1. Heard Sri V.K. Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Murtuza Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.C. Tripathi, learned standing counsel for the State.
2. Originally, the present petition was filed seeking quashing of the order dated 05.02.2020 passed by Additional Excise Commissioner (Administration) Uttar Pradesh, in Excise Appeal No. 95 of 2019 (Sandeep Singh Versus Collector/Licensing Authority & Another) as well as the order dated 30.10.2019 passed by the Collector/Licensing Authority Fatehpur cancelling the country liquor shop license of the petitioner - at village Majhenpurwa, District Fatehpur. Upon amendment, the petitioner has also challenged another order dated 17.06.2020 passed by Additional Excise Commissioner (Administration) Uttar Pradesh. At the outset, it may be noted that the order dated 17.06.2020 was passed with reference to the other country liquor shop license of the petitioner at Village Gehrukheda. That controversy has been dealt with a separate order passed in Writ-Tax No. 277 of 2020 decided on 19.01.2021. Therefore, the challenge raised in the present petition to the aforesaid order dated 17.06.2019, is misconceived. It is accordingly rejected.
3. Undisputedly, for the Excise Year 2018-2019, the petitioner held two country liquor shop excise licenses. One for his shop at village Gehrukheda (hereinafter referred to as the "Gehrukheda license) and another for his shop at village Majhenpurwa (hereinafter referred to as the "Majhenpurwa license"). Vide order dated 25.3.2019, the Gehrukheda license of the petitioner was suspended, arising from the facts noted during an inspection dated 23.3.2019. Then, vide order dated 28.05.2019, the licensing authority proceeded to cancel both the licenses of the petitioner without any prior notice proposing to cancel the Majhenpurwa license. The order dated 28.05.2019 gave rise to two separate appeals being Excise Appeal No. 31 of 2019 (for Gehrukheda license) and Excise Appeal No. 32 of 2019 (for Majhenpurwa license). By order dated 10.08.2019, the appeal authority allowed the Excise Appeal no. 32 of 2019 and remitted that matter to the licensing authority after taking notice of the ground of challenge that no show cause notice had been issued to the petitioner before cancelling that license. Yet, the appeal authority left it open to the licensing authority to issue a fresh show cause notice in that regard. No challenge was raised to that order. It attained finality.
4. Thereafter, the licensing authority issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 29.08.2019 proposing to cancel the petitioner's Majhenpurwa license. The notice reveals that it was issued on account of cancellation of the Gehrukheda license of the petitioner. It was consequently alleged- the petitioner's character was not good and he was guilty of violation of the Excise Act. The petitioner replied to the same vide his written reply dated 2.9.2019. Yet again, by his order dated 30.10.2019, the licensing authority cancelled the Majhenpurwa license. Against the order dated 30.10.2019, the petitioner filed Excise Appeal no. 95 of 2019. It has been dismissed vide order dated 05.02.2020 passed by Additional Excise Commissioner (Administration) Uttar Pradesh. That order is under challenge here.
5. At the outset, a preliminary objection has been raised by the learned standing counsel as to the maintainability of the present petition. He submits that the order of the Additional Excise Commissioner (Administration) Uttar Pradesh is revisable before the State Government. Opposing that preliminary objection, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit, there was neither any jurisdiction nor notice nor any legal basis to cancel the petitioner's Majhenpurwa license. Alternatively, upon the matter pertaining to Gahrukhera license being remanded, the appeal order in the present case cannot survive. The objection being raised is thus stated to be too technical to merit acceptance by the Court.
6. On merits, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner would submit that the orders passed by the licensing authority and the appeal authority arise from the proceedings that are wholly without jurisdiction in as much as no violation had been noted with respect to the Majhenpurwa license. Another jurisdictional defect has been cited as no notice had been issued before cancelling the petitioner's Majhenpurwa license vide order dated 28.05.2019. That jurisdictional defect did not stand cured by the observations made in the appeal order dated 16.08.2019. Then referring to Section 34 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") and Rule 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Excise Settlement of Licenses for Retail Sale of Country Liquor) Rules, 2020 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"), he would submit, unless a specific violation had been noted as to the operation of the Majhenpurwa license, that license could never be cancelled merely because any other violation may have been alleged against the petitioner with respect to the Gehrukheda license. Alternatively, it has been submitted, the allegations made in the notice even if accepted on their face value, are vague and such as may never fall within the scope of Section 34 of the Act or Rule 21 of the Rules or any of the terms and conditions of the license on Form 5-C. In such facts, it has been submitted, the orders passed by the licensing authority and the appeal authority are liable to be quashed and the Majhenpurwa license liable to be restored. He has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Gorakhnath Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.; (1996) 11 SCC 278 and a decision of this Court in Girishdutta Mishra Vs. State of U.P. & 4 Ors.; decided on 5.9.2014.
7. On the other hand, the learned standing counsel would submit once the appeal authority had allowed the licensing authority to issue a fresh notice and that proceeding was undertaken without any let or objection at the appropriate stage, that challenge may no longer arise. Also, the licensing authority was right to cancel the Majhenpurwa license of the petitioner as it stood established that the petitioner had made violations in the operation of the Gehrukheda license. Since the petitioner was found to have committed violations of use of tampered QR code and caps against his Gehrukheda license referable to Section 34 (1) (b) of the Act, no other independent violation was required to be established with respect to operation of the Majhenpurwa license. Any other construction given to the statute would render redundant or superfluous the provisions of Section 34 (2) of the Act. Also relevant of Rule 21(3) of the Rules read with the terms and conditions of the license, it has been submitted that once the Gehrukheda license stood cancelled, by way of a necessary consequence, the Majhenpurwa license also became liable to cancellation. Alternatively, it has been submitted that in any case the proceedings arising from the cancellation of the Gehrukheda license having been remanded, the same fate must meet the present Majhenpurwa license as well.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, the preliminary objection raised as to maintainability of the present petition is found not acceptable as a question of law does appear to exist as to the true meaning to be given to section 34(2) of the Act. Also, the proceeding for cancellation of the Gehrukheda license that occasioned the present proceeding has been remitted to the appeal authority by a separate order passed in Writ Tax No. 227 of 2020 on 19.01.2021. As, stated by both sides, the fate of the present petition hangs, at least partly, on the fate of the Gehrukheda license. Then affidavits have already been exchanged. No useful purpose may be served in requiring the petitioner to approach the revising authority at this stage, in such facts.
9. As to inherent lack of jurisdiction, claimed by the petitioner, it appears that the same may not be entirely correct, in the face of the proceedings as they stand today. Though it is true, no prior notice had been issued to the petitioner to cancel his Majhenpurwa license before the order dated 28.05.2019 came to be passed, two different appeals were filed by the petitioner against that order- one against the cancellation of the Gehrukheda license (Excise Appeal no. 31 of 2019) and the other against the cancellation of the Majhenpurwa license (Excise Appeal no. 32 of 2019). While allowing appeal no. 32 of 2019 on 10.08.2019, the appeal authority specifically observed that the licensing authority may issue a fresh notice to the petitioner to cancel the Majhenpurwa license. That order has attained finality.
10. After the remand made, undisputedly, a notice dated 29.08.2019 was issued to the petitioner by the licensing authority requiring the petitioner to show cause why Majhenpurwa license may not be cancelled. The petitioner replied vide his reply dated 2.9.2019. The subsequent order dated 30.10.2019 was passed by the licensing authority cancelling the petitioner's Majhenpurwa license on that proceeding. It was challenged in appeal being Excise Appeal no. 95 of 2019 which came to be decided by the impugned order dated 05.02.2020.
11. The ground of patent lack of jurisdiction to cancel the Majhenpurwa license may have existed with the petitioner, when that license came to be cancelled first, on 28.05.2019. Upon order dated 10.08.2019 passed in Excise Appeal No. 32 of 2019, the licensing authority issued the notice dated 29.08.2019. On that date the Gehrukheda license of the petitioner stood cancelled. As further discussed later, the jurisdictional fact to proceed against the Majhenpurwa license, under section 34(2) of the Act, thus arose on 28.05.2019 and it existed on 29.08.2019. The present proceedings arise solely from that notice. Hence, the challenge raised as to lack of jurisdiction does not survive for consideration in this writ petition. At present, the proceedings instituted after issuance of the notice dated 29.08.2019 alone are to be tested, on their merits. That notice was within jurisdiction.
12. Next, in the context of proceedings to cancel the Majhenpurwa license, it is difficult to accept the submission advanced by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that an independent ground of violation must be made out (under section 34(1) of the Act read with Rule 21 of the Rules and terms and conditions of license on Form 5-C). That submission runs contrary to the statutory scheme. Relevant to our discussion, the provisions of Section 34 and 35 of the Act and 21 (3) of the Rules, may be quoted as below:
"34. Power to cancel or suspend licences, etc. - (1) Subject to such restrictions, as the State Government may prescribe, the authority granting any licence, permit or pass under this Act may cancel or suspend it-
(a) if any duty or fee payable by the holder thereof be not duly paid; or
(b) in the event of any breach by the holder of such licence, permit or pass or by his servants, or by any one acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission of any of the terms or conditions of such licence, permit or pass; or
(c) if the holder thereof is convicted of any offence punishable under this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to revenue, or of any cognizable and non-bailable offence, or of any offence punishable under the [Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930,] or under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889, or of any offence punishable under Sections 482 to 489 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code; or
(d) where a licence, permit or pass has been granted on the application of the grantee of an exclusive privilege under this Act, on the requisition in writing of such grantee; or
(e) if the conditions of the licence or permit provide for such cancellations or suspension at will.
(2) When a licence, permit and pass held by any person is cancelled under clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (1), the authority aforesaid may cancel any other licence, permit or pass granted to such person by, or by the authority of the State Government under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue or under the [Opium Act, 1878.] (3) The holder shall not be entitled to any compensation for the cancellation or suspension of his licence, permit or pass under this section nor to a refund of any fee paid or deposit made in respect thereof.
35. No compensation or refund claimable for cancellation or suspension of licence, etc., under this section. - (1) Further power to cancel licences. - Whenever the authority granting a licence under this Act considers that such licence should be cancelled for any cause other than those specified in Section 34 it shall remit a sum equal to the amount of the fees payable in respect thereof for fifteen days, and may cancel the licence either-
(a) on the expiration of fifteen days, notice in writing of its intention to do so, or
(b) forthwith, without notice.
(2) Compensation in the case of cancellation. - If any licence be cancelled under clause (b) of sub-section (1) in addition to the sum remitted as aforesaid there shall be paid to the licensee such further sum by way of compensation as the Excise Commissioner may direct.
(3) Refund of fee or deposit. - When a licence is cancelled under this section, any fee paid in advance or deposit made by the licensee in respect thereof shall be refunded to him, less the amount (if any) due to the State Government.
RULE 21 (3) In case the license is cancelled the basic license fee, license fee and security amount deposited by him shall stand forfeited in favour of the Government and the licensee shall not be entitled to claim any compensation or refund. Such licensee may also be blacklisted and debarred from holding any other excise license."
13. In the first place, by virtue of section 34(1) of the Act, if the licensing authority proposes to cancel a license, he may do so for any violation of the law noticed by him either in the context of section 34(1) of the Act or Rule 21 of the Rules or the terms and conditions of the license issued on Form 5-C. He may do so by making specific allegation/s with respect thereto. That condition applied to the Gehrukheda license as proceedings to cancel that license were initiated first, upon alleged violations noted during the inspection dated 23.3.2019.
14. Under section 34(2) of the Act, after, the licensing authority has cancelled an existing license under section 34(1) of the Act, he may, occasioned by that action choose to cancel another/other license of the same licensee. A question does arise whether another/other license/s of the same licensee may be cancelled only if similar or any other violations, as specified under section 34(1) read with Rule 21 of the Rules and terms and conditions mentioned on Form 5-C is/are established with respect to another/other license/s or another/other license/s may be cancelled merely because the licensing authority has already cancelled one license of the same licensee.
15. It may also be noticed, under section 35 of the Act, the licensing authority has been given a further power to cancel an existing license, for any cause other than those specified under section 34 of the Act. However, that power may be exercised accompanied with proportional remission of license fee. In Sri Basdeo Prasad Vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and another 1956 ALJ 81, the power under Section 35 of the Act was held to be administrative but, discretionary. A key difference between cancellation of license made under Sections 34 and 35 of the Act is- upon a cancellation made under Section 35 of the Act, the licensee may retain a right to proportionate refund of deposits made by him (towards license fees etc.), whereas forfeiture of such deposits follows the canellation of a license made under Section 34 of the Act.
16. Under section 34(1) of the Act, an existing license may be cancelled in face of any of the eventualities mentioned under clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section section 34 of the Act being found to exist. The legislature has used the word 'may' in section 34 (1) & (2) and section 35 of the Act. At the same time, it has used the word 'shall' in Chapter X of the Act while providing for impost of penalties prescribed for different infringements of law, including possession of any intoxicant in contravention of the Act or Rule or Order or license or permit or pass.
17. Thus, the legislature has used both words - 'may' and 'shall', in the same enactment, while dealing with two different consequences of cancellation of license/s and penalties, that may arise from a same or single fact situation, namely, violation of the Act, Rule or license. In Mahaluxmi Rice Mills v. State of U.P., (1998) 6 SCC 590, a question arose to the meaning of the words 'may' and 'shall' used in section 17 of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 while dealing with the nature of liability of the purchaser to pay an amount towards market fees while buying goods inside a 'mandi' (word used 'may') and the liability of the seller to pay market fees (word used 'shall'). Though, in that case both consequences arose from a single transaction and were governed by a single provision of that Act, yet the ratio of that decision is attracted to the facts of the present case. In the present case also, both consequences of penalty and cancellation of license (covered under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 34(1) of the Act) arise from a common/similar violation/fact.
18. In the language of section 17 of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, the Supreme Court had reasoned:
"9. It is significant to note that the word used for the seller to realise market fee from his purchaser is "may" while the word used for the seller to pay the market fee to the Committee is "shall". Employment of the said two monosyllables of great jurisprudential import in the same clause dealing with two rights regarding the same burden must have two different imports. The legislative intendment can easily be discerned from the frame of the sub-clause that what is conferred on the seller is only an option to collect market fee from his purchaser, but the seller has no such option and it is imperative for him to remit the fee to the Committee. In other words, the Market Committee is entitled to collect market fee from the seller irrespective of whether the seller has realised it from the purchaser or not".
19. Similarly, necessarily, an implied discretion is vested in the licensing authority to cancel or to not cancel an existing license even if any condition under section 34(1) (a) to (i) or 34 (2) or 35 exists. In Sri Basdeo Prasad Vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and another (supra), a division bench of this Court had clearly held the power to cancel a license under section 35 of the Act to be discretionary. There is no reason to hold Section 34(2) of the Act to be mandatory, as suggested by the learned Standing Counsel. It is a discretionary power.
20. Then, though it is necessary to establish violation of any of the stipulations contained in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act to cancel an existing license, under that provision, there is nothing in the plain language of section 34(2) of the Act to oblige the licensing authority to establish an independent violation of clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act before proceeding to cancel any other license of a licensee, under section 34(2) of the Act. The only mandatory pre-condition prescribed to exercise that power is the prior cancellation of any other license of that licensee under any of the first three clauses of Section 34(1) of the Act. That fact alone exposes the licensee to further proceedings for cancellation of his another/other license/s under Section 34(2) of the Act.
21. To read the fulfilment of clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of section 34, into sub-section (2) of section 34 of the Act would be to read into the statute something that is plainly not there. It would also render superfluous, Section 34(2) of the Act. If the conditions enumerated under section 34(1) of the Act are necessary to be satisfied in a proceeding under 34(2) of the Act, there would be no eventuality when sub-section (2) of section 34 would ever have an application. In that case, in every situation, all proceedings to cancel a license would continue to arise under section 34(1) of the Act. An interpretation that renders any part of a legislation superfluous is to be avoided. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P., AIR 1953 SC 394 an early Constitution bench of the Supreme Court observed:
"5. Learned counsel strongly relied on Attorney-General v. Herman James Sillem [10 House of Lords Cases 704 : 11 ER 1200] to show that a provision such as the above was meant only to regulate the proceedings in a case within the four walls or limits of the court. The statutory provision which came up for construction in that case was however very differently worded, and was meant to regulate "the process, practice, and mode of pleading" i.e. the procedure in the court and not "the proceedings" of the court. While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The construction urged for the appellant renders Section 6 futile and leaves even a convicted person without appeal. We have no hesitation in rejecting it".
22. Thus, giving full play to the provisions of section 34(1) and (2) of the Act, in case a licensee commits separate violations with respect to each or more than one license held by him, he may stand exposed to proceedings for cancellation of each such license under section 34(1) of the Act, exclusively. If, however, one out of more license held by a licensee is cancelled, either under clause (a) or (b) or (c) of section 34(1) of the Act, it would expose such a licensee to cancellation of his another/other license/s, irrespective of a complete absence of any violation committed in the operation of the another/other license/s. That is the plain meaning of section 34(2) of the Act.
23. Other than excluding the contingencies specified under clauses (d) & (e) of section 34(1) from the scope of applicability to the power conferred under section 34(2) of the Act, the legislature has vested a wide discretion on the licensing authority, in that regard. Thus, the legislative intent, is to confine the power under section 34(2) of the Act to situations involving specified violations - as to payment of fee, breach of any express or implied terms and conditions and conviction for any of the specified offences. Unless a license of a licensee is first cancelled for any such ground, another/other license/s of that licensee cannot be cancelled under section 34(2) of the Act.
24. At the same time, by very nature, the power under section 34(2) of the Act is harsher than that vested under section 34(1) of the Act. Though akin to the residuary power vested under section 35 of the Act-to cancel any existing license, that power is purely administrative, not involving any punitive consequence. Upon cancellation of a license under section 35, the affected licensee may remain entitled to refund of license fee, deposit etc. and also compensation. However, by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act, such claims are barred if the cancellation of a license is made under section 34(1) or section 34(2) of the Act. That consequence is mandatory.
25. Thus, upon cancellation of one license of a licensee under Section 34(1)(a) or 34(1)(b) or 34(1)(c) of the Act, the licensing authority may in its discretion choose to cancel another/other license/s of that licensee, whether issued under the Act or under any other law relating to excise revenue or under the Opium Act, 1878.
26. Without attempting to define the grounds on which such a license may be cancelled under section 34(2) of the Act, a few statutory pointers may be discerned from the language of the Act itself. First, the jurisdiction to exercise that power arises after and not during or before the exercise of power under section 34(1) of the Act with respect to another license. Second, by virtue of its linkage to clause (a), (b) and (c) of section 34(1) of the Act, that power may come to be exercised only if another license of the same licensee has been cancelled (prior in time), either upon a default in payment of license fees etc. or breach of any of the terms and conditions of his license, permit or pass or upon his conviction for any of the specified offences. Third, exercise of the power under section 34(2) visits the licensee with a very harsh consequence since he would suffer the consequence of cancellation of his (other) license/s without allegation of any express violation with respect to the same. Fourth, contrasted with the power vested under section 35, the power has heavy civil consequence as it deprives the licensee of any right to compensation and it also involves forfeiture of fees, deposits etc. Fifth, the power to cancel the other license/s extends not only to any other license granted under this Act but to any other license issued under "any other law", "relating to excise revenue" or under the "Opium Act, 1878".
27. In that view, the submission advanced by the learned Standing Counsel that cancellation of the other license follows as an automatic consequence of the first cancellation proceeding also does not merit acceptance. The provisions of Section 34(2) of the Act are discretionary and not mandatory as suggested by the learned Standing Counsel. Also it's application can never be an automatic consequence of cancellation of another excise license of a licensee. Being a power exercisable only in the interest of revenue against a licensee who has already suffered cancellation of one license u/s 34(1) of the Act; such a power would have to be exercised with extreme caution only in cases where upon facts proven in the earlier proceedings it appears to the licensing authority that continuance of another/other license/s of a licensee would be detrimental to the interest of revenue. It is this fact that would have to be proven in such proceeding initiated under Section 34(2) of the Act.
28. Thus, the proceedings under section 34(2) may arise purely in the core interests of revenue, owing to the deliberate violation committed by the licensee, as may have been found/proven in an earlier proceeding of cancellation of any other license issued under the Act. Yet, no further and other violation may exist as a pre-condition to be satisfied or proven before action may be taken under section 34(2) of the Act to cancel any other license of that licensee. Therefore, the proceedings for cancellation of an earlier license must itself bring out existence of reason/s so grave and serious as may give rise to a satisfaction with the licensing authority, that all or any other license of that licensee be also cancelled in the interest of revenue. Illustratively, but not in any way exhaustively, those may be cases of large scale or organized evasion or avoidance of excise duty; breach of terms and conditions made by way of a regular business practice adopted by the licensee; disentitlement earned to hold any excise license, due to any of the specified convictions or operation of law or any other reason/ground that may spring form the facts already proven in the earlier proceeding, to cancel one or more licence of the same licensee, under section 34(1)(a) or (b) or (c) of the Act.
29. Before such discretionary power may be exercised, two requirements would have to be fulfilled. One, there must be shown to exist an order cancelling another license (issued under the Act) of the licensee, under Section 34(1)(a) or (b) or (c) of the Act. Two, a notice would have to be issued to the licensee requiring him to show cause why another/other license/s standing in his name may not be cancelled. The notice would state how/why in the proven facts of the other case/s, any other license is to be cancelled. No other allegation of a fresh violation is to be made or proved in those proceedings.
30. Coming to the facts of the present case, it would be wholly pre-mature to reach a conclusion that the ground specified in the showcause notice is wholly insufficient or is sufficient for the purposes of examining the correctness or otherwise of the cancellation of the Majhenpurwa licence. It is so because the basic facts giving rise to the cancellation of the Gehrukheda licence, have yet not attained finality. By the order passed in Writ Tax No. 277 of 2020, decided on 19.01.2021, those proceedings have been remanded to the Appeal Authority to examine the same afresh and to record it's conclusions whether the petitioner was in possession of tampered QR Code and Caps. Till the Appeal Authority reaches a firm conclusion as to that, in the facts of the present case, the cancellation of Majhenpurwa licence may not be examined, simultaneously.
31. Thus, for the purpose of clarification, it is stated that in case the petitioner succeeds in establishing that his Gehrukheda licence was not liable to be cancelled as he had not violated either section 34(1) (a) or (b) or (c) of the Act, the present proceedings to cancel the Majhenpurwa license would necessarily fall. However, if the Appeal Authority does reach a conclusion adverse to the petitioner (in that case), it would be for the Licensing Authority to then examine the existence or otherwise of an adequate reason or ground to exercise his extra-ordinary discretionary power to cancel the Majhenpurwa licence of the petitioner under Section 34(2) of the Act, keeping in mind the observations made above.
32. Ordinarily, if the present writ proceedings were being finalized during the Excise Year of 2018-2019, the petitioner may have remained entitled to restoration of his Majhenpurwa license. However, since that year is long over, and the current Excise Year 2020-21 is at its end, it is provided that the orders dated 05.02.2020 and 30.10.2019 are set aside and the matter remitted to the licensing authority with a stipulation that such remanded proceedings may be recommenced, if required, only after the decision of the Appeal Authority with respect to the Gehrukheda license of the petitioner. If no case is made out for cancellation of petitioner's Majhenpurwa license, under section 34(2) of the Act (as discussed above), his claim for renewal of that license, if otherwise eligible, for the Excise Year 2021-22 may be considered by treating the petitioner to be a continuing licensee, on notional basis or (if the petitioner does not seek renewal, at that stage), to grant proportional refund to him in terms of section 35 of the Act, as in that case the cancellation of the Majhenpurwa license would remain referable to that provision of law only. Such proceedings be completed by 15.04.2021.
33. The ratio of Gorakhnath (supra) and Girishdutta Mishra (supra) is found inapposite. The ratio of those decisions is to the rights of the original licensee viz a viz his replacement licensee who came to be appointed after the license of the original licensee had been cancelled. Once the license of the original licensee was restored, the replacement licensee was found to have no rights surviving with him to claim continuance of his license. Such is not the case here. As observed above, the Gehrukheda license stands cancelled and also, it is not clear if the Majhenpurwa license had ever been renewed for the Excise Year 2018-2019. In any case, that Excise Year is long over. Hence revival of that license is not warranted, at this stage.
34. Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed.
Order Date :- 21.1.2021 SA