IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR CRL.P.NO.8175/2017 BETWEEN MR. SAKTHIVEL S/O. B. LOGANATHAN, AGE 30 YEARS, INDIAN INHABITANT, PRESENTLY RESIDING AT AL RUFAA TOWER, 3RD FLOOR, OFFICE NO. 3, BUILDING NO.54, STREET NO.830, ZONE 17 AL MINA STREET, OLD SALATA, P.O. BOX 200238, DOHA, STATE OF QATAR, PERMANENT ADDRESS AT:
NO.79, SOUTH STREET, BEHIND KRISHNA NURSING HOME, VRIDHACHALAM, CUDDALORE D T, PIN-606 001.
REPRESENTED BY POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER:
MR. SUBRAMANYAM SHARMA, SON OF LATE SRI. G. SESHASAYI, AGED 40 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.7, 4TH CROSS, LINK ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BANGALORE-560 003. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI BALASUBRAMANYA B N, ADV.) AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA THRO’ MAHALAKSHMIPURAM P. S, BANGALORE.
REPRESENTED BY PUBLI PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA 2. MS. DEVASHEELA D/O SRI. MANOHARAN, AGED 35 YEARS, R/A.NO.564, 4TH CROSS STREET, MAHALAKSHMI LAYOUT, BANGALORE. ..RESPONDENTS (BY SRI VIJAYA KUMAR MAJAGE, ADDL. SPP FOR R1, SRI C.N.RAJU, ADV. FOR R2.) (CORRECTIONS CARRIED V/C/O DATED 25.02.2019.) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S. 482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN FIR 296/2017 DATED 29.08.2017 REGISTERED UNDER SECTION 376 AND 420 OF IPC REGISTERED BY THE MAHALAKSHMIPURAM POLICE STATION, BENGALURU CITY AND THE PETITIONER BE SET AT LIBERTY ALLOWING THE PETITION.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Counsel for respondent No.2 and the learned Addl. SPP.
2. The petitioner and respondent No.2 are present. A joint affidavit is filed, whereby in paragraphs 6 & 7, it is deposed as under:
“6. We submit that, this Joint Affidavit, being filed on our own accord and not at the behest of any persons, coercion, threat or any other extraordinary interest in seeking to close the case once for all. We have decided not to get married to each other and lead independently life. We both have settled our claims, disputes or other issues ourselves outside the Court and we have decided to lead our peaceful happy life independently.
7. We submit that, the 2nd respondent has no objection for quashing the entire proceedings pending on the files of Hon’ble LIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH54) in S.C.No.825/2019 (C.C.No.19770/2018) (Crime No.296/2017) for the offences punishable under Sections 375 and 420 of Indian Penal Code and acquit the petitioner/Sakthivel in the instant case.”
3. The matter was listed on 11.10.2019 and on the said date, the Addl. SPP vehemently opposed the compromise of the case and submitted that the commission of a heinous offence is leveled against the petitioner and that in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it is impermissible to invoke the provisions of Section 482 of Cr.PC., and thereby permit the parties to compound the non- compoundable offence. Upon which, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and respondent No.2 sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Criminal Appeal No.1165/2019 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2712/2019. The copy of the judgment was furnished to the Addl. SPP to peruse the same and appraise the Court as to whether the law as laid down by the Apex Court interpreting the word ‘consent’ to the sexual acts described in the main body of Section 375, would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand.
4. Today, learned Addl. SPP would admit that the law as laid down by the Apex Court would apply to the facts and circumstances involved in the instant case also.
5. The factual matrix to the instant case as narrated in the complaint dated 29.08.2017 is as under:
6. It is stated in the complaint that she met the petitioner in 2006-07 when she was working in M/s. HCL, Pondicherry. That they had a good understanding and the understanding blossomed into a relationship sometime in 2007. That the accused-petitioner had assured and promised that he would get married to her despite the age and caste difference. Believing in his words, she was in a steady and constant relationship with him. That in July 2007, both of them moved to Chennai and worked in Chennai between 2007 to 2011 and during that period, she was employed with Avalon Technologies Private Limited and the accused-petitioner was employed with Johnson Control India Private Limited. That during the entire tenure, the accused had unequivocally assured and promised the complainant that he would marry her but was only waiting to speak to his parents about the marriage and that she bonafidely believed the same and earnestly waited for a positive response. That he gave the hope of marrying her and insisted upon having a relationship with him. That during February 8th & 16th 2010 and May 8th & 18th 2010 and October 7th & 8th 2010, the petitioner insisted on having her physical relationship under the promise of marriage in the room where she was staying. That on 08.10.2019, he destroyed all the information on her phone and the motivated action was with the intention of destroying all the information and that she realized about the same after he left. That in 2011, the petitioner traveled to Qatar and even at that time, he had promised her that he would be there for six months and thereafter, he would make arrangements for her also to move to Qatar and then get married. That during the period of his stay in Qatar, he used to converse with the complainant on Gmail video call, Skype and Whatsapp and continued the talks about getting married and insisted and forced her to commit sexual acts. That in January 2016, he promised to meet her in Bangalore where she worked and he traveled to Bangalore between 07.01.2016 to 09.01.2016 and under the promise of marriage, he continued the physical relationship. That the petitioner promised her that he would definitely marry the complainant and asked her to wait for a while because he would convince his parents for the marriage. That all along, the petitioner though apprehensive, believed that he loved her and would marry her. That till March 2017, the petitioner was promising her of marriage and then suddenly he took a U-turn and told her to get married to someone else and he informed her that he would not marry her as his parents were against it. In this background, she concluded that she had been used for more than 10 years under the false promise of marriage, and thereafter he deserted her and cheated her. That on account of the false promise of marriage, she was forced to engage in a physical relationship with him and she has been forced to undergo severe stress and agony.
7. In the background of these allegations, the complainant requested the respondent-police to initiate action in accordance with law.
8. From the reading of the complaint and even as per the admission of the complainant, the complainant and the petitioner were in a relationship for a decade and from the recital, it is apparent that the parties have indulged in consensual acts of sex and that there is no statement that she was ever physically forced to have sexual intercourse without her consent or against her wish.
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1165/2019 after adverting to the facts therein which involved relationship between 1998 and 2016 and acts of sexual intercourse on multiple occasions and on multiple dates, and after looking into the scope and ambit of Section 482 of Cr.PC and after interpreting the word ‘consent’ and ‘without her consent’ was pleased to hold as under:
“7. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. These principles have been consistently followed and re-iterated by this Court. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, this Court observed.
“23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself.
Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.”
8. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court's extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court's hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted that quashing may be appropriate where, “102.(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).
… (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (“Dhruvaram Sonar”):
“13. It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.”
9. The present proceedings concern an FIR registered against the appellant under Sections 376, 417, 504, and 506(2) of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(u), (w) and 3(2)(vii) of SC/ST Act. Section 376 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of rape which is set out in Section 375. Section 375 prescribes seven descriptions of how the offence of rape may be committed. For the present purposes only the second such description, along with Section 90 of the IPC is relevant and is set out below.
“375. Rape - A man is said to commit “rape” if he -
… under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions-
Firstly … Secondly. - Without her consent.
… Explanation 2. - Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.”
“90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception - A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or…”
10. Where a woman does not “consent” to the sexual acts described in the main body of Section 375, the offence of rape has occurred. While Section 90 does not define the term “consent”, a “consent” based on a “misconception of fact” is not consent in the eyes of the law.
11. The primary contention advanced by the complainant is that the appellant engaged in sexual relations with her on the false promise of marrying her, and therefore her “consent”, being premised on a “misconception of fact” (the promise to marry), stands vitiated.
12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Sonar which was a case involving the invoking of the jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court observed:
“15. … An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of.”
This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of this Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala:
“12. … “Consent”, for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance of the moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and asset. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances.”
13. This understanding of consent has also been set out in Explanation 2 of Section 375 (reproduced above). Section 3(1)(w) of the SC/ST Act also incorporates this concept of consent:
“3(1)(w) -
(i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, when such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the recipient's consent;
… Explanation.--For the purposes of sub-clause (i), the expression “consent” means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the person by words, gestures, or any form of non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific act:
Provided that a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe who does not offer physical resistance to any act of a sexual nature is not by reason only of that fact, is to be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity:
Provided further that a woman's sexual history, including with the offender shall not imply consent or mitigate the offence;”
14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, this Court held:
“37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.”
Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (“Deepak Gulati”):
“21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused…”
15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh the accused forcibly established sexual relations with the complainant. When she asked the accused why he had spoiled her life, he promised to marry her. On this premise, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with the complainant. When the complainant became pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. When the matter was brought to the panchayat, the accused admitted to having had sexual intercourse with the complainant but subsequently absconded. Given this factual background, the court observed:
“10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent….”
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed:
“21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.
… 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”
(Emphasis supplied) 17. In Uday v. State of Karnataka the complainant was a college going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainant's statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant opposition from both the complainant's and accused's families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The court observed that in these circumstances the accused's promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to the complainant's decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by other factors:
“25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married…”
(Emphasis supplied) 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.
19. The allegations in the FIR indicate that in November 2009 the complainant initially refused to engage in sexual relations with the accused, but on the promise of marriage, he established sexual relations. However, the FIR includes a reference to several other allegations that are relevant for the present purpose. They are as follows:
(i) The complainant and the appellant knew each other since 1998 and were intimate since 2004;
(ii) The complainant and the appellant met regularly, travelled great distances to meet each other, resided in each other's houses on multiple occasions, engaged in sexual intercourse regularly over a course of five years and on multiple occasions visited the hospital jointly to check whether the complainant was pregnant; and (iii) The appellant expressed his reservations about marrying the complainant on 31 January 2014. This led to arguments between them. Despite this, the appellant and the complainant continued to engage in sexual intercourse until March 2015.
The appellant is a Deputy Commandant in the CRPF while the complainant is an Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax.
20. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 of the IPC has occurred.
21. With respect to the offences under the SC/ST Act, the WhatsApp messages were alleged to have been sent by the appellant to the complainant on 27 and 28 August 2015 and 22 October 2015. At this time, Sections 3(1)(u), (w) and 3(2)(vii) of the SC/ST Act as it stands today had not been enacted into the statute. These provisions were inserted by the (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act 201513 which came into force on 26 January 2016. Prior to the Amending Act, the relevant provisions of the statute (as it stood then) were as follows:
“3. (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. -
… (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Schedule Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(xi) assaults or uses force to any woman belonging to a Schedule Caste or a Scheduled Tribe with intent to dishonour or outrage her modesty;
(xii) being in a position to dominate the will of a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and uses that position to exploit her sexually to which she would not have otherwise agreed; …”
22. Without entering into a detailed analysis of the content of the WhatsApp messages sent by the appellant and the words alleged to have been spoken, it is apparent that none of the offences set out above are made out. The messages were not in public view, no assault occurred, nor was the appellant in such a position so as to dominate the will of the complainant. Therefore, even if the allegations set out by the complainant with respect to the WhatsApp messages and words uttered are accepted on their face, no offence is made out under SC/ST Act (as it then stood). The allegations on the face of the FIR do not hence establish the commission of the offences alleged.
23. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgement and order of the High Court dated 7 February 2019. The FIR dated 17 May 2016 is quashed.”
10. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court and in the light of the joint affidavit, the complainant who is present before the Court was queried if there is any compulsion or coercion in filing the affidavit, to which she would reply in the negative. It is also submitted that the complaint came about on account of certain misunderstandings and that she does not intend to further pursue the complaint and she has to move ahead in life and put the past behind her and to end the disputes.
11. In the above factual matrix and in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court and the submission of the complainant before this Court, no purpose would be served in driving the petitioner to undergo the ordeal of a full- fledged trial and further no purpose would be served in asking the parties to undergo the process of trial as the same would be a futile exercise in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court stated supra. Hence, the following order.
12. The criminal petition is allowed. The case in *S.C.No.825/2019 pending on the file of the LIII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, arising out Crime No.296/2017 registered in Mahalakshmipuram Police Station and all further proceedings are hereby quashed.
Sd/- JUDGE KK CT-HR *CORRECTED V/C/O DATED.17/12/2019.