The appellants before this Court are the defendants 1,2 3,5 and 6 in O.S.No.21 of 1984 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Nagapattinam.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are described as per their rank and status shown in the original suit.
3. The suit in O.S.No.21 of 1984 was filed against the appellants herein for partition claiming 258-1/3, out of 576 in the suit property and declaration of title to that effect. According to the plaintiff, Survey Nos.1541 and 1542 in Nagapattinam taluk, Nagoor Kalpa, Malumiyar Street measuring to an extent of 4534 sq.ft., which is more fully described in the suit schedule were original enjoyed by one Fathima Natchiar and the same was given as Seethana to one Katheeja Natchiar, who is the wife of Hameed Maraikkayar. Katheeja Natchiar had two sons and four daughters. Two of his daughters viz., Rafiakani and Rahameth Natchiar together released her 2/8 share in favour of his brother Haji Hasana Maraikkayar on 17.01.1963. From the remaining heirs of Katheeja Natchiar, the plaintiff purchased 258-1/3/576 for consideration of Rs.20,000/- on 06.12.1983 and the same was duly registered. From the day onwards, the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
4. The defendants are the wife and children of Katheeja Natchiar.
The second son of Katheeja Natchiar by name Hasana Maraikkayar another son Mohammed Ghouse are together holding the remaining shares in the suit property. When the plaintiff sought for partition by metes and bounds, the defendants refused. Hence, the suit for declaration of title and partition.
5. The case was contested by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff has no right or title over the suit property, he is not the co- sharers of the suit property under the Muslim Law. Therefore, he cannot maintain the suit for declaration and partition as prayed. The property is not traceable through Fathima Natchiar as claimed by the plaintiff and the genealogy tree furnished by the plaintiff is not true. The property being in absolute possession and enjoyment of the defendants for years, the documents relied by the plaintiff alleged to have been executed by the persons, who are all parties unrelated to the properties.
6. The trial Court framed the following issues based on the pleadings:
(1) Whether the plaintiff has right over the suit property?
(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the share as claimed in the plaint?
(3) Whether the suit property is the absolute property of the defendants?
(4) Whether the suit is maintainable?
(5) Whether the Court fee paid is proper?
(6) What relief the plaintiff is entitled to?
7. When the above said suit was pending, one Thirugnanasampatham filed a suit in O.S.No.116 of 1986 for injunction against the parties in the suit now under appeal, seeking permanent injunction alleging that he is a tenant under the plaintiff and the defendants are forcibly trying to evict him. Hence, he sought for injunction.
8. Both the suits were tried together for jointly. On the side of the plaintiff, three witnesses were examined and 72 documents were marked as Ex.A1 to A72. On the side of the defendants, four witnesses were examined and 31 documents were marked as Ex.B1 to B31. The trial Court has concluded that from the evidence the plaintiff has proved his right over the suit property and entitled for the share in the suit property as claimed and also held that the suit property is not exclusive the property of the defendants and also dismissed the suit filed by the tenant Thirugnanasampatham.
9. Aggrieved by that, the plaintiff in O.S.No.116 of 1986 Thirugnanasampatham preferred appeal in A.S.No.214 of 1993, whereas the defendants 1 to 3,5 and 6 preferred appeal in A.S.No.29 of 1994. The first appellate Court, after re-appreciation and formulating the point for determination, went on analysing Ex.A3-sale deed upon which, the plaintiff claims title over the suit property. Relying upon Ex.A17 'Fatwa' given by Poravacharvi Jamath ascertaining the shares of the plaintiff's vendor and upon Ex.A42 document, dated 15.07.1900, which was executed during the marriage of Katheeja Natchiar, confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court by dismissing the both the appeals.
10. Aggrieved by the concurrent judgment, the first respondent has preferred this Second appeal in S.A.No.484 of 1997 raising the following Substantial Questions of Law:-
(1) Whether gift of undivided share is invalid in law as hit by doctrine of Musha?
(2) Whether the Courts below are correct in relying upon an unauthenticated and translated copy of Nikah letter, which is in 'Arabic' even without the production of the original or certified copy of the Nikah for proving title?
(3) Whether Courts below are correct in believing the Fatwa, without verifying or calculating the shares under personal law of inheritance. The Fatwa itself is not discussed nor does it contain the dates of death of the parties and derivation of title?.
11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants pointing out Ex.A42, which is the translation of Nikah document executed on 15.07.1900 during the marriage of Kajeetha Natchiar submitted that it is not at all admissible in evidence since the original was not produced and the person, who has spoken about it is not the author or otherwise competent to speak about the document.
12. This Court has no doubt about the inadmissibility of Ex.A42. It is not the original document and it is neither spoken by the person, who is party to the original nor it is spoken by the person, who translated it from Arabic into Tamil. So, this document cannot be relied upon. However, on going through the facts of the case and evidence analysised by the Courts below, Ex.A42 is not only the document upon which the Courts below have arrived at the conclusion though it has been relied and referred for the purpose of tracing the title to Katheeja Natchiar. Even if that is not to be taken as a substantial evidence, the voluminous document starting from Ex.B4, dated 21.04.1917 being the sale deed in favour of Sulthan Beevi goes to show that the property in dispute had been held by the family members of Katheeja Natchiar and there was no effective partition by metes and bounds, till the date of filing the suit. In this context, Ex.A4-release deed executed in favour of the plaintiff on 17.01.1963 and the subsequent tax receipts in the name of Fathima Natchiar gain significance.
13. It is not that the plaintiff purchased the property, without ascertaining the rights of its vendor or he is a interloper. He before purchase has sought the opinion of Expert. The opinion marked as Ex.A17, reveals that the question has been raised to “Porava Jamiya Arabia Bijeelhashayudh Arabic College Najeer Sachsabeer Serkar Kilpa” by H.A.Ushuf Shahib Meer (Bigee) to render his opinion about the shares of the respective parties in the estate of Kajeetha Natchiar, which she got as Seethana (Mahr) during her marriage. As an expert in Muslim Law, his opinion has been considered and based on his opinion, the transaction has taken place.
14. This piece of evidence as an opinion of expert under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can always be relied upon, when that is no other contra opinion produced by the rival party or if the Court is satisfied about the expertise of the author of the document and its genuineness. In this context, both the Courts have accepted the opinion and relied upon it. There is no reason for this Court to differ from the view taken by the Courts below in respect of Ex.A17.
15. Though the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that Fatwa, which is marked as Ex.A17 does not reflect the true possession of law of inheritance in respect of Muslim, he could not place before this Court any other preposition of inheritance, which is different from what mentioned in Fatwa Ex.A17. So, when a relinquishment of undivided share has been accepted by the parties concerned and acted upon, it is too late for the day after several decades to question its validity on the ground that it is hit by “doctrine of Musha”.
16. The doctrine of Musha under Muslim Law impose restrictions of gift in an undivided property but, such restrictions is not for hiba-bil-iwaz or Mahar or Dower. On fact, the transfer of property by the pre-decessor of the plaintiff's title does not fall within the doctrine of Musha. Neither there is pleadings nor evidence to substantiate but, except the ground raised by the appellants. When the relinquishment fulfills the conditions required by the Mohammed Law, such relinquishment cannot be nullified by doctrine of musha, even if the property transferred is undivided one.
17. The above view is well fortified through the old judgment of Allahabad High Court reported in Mt.Kulsum Bibi v. Bashir Ahmad and Ors. [AIR 1937 All 25] rendered paras 3 and 4, which are as follows:
“3. ....Hiba-bil-iwaz means, literally gift for an exchange; and it is of two kinds, according as the iwaz, or exchange, is, or is not, stipulated for at the time of the gift. In both kinds there are two distinct acts: first, the original gift, and second the iwaz or exchange. But in the Hiba-bil- iwaz of India, there is only one act, the iwaz, or exchange, being involved in the contract of gift as its direct consideration. And all are agreed that if a person should say, 'I have given this to thee for so much' it would be a sale, for the definition of sale is an exchange of property for property, and the exchange may be effected by the word 'give' as well as by the word 'sell.' The transaction which goes by the name of hiba-bil-iwaz in India is, therefore, in reality not a proper hiba-bil-iwaz of either kind but a sale; and has all the incidents of the latter contract. Accordingly, possession is not required to complete the transfer of it, though absolutely necessary in gift, and what is of great importance in India, an undivided share in property capable of division may be lawfully transferred by it, though that cannot be done by either of the forms of the true hiba-bil-iwaz.
4. We take this passage to mean that the 'hiba- bil-iwaz' known to Muhammadan Law, is made up of two distinct gifts, each party to the transaction being donor in one and donee in the other, with the result that the rule as to delivery of possession and the limitation imposed by the doctrine of 'musha' are applicable to both gifts, so that, if a transaction be treated as 'hiba-bil-iwaz' as contemplated by Muslim jurists, delivery of possession for both gifts is essential, and neither of the two should be affected by the doctrine of 'musha'.”
18. Though Ex.A42 is an unauthenticated translation of Nikah letter of the year 1900, as pointed out earlier, it is not only the document relied by the Courts below to allow the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Ex.A2 has been relied by the Courts below only to ascertain the devolution of the property, even if this document is eschewed, the other documents are overwhelmingly in favour of the plaintiff and therefore, there is no error in the findings of the Courts below.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds there is no Substantial Question of Law arise in this appeal to differ the findings of the Courts below. Hence, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.
08.02.2017 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No ari To The Principal District and Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam.
The Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam.
Dr.G.Jayachandra, J.
ari
Judgment made in S.A.No.484 of 1997
08.02.2017
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