ORDER B.K. Rathi, J.
1. Heard Sri Tejpal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri S. P. Tiwari and Sri Veer Singh, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The petitioner moved an application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. for registration of the case and investigation against the respondents for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, I.P.C. The learned Magistrate has allowed the application on 25-6-2002 and directed the police to register the case and investigate. Against that order, the respondents preferred criminal revision No. , 215 of 2002 before the Incharge Sessions Judge, Agra. The revision was put up before the Additional Sessions Judge, Agra, who has admitted it and stayed the operation of the order of the Magistrate. Aggrieved by it, the present petition has been preferred.
3. It has been argued by Sri Tejpal, learned counsel for the petitioner that the Magistrate passing the order under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. is not a Court and therefore, the criminal revision under Section 397, Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. It has further been argued that the order is interlocutory and therefore, the revision does not lie as provided by Clause (2) of Section 397, Cr. P. C, that therefore, the learned Incharge Sessions Judge erred in admitting the revision and staying the operation of the order.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his first argument has referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar (1997) 7 JT (SC) 85 : AIR 1997 SC 3104. The only relevant observation in this case is in para 8, which provide that as soon as the order is passed under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. it transforms itself into a report given in writing within the meaning Section 154, Cr.P.C. which is known as first information report. As under Section 156(1), Cr.P.C. the police can only investigate a cognizable case, it has to formally register a case on that report.
5. This authority does not lay down that the Magistrate passing the order under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. is not a Court and does not support the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
6. It has also been argued that the order is interlocutory and no revision lie against that order. In my opinion, the argument of Sri Tejpal, learned counsel for the petitioner does not require a detailed discussion in view of the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Ajai Malviya v. State of U.P. (2000) 41 All Cri C 435 : 2000 All LJ 2730.
7. In this case, the F.I.R. was registered pursuant to an order under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. of the Code directing the police to register and investigate the case. The accused approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a direction not to arrest him besides the relief of certiorari for quashing the first information report of the said case. At the very outset a question arose before the bench as to whether the writ petition for quashing the first information report sans any challenge to the order under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate is maintainable. It was urged on behalf of the accused-petitioner that the order under Section 156(3) of the Code has the complexion of an administrative order and hence it was neither revisable under Section 397 of the Code not open to challenge under Section 482 of the Code and, therefore, the F.I.R. could be quashed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in case the Court was of the opinion that taken in its entirely the F.I.R. did not disclose commission of cognizable offence
8. The Division Bench took the view "Having given our anxious consideration to submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner we are of the considered view that an order under Section 156(3) of the Code has the complexion of a judicial order amenable to revision jurisdiction under 'Section 397 of the Code." Accordingly the writ petition for quashing the first information report was dismissed as not maintainable."
9. This decision supply the complete reply of both the submission of Sri Tejpal.
10. In view of the above decision, there is no illegality in the order of Incharge Sessions Judge in admitting the revision and also staying the operation of the order.
11. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. However, the learned Sessions Judge, before whom the revision is pending is directed to dispose of the revision expeditiously preferably within a period of one month from the date of presentation of the certified copy of this order before him.