This application is a classic example of sheer lethargy and inaction on part of the petitioners who have preferred this Misc. Application seeking inter alia condonation of delay u/s. 5 of Limitation Act . It would be appropriate to briefly state the chronology of events which culminated in preferring the present petition.
Mother of the present petitioner preferred Regular Civil Suit No. 292 of 1978 before Jt.Civil Judge (JD), Bhuj-Kutchh with a prayer of specific performance of agreement to sale wherein parties had compromised and consent decree was passed on 17th October, 1981 on the basis thereof.
Subsequently, Execution Petition No. 28/82 was preferred as registered sale deed was not effected, pursuant to such compromise decree.It appears that original decree holder -Champaben Ramjibhai has expired on 2nd August, 1997 .
In the said execution petition, hairs of original decree holder preferred an application after 8 years of her death by moving an application Exh.33 dated 12th August, 2005.
Court after hearing both the sides rejected such an application on the ground of the same being ex-facie time barred. This rejection of 3rd September, 2005 was challenged by preferring this petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India in the year 2008. As there were certain office objections, petition was not numbered finally but was given Stamp No. (SPL.C.A) No. 5506 of 2008. On 4th August, 2008, this Court directed removal of office objection (Coram :Mr.M.R.Shah,J) "Office objections to be removed on or before 20th August, 2008, failing which the application will be dismissed for non-prosecution automatically without referring the matter to the Court. On removal of the Office objections, Registry to place the same on Board for Admission hearing immediately."
Opportunity was given to the petitioners herein to remove office objections on or before 20th August, 2008, however, since the said order was not complied with petition was dismissed.
After nearly four years of such dismissal, present Misc. Civil Application is preferred inter alia urging to set aside the said order of dismissal and with a further request to restore the Special Civil Application by contending the delay of 1328 days . There is no reason much less sufficient reason having emerged in the said application for this Court to consider the request of condonation of delay.
These appears to be an absolute act of negligence on the part of present petitioner at every stage of legal proceedings . Petitioners appear to be acting contrary to their own interests and no law can help such litigants who choose not to help themselves.
Ordinarily, Courts are to be liberal in grating such applications for condonation of delay and technicality is not to deny the substantive rights of the parties. However, as can be noted from the chronology of events as also from contents of application, there is not an iota of reason tendered for such huge delay . It would be apt to refer to the judgement of Apex Court rendered in case of Balwantsingh Vs. Jagdish Singh, reported in AIR 2010 SC 3043. In the words of the Apex Court;
"25 We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise . These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away the right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. "
Petition being devoid of any merits stands dismissed and stands disposed of in above terms.
(Ms.Sonia Gokani,J) bina Top