JUDGMENT Y.R. Tripathi, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing the verdict given by the summary court-martial holding the petitioner guilty as also for quashing the appellate order whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the verdict of the summary court martial has been rejected. The petitioner has also prayed for a direction in the nature of mandamus to be issued to the opposite parties commanding them to reinstate him to the post held by him at the time of his dismissal with consequential benefits of service including pay and allowances.
2. The petitioner having been enrolled in the Indian Army in medical corpse was working on the post of Naik at the relevant time and was posted as operation room assistant at the A.D.M. Battalion A.M.C. Centre and School, Cantonment, Lucknow. It is said that he impersonating himself as Naik Om Prakash of 325 Lt. A.D. Regiment and Naik Sadanand Roy of Military Hospital, Belgam sponsored respectively Sri Bindeshwar Prasad, son of Sri Sobhi Sahu and Sri Suman Kant Bharti for their enrolment in the Army, consequent upon which they were enrolled. On this fact coming to light, the petitioner was tried for the offence under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950 by a summary court-martial which held him guilty of the charge and besides reducing him to ranks also sentenced him to R.I. for six months and dismissal from service. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said verdict of summary court-martial which failed to bear fruit and was rejected. Aggrieved from the punishment inflicted by the summary court-martial as also the rejection of his appeal by the appellate authority, the petitioner has preferred this petition assailing both the aforesaid orders inter alia on the grounds that his trial by the summary court-martial was bad in law and the orders of the summary court-martial and the appellate authority being non-speaking are not legally sustainable.
3. Captain Trilochan Singh, who has filed counter-affidavit on behalf of the opposite parties, has justified the trial held by the summary court-martial and the orders passed by it as well as the appellate authority.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at sufficient length and have gone through the materials on record.
5. It has not been disputed before me that the scope of judicial review in administrative law is very limited and it is only the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself which is reviewable, as this Court will not sit as an appellate court while exercising the power of judicial review. It is also well-settled that in exercise of the power of review, this Court cannot substitute its own finding for the finding recorded by the summary court-martial based on evidence. Having these limitations in mind, I now proceed to discuss the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned orders mainly on the grounds, that the petitioner was not allowed to get his handwriting compared with the disputed sponsorship forms and was thereby denied the reasonable opportunity of hearing that neither the order of guilty nor the appellate order contain any reason ; that oath was not administered to the members constituting the summary court-martial and the witnesses appearing before it and that the punishment awarded is harsh and excessive.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the allegation made in paragraph 9 of the writ petition wherein it has been alleged that the petitioner had made a request at the time of trial for getting the disputed handwriting of sponsorship forms compared with his handwriting by an expert but the said request was neither recorded, nor accepted. It has further been alleged that when the sponsorship forms were said to have been filled in by the petitioner, he was on medical leave and was outside Lucknow, which fact too was not considered by the summary court-martial. The aforesaid allegations have been denied in the counter-affidavit. There is also nothing on record to show that the petitioner had made any request for the matter being referred to any handwriting expert. Besides, the finding of guilty recorded by the summary court-martial is based on appraisal of evidence. As many as six witnesses named in paragraph 8 of the writ petition appeared before the summary court-martial and testified about the petitioner having himself prepared the sponsorship forms. No enmity has been assigned to any of the witnesses for his having deposed falsehood on this point. The evidence of a handwriting expert is merely an opinion which no doubt helps in appraising the evidence, but that in itself is not a conclusive piece of evidence. When there was overwhelming direct evidence about the petitioner having prepared the disputed sponsorship forms, I am afraid if the expert's opinion could have made any difference in the conclusions arrived at by the summary court-martial. I thus find that neither there is any material to show that the petitioner made any request for getting the disputed handwriting compared with his handwriting, nor was there any necessity for getting the opinion of any handwriting expert in the matter.
8. It was then next argued that one of the cardinal principle of natural justice is that the authority exercising quasi-judicial function must record clear and explicit reasons, though not elaborately, for its decision whether or not it is subject-matter of appeal, revision or judicial review. It has strenuously been urged that in this case neither the summary court-martial, nor the appellate authority has given any reason in support of its order, hence the impugned orders suffer from manifest error of law. Rule 121 of the Army Rules, 1954 itself provides that the finding on every charge upon which the accused is arraigned shall be recorded, and except as mentioned in these rules, such finding shall be recorded simply as a finding of "Guilty", or of "not guilty". This rule also provides the exceptions where the reasons are required to be given. The instant case does not fall within those exceptions, hence no reason was required to be given. The legality of Rule 121 of the Army Rules has elaborately been examined with reference to Article 33 of the Constitution of India under which the Army Act, 1950 has been enacted, in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, wherein it has been held that neither the order of the summary court-martial, nor the appellate order need contain reasons. In view of the law laid down in the case of S.N. Mukherjee (supra), the arguments raised about the orders of summary court-martial and the appellate authority being non-speaking carry no merit.
9. It was then next contended that oath was not administered to the members of summary court-martial and the witnesses appearing before it, which fact has been denied by the opposite parties in counter-affidavit. The petitioner himself has filed excerpts of the statements of certain witnesses which show oath having been administered to them.
10. The decision for trial of the petitioner by summary court-martial has been taken by the commanding officer, who, under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 22 of the Army Rules, 1954 is empowered to take decision on this point.
11. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the fact proved to the effect that the petitioner sponsored two persons impersonating himself as Naik Om Prakash and Naik Sadanand Roy and both of them on the strength of fake sponsorship forms got themselves enrolled, itself speaks of the seriousness of the charge. It cannot be denied that the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner was highly prejudicial to the good order and military discipline. Keeping in view the gravity of the charge, the punishment inflicted on the petitioner in no way can be said either to be excessive or harsh warranting any interference.
12. In view of what has been discussed above, this petition has no force and is hereby dismissed.