehbazari on public roads or in front of rate payers' properties. The matter before the Court is one of public law.
12. Before the Court goes into the aspect of noticing the precedents and case law, one recent development needs to be noticed on facts. The Court cautioned the local administration that its resolution of 4th November. 1986 mentions finding an alternate near the State Carpentry School, even that alternate has been lost because Doordarshan Television studios have been put on that spot. The respondents acknowledged that with the passage of time they had rusted the policy decision of their resolution of 4th November. 1986. The resolution says "CARPENTRY SCHOOL KE AAS PASS".
13. Here the Court may appreciate the fairness of the Chief Standing Counsel that he sought a short adjournment to advise the District Magistrate, Allahabad, that the resolution may be seen again as it still lies unimplemented and any area which may be near and in the vicinity of the State Carpentry School should be (a) surveyed and (b) indicated to the Court. The Chief Standing Counsel himself joined the inspection. It was reported to the Court that opposite the State Carpentry School is also an estate which is part of the State Carpentry School measuring about more than 5 acres. This estate has a dilapidated building and is in disuse, like the other area of the State Carpentry School, which institution having become derelict and neglected within its estate saw Doordarshan Television studios established despite status quo orders of the High Court. The statement made by learned Chief Standing Counsel, on instructions from the District Magistrate, was that the local administration will shift this Tehbazari temporarily to this place. That, learned Chief Standing Counsel, mentioned on instructions that it will be shifted temporarily to this place also has a background. This became clear when an affidavit, of the City Magistrate, dated 15th April. 1999, on behalf of the district administration, was filed before the High Court. This was followed by another affidavit of the District Magistrate, Allahabad, dated 16th April, 1999. Between these two affidavits, it appears other arrangements on this estate had been made. Learned Chief Standing Counsel had instructions to submit that these arrangements were unknown to the District Magistrate and had only been discovered when the Court had required the local administration, during hearing of the writ petition, to act on its decision of 4th November, 1986.
14. The contents of the affidavit filed by City Magistrate, Allahabad are reproduced below :
"1. That the deponent is presently posted as City Magistrate, Allahabad and as such, he is fully acquainted with the facts of the case deposed to below.
2. That just opposite Carpentry School, at 5 New Katra Road, Allahabad a big compound is situated, which at present is under occupation of Regional Vocational Training Institute for Women, Government of India, Ministry of Labour. A true copy of report of Principal. R.V.T.I.. Allahabad dated 14.4.1999 is filed herewith and marked as Annexure-1.
3. That the lease has been executed in favour of Central Government to erect a house building thereon for use as Regional Vocational Training Institute and a true copy of the lease deed is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-2.
4. That (he compound is very big one, no constructions at present are going on and for temporary shifting of the Katra Sabzi Mandi, till proper arrangements are made in accordance with the report of Commissioner, dated 4th May. 1994 the Subzi Mandi can be shifted to that compound temporarily. (Emphasis).
5. That with regard to the present writ petition the District Magistrate has submitted a report to the Chief Standing Counsel dated 14th April. 1999. A true copy of the said report is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-3."
15. The contents of the affidavit filed by, the District Magistrate. Allahabad are reproduced below :
"1. That the deponent is District Magistrate and Collector, Allahabad and as such is fully acquainted with the facts of the case deposed to below.
2. That with regard to the land Plot Nos. 461. 462, 464, 468 of Government Wood Working Institute, Allahabad a proposal was sent by the Principal of that Institute to the Director, Training and Employment, U.P. and the proposal was then forwarded to the State Government by the Director which was accepted by the State Government in the year 1992. The lease deed dated 23.1.1995 was executed by the State Government through Director. Training and Employment. U. P., Lucknow.
3. That in revenue records the land is still entered in the name of Rajkiya Carpeniry School (Government Wood Working Institute). A copy of Khataunl is enclosed herewith as Annexure-1.
4. That the deponent had no personal knowledge of transfer of the land in question to Ministry of Labour, Government of India till 13.4.1999."
16. The affidavit filed by the District Magistrate. Allahabad contends that the revenue record corresponding to 1405 Fasli (1988-1999), being the Khatauni. a true copy of which certified by the office of the District Magistrate on 16th February, 1999 has been filed, does not record any transfer. It is on this that the District Magistrate contends that the revenue record does not record any transfer, as of date.
17. The facts as submitted are rather strange, but are being noticed, as learned Chief Standing Counsel desires that the Court notices these circumstances. Without the participation and consultation with the local administration, this other estate which is part of the State Carpentry School measuring more than 5 acres, was settled with Regional Vocational Training institute for Women, Ministry of Labour, Government of India. A lease had been drawn up. The lease had been drawn up on 23rd January, 1995. The consideration of the lease was Rs. 1. It was submitted before the Court that this area had been transferred to the Government of India and that possession had been delivered to the Government of India. It was also indicated to the Court that for the last seven years, nothing has been heard of any planning and this area ties dormant, vacant and in disuse. The settlement record were shown to the Court. As the lease deed has been drawn up in the year 1992, the lease register of Government estates effective from 1398 Fasli (1991 A.D.) mentioned nothing aboul this transfer and all the columns which normally ought to record such settlements, having been made by the Government, in favour of any other person which the administration is obliged to record, are conspicuous by their absence. The lease register of Government estates does not record these transfers even today while the hearing of this case is concluding with this judgment.
18. Learned Chief Standing Counsel explained that the local administration had no part in whatever took place between New Delhi and Lucknow and that a large track of land, otherwise under the direct supervision of the District Magistrate/Commissioner. Allahabad, stood transferred to the Government of India. This aspect of transfer of Government land without consulting the local administration, the Court is of the opinion, is irregular. The Court is reminded of two cases of the Supreme Court. The first case is a case in which a large part of a public park in the State of Karnataka, under the order of the Chief Minister, stood transferred to an organisation, which had planned to establish a medical college in a public park. The Supreme Court was critical that the local administration should be bye-passed and took note of the file notings recording endorsements of the Chief Minister and deprecating the tendency to belittle local self-Government by saying, in effect, that the local administration should best be left in the district and not run from State capitals. Bangalore Medical Trust v. B. S. Muddappa. AIR 1991 SC 1902. In another case, the Zoning Authority had prevented the spread of a commercial venture as a hotel in and around a lake in the State of Tamilnadu. The local administration did not permit it. The Chief Minister interfered with the local self-government in the district. The Supreme Court was not appreciative of the fact that in such matters of discipline in urban construction and environment protection instructions should be given from the top which result in for violation of planned urban habitats. Pleasant Stay Hotel v. Pilani Conservation Council. 1995 (6) SCC 127.
19. The Court is citing these two cases of the Supreme Court as in the present cases what has happened is that the local administration, apparently, seems to have been caught unawares, at least it claims, that it was making arrangements to shift squatters from a public road and clear it for the purpose for which the road is laid, i.e., passage only, to an alternate site available which was frustrated from the hierarchy. First, when a Doordarshan Studio was put in the State Carpentry School, a place where the Tehbazarl of vegetable vendors had been planned for shifting. Later, another alternate north of the State Carpentry School, the land-fill site, a no-mans-land was never made ready, though committed on record to the High Court. And yet later with this no-mans-land identified but not made ready), the District Magistrate was suggesting that the State Carpentry School had more spare land across the road, east, and this could take the shift of the Tehbazari vegetable market at present half a kilometer away.
20. No sooner this alternate was suggested, the administration of the District Magistrate, after two days mentioned that unknown to the District Magistrate, but learnt from the Principal. State Carpentry School, this site has been allotted to Regional Vocational Training Institute for Women. Government of India. Ministry of Labour. No doubt the establishment of this institution will be good for the region, and it should not be misunderstood that its planning and set up should be blocked. But, this case has been pending since 1987. The land suggested to the Court to implement resolution of local administration dated 4th November. 1986, is an alternate chosen thirteen years ago. The local administration gave an assurance to the people of the area that the nuisance of occupation of public roads by squatters and vegetable market will be removed.
21. The local administration its fabric is local self-government constituted by the people, for the people and of the people. Public plans must be shared with the elected representatives of the people. This is local democracy. And, if any assurance was given to the Court, by local administration on a plan, that faith should have acted upon. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court in its two decisions (supra) highlighted that local matters must be discussed, planned, finalised and executed by the local administration. This facilitates co-ordination, solutions to the satisfaction of local people, and an administration which is seen in transparency and consequentially, decentralised. Talking the people of the area that encroachments will be taken off the road and the rehabilitation of vendors will be at a selected site, is a promise which should have kept and not broken by foundation laying ceremonies by dignitaries in position. And at what cost? Erosion of faith. The people then take to Courts. This case is an example.
22. It is hard to believe that the local administration is unaware who is occupying State land, and is unmindful of encroachments on public roads and a vegetables market which has during day time blocked. obstructed and rendered a public road useless. The shifting of this Tehbazari vegetable market is being embroiled by the administration into a localised political issue, tailor-made for roadside dadas, who, for their personal advertisement, will compromise the law and Supreme Court judgments, which under the Constitution, is also law to be carried out by all civil authorities. It is law that public roads and side walks cannot be blocked or encroached by anyone not even the Government. This is the law, which for the benefit of all, and the administration, the Court is obliged to reiterate on the several decisions of the Supreme Court.
substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter". In the case of Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Gumam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38, the Supreme Court reiterated the law that to remove an encroachment of a public road is the obligation of a municipality and that an injunction could not be granted to suffer an encroachment of a public place like a street which is meant for the use of the pedestrians. In the matter of Sohan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1989 SC 1988, the Supreme Court did not permit the plea of life and liberty to be raised, in the context, of carrying on trade or business on a public road. It is in this case that the Supreme Court also held that there can be no fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place where he can squat and engage in trading business. In the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. D. Balwantsingh. JT 1992 (2) SC 363, the Supreme Court negatived the plea of an occupier of a public street when he obtained an injunction in a suit to prevent the removal of an encroachment. The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier decisions. Removal of encroachment was upheld ; so was the action of the municipal corporation to shift the hawkers to an alternate site. In the case of Gobind Pershad Jagdish Pershad v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1993 SC 2313, the Supreme, Court extended the public street into the verandhas in front of a shop which by long user had been used by the public as a passage. Thus, shopping arcades or verandhas adjoining public streets were given the declaration of a public street. Encroachment of such verandhas in front of public streets was held as illegal.
24. The law as has been settled by the Supreme Court now provides sufficient guidelines that hawking cannot take place on public roads and streets nor on the side walks. Simply, public streets and side walks are to be kept clear for the purposes of passage only and for no other purpose. In so far as hawking on public roads is concerned, Tehbazari as it is known in this State, the Supreme Court has made it absolutely clear that no hawker or squatter has any particular right to any particular spot on a public road. The arguments of life and liberty under Article 21 to occupy a public road has been repelled.
25. But simultaneously, while the Supreme Court declared that the public roads cannot be occupied and had to be left for passage only, it left guidelines that the making of alternate plans ought not to be misunderstood that encroachments will not be removed. To keep a public road or street and its side-walks clear of encroachments is the statutory obligation of the administration in the performance of public duty. However, learned Chief Standing Counsel, U.P., apparently, has advised the local administration and rightly, and the latter has filed an affidavit that temporarily the shifting shall take place. Whether it happens temporarily or otherwise, is not concern of the Court. The Court mentions that as of now, the law is absolutely clear that Tehbazari in modern times cannot be held on public roads.
26. In the circumstances, in so far as the present case is concerned, the District Magistrate has already suggested an alternative site, though temporarily, in his affidavit of 15th April, 1999. It is entirely up to the local administration where to shift the Tehbazari. In context. As the situation before the Court is not that there is no alternative available. It was and is available except that the local administration has permitted the situation to be ignored and did not act on its administrative decision which had already been taken on 4th November, 1986 that the Tehbazari market being continued on the sidewalks of Master Zahurul Hasan Road (popularly known as Katra Road) is creating public nuisance, causing congestion and choking the traffic and inconveniencing the public. This decision of the administration taken in 1986, thirteen years ago, records that the Tehbazari market in this area is to be shifted and this road including its side walks will be cleared forthwith to the site already indicated by the local administration. The preparation for shifting of the Tehbazari market shall be made within three weeks and, thereafter, forthwith the market shall be shifted without any let or hindrance.
27. Thus, a rule of mandamus issues to eight of the nine respondents, so arrayed, to make arrangements for shifting the Tehbazari market of Master Zahurul Hasan Road (popularly known as Katra Road) within three weeks and, thereafter, forthwith the market shall be shifted without any let or hindrance. All the encroachments on this road and on the side walks will be removed by the same rule of mandamus which has been issued consequentially and simultaneously.
28. The petition is allowed with costs.