JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 15.1.2000, passed by the Director, Bal Vikas Sewa Evam Pushtahar, U. P. Lucknow, Annexure-5 to the writ petition.
2. The petitioner was appointed on 25.3.1995 as a driver at Bal Vikas Pariyojna, Noorpur, district Bijnor by the respondent. He joined the post in the department on 10.4.1995.
3. On 30.11.1999, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the respondent directing him to submit the original driving licence issued by the R.T.O., Mumbai along with his reply within fifteen days alleging that the petitioner had obtained appointment by fraud, which is punishable and is a misconduct for which major penalty can be imposed. The petitioner vide letter dated 20.12.1999, sought fifteen days more time to submit required document along with his reply.
4. The petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 15.1.2000 on the ground that he had obtained employment on the basis of forged driving licence. It has been challenged on the ground that before passing the impugned order dated 15.1.2000, the respondent neither served any charge-sheet upon the petitioner nor disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the U. P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999.
(a) The petitioner submitted that his services could not be terminated without following the procedure as contemplated in the said Rules, which came into force with effect from 9th June, 1999 as neither any charge-sheet was served nor any enquiry was conducted.
(b) Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules, 1999, which is mandatory in nature, prescribes that before imposing any major penalty on a Government servant, an enquiry shall be held in the manner and procedure provided therein.
(c) On the basis of said Rule it is contended that it was incumbent upon the respondent before passing the impugned order against the petitioner to hold the full fledged disciplinary proceedings and this was not done by the respondent, the termination is vitiated being illegal and contrary to statutory rules and principles of natural justice. D. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries Ltd.
(1993) 3 SCO 259 ; Gulzar Singh v. S. D. M. and another, (1999) 3 SCC 107 ; Basudeo Tiwary v. S.I.D.O. Kanhu University and Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 194 and Ram Vlkas v.
State of U. P. and Ors., (2002) 1 UPLBEC 352. The Apex Court in High Court of Judicature at Mumbai through its Registrar v. Shashikant Patil and another, 2000 (1) AWC 99 (SC) : (2000) 1SCC 416 (Para 16), has also held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if such authority had held proceeding in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulation prescribing the mode of such enquiry.
5. In the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that the petitioner got appointment by mis-representation and playing fraud in the service. It is stated that after the petitioner was transferred in Bal Vikas Pariyojna, Noorpur, an information was received against the petitioner to the effect that at the time of appointment in service, the petitioner was not eligible for being appointed on the post of driver as he had stolen the licence of another person and had produced the same at the time of appointment after affixing his photograph on it. It is further submitted that in the preliminary enquiry made by the department on the basis of the information, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice to submit his original licence.
6. The department further verified the photo copy of the licence produced by the petitioner from the Commissioner, Transport Division, Maharashtra, Mumbai and were informed that the licence alleged to be of the petitioner, was originally issued to Babu Shah Legje for driving motor cycle and no licence was issued by the R.T.O., Mumbai, in the name of Sanjai Kumar Chaturvedi. Copies of the correspondence between the department and the R.T.O., Mumbai and the copy of the licence submitted by the petitioner are enclosed along with the counter-affidavit. It is submitted that the petitioner had entered in Government service by misrepresentation and fraud.
In Chet Ram v. D.D.C. and Ors., it has been held :
"It is well-settled that fraud vitiates all solemn proceedings. If a decree is obtained by fraud, even through from a competent court, is not binding between parties. The question of fraud can be raised in any proceeding where so ever a decree is sought to be relied on as a good decree."
7. A similar decision has been given by this Court in Baliram v. Board of Revenue, para 7 :
"When the Court finds that there Is a miscarriage of justice on account of fraud practiced upon the Court, they cannot place an embargo of limitation upon it. It is the duty of the Court to see that no miscarriage of justice takes place on account of any fraud practiced by any party upon the Court. Whenever, it comes to the light of the Court, it is under a duty to set aside such fraudulent decree. The Court cannot be used as a tool in fraudulent scheme of a party. It is settled principle that fraud vitiates all proceedings."
8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of obtaining orders/admission by fraud has further permitted the authority to withdraw the benefit even without giving any opportunity and It has been said that rules of principle of natural justice will not apply. Reference in this connection is to be made to decision given In case of U. P. Junior Doctor's Action Committee u, Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, in which It has been held :
"The circumstances in which such benefit has been taken by the candidates concerned do not justify attraction of the application of rules of natural Justice of being provided an opportunity to be heard."
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarana Board Mills and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 2657, has held that :
"It is well-settled that the natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket : Its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact situation to another. All that has to be seen in that ; no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensure before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated."
10. Again In a recent decision, Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, 2001 (91) FLR 28 (Paras 16, 17, 18 and 19), the Apex Court held :
"16. As pointed out recently In M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, there can be certain situations In which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example, where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is itself illegal as in Gadde Venkatesh Wara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828."
"17. In M. C. Mehta, it was pointed out that at one time, it was held in Rigde v. Baldwin, that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other "de facto" prejudice needed to be proved. But since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in English but also in our country. In S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, 1980 (4) SCC 379, Chlnnappa Reddy, J., followed Ridge v. Baldwin, and set aside the order of supersession of the New Delhi Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice through notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer.
18. Chinnappa Reddy, J., in S. L. Kapoor's case, laid two exceptions, namely, (Page 395) : "If upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible" then in such case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would riot apply. In other words, if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or Indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order, which was passed in violation of natural Justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception.
19. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India. Sabyasachi Mukherji, J., (as he then was), also laid down the principle that not merely violation of natural Justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had also to be proved. It was observed : quoting Wade's Administrative Law (5th edition, pages 472 to 475) as follows (Para 31) :
It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent............. There must have been some real prejudice to the complainant, there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural Justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case."
11. In the circumstances in which the petitioner has procured appointment does not justify application of principles of natural Justice as they are not obviously applied in each and every case. Since the petitioner has succeeded in obtaining appointment by producing a farzi driving licence, the respondents were justified in passing the order of dismissal from his service. It is not a case that the petitioner did not avail several opportunities to produce the original licence and as such, the action of the respondents cannot be held to be illegal.
12. It is relevant to point out here that this writ petition has been filed by Sri Rajeshwar Prasad Chaturvedi alleging himself to be the father and pairokar of Sanjai Kumar Chaturvedi. Another writ petition was also filed by him on the same grounds being Writ Petition No. 7131 of 2000, Hemant Kumar Chaturvedi v. Director, Bal Vikas Sewa Euam Pushtahar, U. P., Lucknow. Hemant Kumar Chaturvedi is the younger brother of the petitioner in this case. In this case also, appointment was secured by the same method on the basis of forged driving licence obtained from the R.T.O., Calcutta. The petitioner was also minor.
13. Thus, it appears that father of the petitioners had filed both the writ petitions challenging the order of termination, though both the petitioners secured appointment by fraud.
14. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.