JUDGMENT
1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit brought by them to have it declared that a certain deed of gift executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (the widow and daughter of one Sambhal Rai) in favour of defendant No. 3, the son of defendant No. 2, is viod and ineffectual as against the plaintiffs, the reversionary heirs of the two sons of Sambhal Rai. The plaintiffs are very distant relatives of the deceased Sambhal Rai and their main grounds of attack were, first, that the defendant No. 3 was not the son of defendant No. 2, second, that Sambhal Rai had died leaving sons, and the defendant No. 1 was in possession as a Hindu mother; and third, that owing to a compromise which had been entered into between defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand and the plaintiffs on the other, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 could not make any valid transfer of the property so as to defeat the rights of the plaintiff--3, the next reversioners. This compromise was effected on the 28th of February 1880 in a suit which the plaintiffs had brought for recovery of possession of the property against defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground of waste. (See paragraph 2 of the plaint in the present suit.) The result of that compromise was that defendant No. 1 was to remain in possession of the property during her life and after her death practically half of the property was to go to the then plaintiffs and half to her daughter, defendant No. 2 It appears that on the 24th of July 1914 the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 made a gift of the estate to defendant No. 3, and this suit is to avoid that deed of gift so far as it may affect the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs. The defence to the suit was that Sambhal Rai left no sons him surviving; that the plaintiffs are not the reversionary heirs of Sambhal Rai; that the defendant No. 3 is the son of defendant No. 2, and that the compromise was not binding and the deed of gift was valid. The Court of first instance, the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur, found that Sambhal Rai had no sons and that none survived him. He also found that defendant No. 3 was the son of defendant No. 2 and consequently a daughter's son of Sambhal Rai. He also found that the compromise, which was nothing short of an alienation by the defendant No. 1, was not at all binding and valid as against defendant No. 3, who was no party to that proceeding. He further pointed out that the previous litigation was not meant to attack the estate which the defendant No. 1 represented, but was really intended to decide as to who was to succeed to the estate after the death of defendant No. 1, and consequently defendant No. 1 did not represent the estate in that litigation, and the compromise, therefore, could not bind any third party. The result was that he dismissed the suit. In appeal the District Judge confirmed the two findings of the Court of first instance on the question of fact referred to above. The learned District Judge did not discuss the question of law regarding the effect of the compromise in detail, but be came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had no right to bring the present suit in the lifetime of the defendant No. 3, who was the next reversioner. It has been argued before us that the compromise of 1880 was in reality a family settlement and was thus binding on all the members of the family, whether they were or were not parties to that litigation. Having regard to the abstract of the previous claim given in the plaint itself we cannot accede to this contention. We are of opinion that there was no attack on the estate by persons claiming by virtue of an antecedent title which the compromise recognised, but that it was an attempt to settle succession for the future in the guise of a claim for possession on the ground of waste against the holder of the life estate. A compromise like the one mentioned above would be of no effect against defendant No. 3. Moreover we think that in the present case the plaintiffs have no right to sue, because the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have surrendered the whole of their estate in favour of the next reversioner, namely, defendant No. 3. There has been what is technically called an acceleration of the estate in favour of defendant No. 3 who is now the full owner. However, be this as it may, the first ground mentioned above is sufficient for the disposal of this appeal. We, therefore, dismiss it with costs, including in this Court fees on the higher scale.