IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF APRIL, 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MRS.JUSTICE S.SUJATHA W.P.Nos.11209 – 11212/2019 (LA – KIADB) BETWEEN :
1. SMT.S.JALAJA W/O N.MALLIKARJUNAIAH, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/AT KUVEMPU NAGARA, "SUKADA NILAYA", TUMAKOORU-572102 2. SRI SIDDAPPA S/O KARIYANNA, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, R/AT KOLALUKUNTE, KORA HOBLI, HALDODDERI POST, TUMAKOORU TALUK & DISTRICT-572128 3. SRI KARIBASAVAIAH S/O KARIYANNA, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, R/AT KOLALUKUNTE, KORA HOBLI, HALDODDERI POST, TUMAKOORU TALUK & DISTRICT-572128 4. SRI DODDA CHINNAPPA S/O MELGIRIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/A THIPPEDASARAHALLI, KORA HOBLI, HALDODDERI POST, TUMAKOORU TALUK & DISTRICT-572128 ...PETITIONERS (BY SRI RAJESWARA P.N., ADV.) AND :
1. UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, KRISHI BHAVAN, Dr. RAJENDRA PRASAD ROAD, NEW DELHI-110001 BY ITS SECRETARY 2. STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE, Dr. B.R.AMBEDKAR BEEDI, VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001 REP. BY ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY 3. THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD, IV & V FLOORS, EAST WING, KHANIJA BHAVAN, RACE COURSE ROAD, BANGALORE-560001 REP. BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & EXECUTIVE MEMBER.
4. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER- NIMZ KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD, MARUTHI TOWERS, 1ST FLOOR, NEXT TO SIT COLLEGE, B.H.ROAD, TUMAKURU-572102 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI LAXMINARAYAN N. HEGDE, ADV. FOR R-1; SRI B.J.ESHWARAPPA, AGA FOR R-2;
SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLY, SENIOR ADV. FOR SRI B.B.PATIL, ADV. FOR R-3 & R-4.) THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 28(4) AND (5) OF THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT ACT, 1966 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE OF FURTHER PROVISO TO ARTICLE 31A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND ETC.
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 28.03.2019, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, S.SUJATHA J., PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
O R D E R These petitions involving similar and akin issues, have been considered together and are taken up for final disposal at this stage itself, with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
2. The petitioners have challenged the provisions of Section 28[4] and [5] of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 ['KIAD Act’, for short] inter alia seeking for a direction, declaring that the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the KIAD Act are void after the enactment of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ['Act, 2013' for short] further assailing the acquisition proceedings under the notification dated 09.12.2016 published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 26.01.2017 issued under Sections 3[1], 1[3] and 28[1] of the KIAD Act, as well as the notification dated 20.07.2018 published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 09.08.2018 issued under Section 28[4] of the KIAD Act, in so far as the petitioners’ lands are concerned.
3. The petitioners are claiming to be the owners of lands in Thippedasarahalli, Bahujanahalli and Kodithimmanahalli Villages, Kora Hobli, Tumakooru Taluk and District, the details of which are as under:
4. Dodda Chinnappa Kodithimmanahalli 22/1P 1 00 Total 9 16 4. The Government of Karnataka – respondent No.2 herein had issued a notification dated 23.07.2010 under Section 28[4] of the KIAD Act, for the purpose of establishing Machine Tools Industry Park by Indian Machine Tools Manufactures Association, acquiring an extent of 1,424 Acres 29 ½ guntas of land in Vasanthnarasapura, Kempanadodderi, Bathasandra, Bahujanahalli, Kempadalihalli and Doddanapalya. Now, as per the notification dated 09.12.2016 and 20.07.2018, the respondents intended to acquire an extent of 54 Acres 9 ½ Guntas of land for the purpose of achieving Compactness and Contiguity. The said notifications are challenged as illegal in so far as the petitioners’ lands are concerned.
5. The learned counsel Sri.Rajeswara.P.N., appearing for the petitioners contended that the provisions contained under Section 28[4] and 28[5] of the KIAD Act making provision for taking over possession even before paying the compensation or tendering compensation is hit by proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution of India. The KIAD Act does not provide for payment of compensation at the time of taking physical possession unlike the urgency provision contemplated under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was argued that the lands of many of the petitioners/lands owners were notified in the year 2010, the petitioners’ present lands being not notified, now in the garb of compactness and contiguity, the lands are sought to be taken away which is nothing but an arbitrary exercise of power and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was further argued that the acquisition of the lands in question is covered by ‘public purpose’ as defined under Section 2[1][b][iii] of the Act, 2013. Therefore, the acquisition of lands for the purpose of manufacturing zone, ought to be under the Act, 2013 and not under the KIAD Act. The repugnancy under Article 254 [1] of the Constitution of India is pleaded in as much as KIAD Act is repugnant to the Act, 2013 enacted by the Parliament. The distinction made between the acquisition under the Act, 2013 and the acquisition under the KIAD Act, giving the benefit in respect of acquisitions under the former and not giving the benefit to acquisitions under the latter will amount to unfair discrimination and violating the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust v/s. Vithal Rao1. Learned counsel contended that as per Annexure-J, the map showing the land acquired for the project in question indicates that certain pockets of land are left out from acquisition notwithstanding the compactness and contiguity, envisaged in the notifications notified for acquisition.
6. Learned Senior counsel Sri.Ashok Haranahalli representing the learned counsel for the respondent – Board contended that Entry 24 of List – II i.e., the State List deals with “Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List – I”. The KIAD 1 1973 [1] SCC 500 Act is enacted in terms of the powers vested with the State Legislation under Entry 24 of the State List i.e., List – II. It was argued that unlike the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which provides for making of an award under Section 11 and taking of possession of lands under Section 16, the KIAD Act in terms of Section 28[5] has a vesting clause. In terms of the same, the lands proposed for acquisition stand vested in the state free of all encumbrances. The actual physical possession too is taken in terms of Section 28[6] and 28[7] of the KIAD Act. The provisions of the KIAD Act in so far as it relates to acquisition of lands are in tune with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and this Act has received presidential assent on 14.05.1966. The acquisition provisions of KIAD Act stand at a different footing as compared to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and further substantiates that the acquisition provisions are an integral part of the KIAD Act for securing the establishment of Industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and it is a self-contained code. In terms of Section 30 of the KIAD Act, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to court, the apportionment to compensation and the payment of compensation.
7. The learned Senior Counsel inviting the attention of the Court to paragraph 17 of the Statement of objections filed by the Board, has stated that the only distinction in the KIAD Act, with the new Act 2013 are in connection with the provisions relating to the compensation accorded to the land loser. Dwelling upon the said issue, the Board constituted under the KIAD Act, in its meeting has resolved that the compensation as regards lands acquired under the KIAD Act by virtue of notifications issued on and after 01.01.2014 shall be in tune with the new Act, 2013. Thus, it was argued that the provisions of Section 28[4] and 28[5] of the KIAD Act are intra vires the Constitution of India and cannot be held to be void subsequent to the enactment of the Act, 2013. Host of cases were relied upon, to substantiate the arguments.
8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material on record.
9. The notifications impugned are issued by the Government of Karnataka under Sections 28[1] and 28[4] for the purpose of establishing the Machine Tools Industry Park by Indian Machine Tools Manufactures Association – a Manufacturing Zone. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that subsequent to enactment of Act, 2013, in terms of Section 2[1][b][iii] of the Act 2013, any acquisition if to be made for acquiring the lands for manufacturing zone, the Provisions of Act 2013 would apply and not the KIAD Act. To address on this point, it is beneficial to refer to Section 2[1][b][iii], 3[z][a] and Section 107 of the Act, 2013 which reads thus:
“2. Application of Act. – [1] The provisions of this Act relating to land acquisition, compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement, shall apply, when the appropriate Government acquires land for its own use, hold and control, including for Public Section Undertakings and for public purpose, and shall include the following purposes, namely, [a] xxxxx [b] for infrastructure projects, which includes the following, namely, [i] xxxxx [ii] xxxxx [iii] project for industrial corridors or mining activities, national investment and manufacturing zones, as designated in the National Manufacturing Policy.”
Section 3[za] of the Act, 2013 reads thus:
“Public purpose” means the activities specified under sub-section [1] of Section 2;”
10. Section 107 of the Act, 2013 reads thus:
“107. Power of State Legislatures to enact any law more beneficial to affected families. – Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State from enacting any law to enhance or add to the entitlements enumerated under this Act which confers higher compensation than payable under this Act or make provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement which is more beneficial than provided under this Act.”
11. The main object of KIAD Act is :
“Statements of Objects And Reasons:
I. Act 18 of 1966: It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of Industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for Industrial Development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of Industries.”
12. The KIAD Act is a self-contained code.
Section 28[1] of the Act, Section 28[4] and 28[5] of the Act reads thus:
“28. Acquisition of land.-
(1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land.
(2) xxxxx (3) xxxxx (4) After orders are passed under sub- section (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect.
(5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.”
13. The validity of Maharashtra Industrial Development Act came into consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shri Ramtanu Co- operative Housing Society Ltd., and Another V/s. State of Maharashtra and Others2, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act is a valid piece of legislation and observed in paragraph 15 as under:
2 1970 [3] SCC 323 “15. It is in the background of the purposes of the Act and powers and functions of the Corporation that the real and true character of the legislation will be determined. That is the doctrine of finding out the pith and substance of an Act. In deciding the pith and substance of the legislation, the true test is not to find out whether the Act has encroached upon or invaded any forbidden field but what the pith and substance of the Act is. It is true intent of the Act which will determine the validity of the Act. Industries come within Entry 24 of the State List subject to the provision of Entry 7 and Entry 52 of the Union List of the Constitution. Entry 7 of the Union List relates to industries declared by Parliament by law to necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. Entry 52 of the Union List relates to industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. The establishment, growth and development of industries in the State of Maharashtra do not fall within Entry 7 and Entry 52 of the Union List. Establishment, growth and development of industries in the State is within the State List of industries. Furthermore,- to effectuate the purposes of the development of industries in the State it is necessary make land available. Such land can be made available by - acquisition or requisition. The Act in the present case deals with acquisition of land by the State and on such acquisitions the State may transfer the land to the Corporation which again may develop it itself and establish industrial estates or may develop industrial areas. Acquisition or requisition of land falls under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. In order to achieve growth of industries it is necessary not ,only to acquire land but also to implement the purposes of the Act. The Corporation is therefore established for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 'De pith and substance of the Act is establishment, growth and Organisation of industries, acquisition of land in that behalf and carrying out the purposes of the Act by setting up the Corporation as one of the limbs or agencies of the Government. The powers and functions of the Corporation show in no uncertain terms that these are all in aid of the principal and predominant purpose of establishment, growth and establishment of ,industries. The Corporation is established for that purpose. When the Government is satisfied that the Corporation has substantially achieved the purpose for which the Corporation is established, the Corporation will be dissolved because the raison d’etre is gone. We, therefore, hold that the Act is a valid piece of legislation.”
14. It is further held that there is no procedural discrimination between the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The two Acts are dissimilar in situation and circumstances. The Maharashtra Industrial Development Act is a special one having the specific and special purpose of growth, development and Organisation, of industries in the State of Maharashtra.
15. In the case of Shanta Talwar and Another V/s. Union of India and Others3, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the context of multiple statutes permitting land acquisition for the public purpose in question, observed thus:
“22. Wherever a particular State Act incorporates the provision of the LA Act by way of reference or by way of incorporation by the legislation, the provisions of the LA Act automatically become applicable for the purpose of carrying out the object of the said particular State Act but wherever such power is not given there is no bar for taking recourse to any of the Acts which are available on the subject. There was no bar or prohibition for the authority to take recourse to the provisions of the LA Act which is also a self- contained Code and also could be taken recourse to for the purpose of acquiring land for public purposes like construction of Metro Railways and works connected therewith. In all these cases no other provision except the provisions of the LA Act have been resorted to and, therefore, the appellants cannot have any grievance for taking recourse to the said provision.
3 [2011] 5 SCC 287 23. Besides, the Metro Railways Act gives power to the competent authority to acquire land for the purpose of construction of Metro Railways and works connected therewith and in the said Act it is also provided that the possession can be taken immediately after issuance of the declaration as envisaged under the Act. The mode of compensation is almost identical with that of Section 23 of the LA Act which lays down the manner for determination of the compensation to be paid.”
16. Having regard to the scheme of KIAD Act relating to acquisition and compensation, Section 28 deals with the Acquisition of Land. Sub-section [1] to [8] of Section 28 contemplates the different stages of of acquisition. Sub-section [1] of Section 28 provides for issue of notification, giving notice after State Government of its intention to acquire such land for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Sub- section [2] deals with the service of notice by the State Government upon the owner/occupier to show cause within thirty days from the date of service of notice why the land should not be acquired. In terms of Sub- section [3], after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard. In terms of Sub- section [4], on the State Government being satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose satisfied in the notification issued under Sub-section [1] after orders are passed under Sub-section [3], a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect. After issuance of declaration under Section 28[4] of the Act, there is a separate procedure provided for taking possession of land. Sub-section [5] contemplates that on the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under Sub-section [4], the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. There is a separate procedure provided for taking possession. Sub-section [6] of Section 28 states that after the vesting of the land, the State Government may by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorized by it in this behalf within thirty days from the service of the notice. Sub-section [7] of Section 28 states that if any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section [5], the State Government or any officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. In sub-section [8] of Section 28, it is stated that where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.
17. Section 29 contemplates for Compensation.
The said Section envisages that where any land is acquired by the State Government under the Chapter VII, the Stage Government shall pay for such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions of the KIAD Act. In terms of Section 29[2] where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. Where such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid, as per Sub-section [3]. In terms of Sub-section [4], on receipt of a reference under sub-section [3], the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land.
18. Section 30 of the KIAD Act contemplates that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Central Act 1 of 1894] shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of lands acquired under the Chapter VII.
19. The KIAD Act, 1966 has received the presidential assent on 14.05.1966. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 28[4] and [5] of the KIAD Act are unconstitutional and violative of further proviso to Article 31A is wholly misplaced. The first proviso to Article 31A states that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of the Article, 31A shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. The further proviso makes it clear that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.
20. Section 29 of the KIAD Act as aforesaid provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof for the acquisition of lands by the State under the Act. A complete machinery is provided under Sections 28, 29 and 30 of the KIAD Act for acquisition of land and awarding compensation as discussed above. Hence, at any stretch of imagination, it cannot be held that Section 28(4) and (5) are in violation of the proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution.
21. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Girnar Traders V/s. State of Maharashtra and Others4, examined the marked distinctions between the Statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act [MRTP Act], 1966. Sl.No.4 of the table found in paragraph 67 of the said Judgment is beneficial to be quoted:
Sl.No. The Land Acquisition Act The MRTP Act 4. Under normal proceedings for acquisition under the Act, the land vests in the Government only after the award is made and possession is taken in terms of Section 16 of the 4 [2011] 3 SCC 1 Under this Act, the land required for development vests in the Government at the very threshold. Under Section 129[1] when emergency provisions are invoked, the land shall vest Act, of course with the exception stated in Section 17 of the Act.
without any further assurance and free from all encumbrances in the State only when notice of 15 days is given by the Collector prior to taking possession. Section 83 shows marked distinction that possession of the land can be taken and it shall vest in the Government/authority where it is necessary to undertake forthwith any work included even in a draft scheme for a public purpose.
22. Considering such points of distinction between the two Acts observed that there are some of the glaring points of distinction between the two Acts. Of course, there may be other distinctions and the ones stated by us are only illustrative, the purpose of referring to the distinction is primarily to demonstrate that they are two different statutes operating in different fields, the provisions of which are required to be utilized by the authorities concerned for the object sought to be achieved under the respective Acts and accordingly upheld the vires of the MRTP Act rejecting the ground of repugnancy raises. Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, it is clear that KIAD Act is aimed at planned establishment and development of Industries in suitable Areas in the State unlike that Central Act enacted with the object to acquire land and disburse compensation in accordance with law. The State is competent to enact such a law under Entry 24 of List – II. It is not in dispute that the KIAD Act is a comprehensive law pertaining to establishment of the Industries in the State of Karnataka which is enacted in furtherance of Entry 24 of the State List. The acquisition of the lands under the said enactment is an ancillary issue and the main purpose is of enacting the growth and development of the industries in the State of Karnataka. Entry 24 of List-II i.e., State List deals with “Industries subject to the provisions of Entry 7 and 52 of List- I”. The new Act 2013 and KIAD Act can reconcile and co-exist. The Scheme of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is repealed by Act 2013, was an ex-proprietary legislation to provide for acquisition of lands for public purposes and for companies. The said enactment is traceable to Entry 42 to List-III of VII Schedule of the Constitution of India pertaining to “Acquisition and requisition of property”. The new Act 2013 and the KIAD Act, being under the respective entries, both the enactments are operating in their own fields. Thus, the ground of repugnancy must fail. There is no bar to the authorities to take recourse to the provisions of the KIADB Act, which is also a self contained code, the acquisition of land under the said Act is justifiable. The petitioners cannot have any grievance for the same.
23. The power of the State Government to take possession of the lands at a threshold would not invalidate the provisions of Section 28[4] and [5] of the Act considering the object of the KIAD Act read with the provisions for awarding compensation. accordingly, Section 28(4) and (5) of the KIAD Act can not be held to be ultravires the constitution and consequently the notifications impugned deserve to be upheld.
24. As aforesaid, Chapter VII of the KIAD Act deals with the provisions of acquisition and compensation. In view of the discussions made in the preceding paragraphs, even after the Act, 2013 coming into force, the said Chapter subsists and aids to achieve the purpose and object of the Act. It cannot be held to be void at any stretch of imagination.
25. As regards certain pockets of lands left out from the acquisition under the subject notifications, it is not in dispute that a temple and a Government School are located in the respective land utilized in the public interest. Those two pockets of lands cannot be construed to be on parity with the petitioners’ lands acquired under the subject notifications.
26. The main ground of attack of the petitioners is that pursuant to the enactment of Act, 2013, no notifications would have been issued for acquisition of the lands of the petitioners in the manufacturing zone resorting to the provisions of the KIAD Act.
27. The genesis of the challenge to the provisions of the KIAD Act vis-à-vis the notifications issued under Section 28[1] and 28[4] of the KIAD Act relates to the visible distinction inasmuch as award of compensation under the two enactments and apprehension of denial of the higher compensation which otherwise the petitioners are legitimately entitled to, under the Act, 2013. This grievance of the petitioners is addressed by the Board wherein, a specific stand has been taken in the Statement of Objections filed by the Board, in paragraph 17, that the Board constituted under the KIAD Act, in its meeting has resolved that the compensation as regards lands acquired under the KIAD Act, shall be in tune with the New Act, 2013. The said paragraph is quoted hereunder for ready reference:
“17. Without prejudice to the aforementioned the doctrine of Severability is applicable where though an enactment as a whole is within the legislative competence of a legislature, particular provisions of the enactment go outside the scope of the legislative entry under which the legislature enacted the law. It is submitted that the repugnancy in the KIAD Act, 1966 with the New Act, 2013 are in connection with only the provisions relating to the compensation accorded to the land loser. It is submitted that dwelling upon the said issue the Board constituted under the KIAD Act, 1966 in its meeting has resolved that the compensation as regards lands acquired under the KIAD Act, 1966 shall be in tune with the New Act, 2013.”
28. The learned Senior Counsel Sri.Ashok Haranahalli appearing on behalf of the Board also substantiates the same on instructions. Further on the application filed by the petitioners bringing subsequent events to the notice of the Court i.e., letter dated 04.10.2018, a communication issued from the Special Deputy Commissioner, KIADB to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, wherein the compensation has been fixed as per the recommendations of the Land Price Advisory Committee which has been approved by the Board in its 356th meeting held on 20.09.2018, that the compensation shall be awarded at Rs.50 Lakhs per acre on consent and if the land owners are not agreeable for such consent awards, the award shall be made in accordance with law. The Board has filed objections to the said application submitting that in terms of Section 29 of the KIAD Act, the compensation of the lands acquired is to be determined and the award has to be made under Section 29[3] of the KIAD Act. In terms of Section 29[2] of the said Act, the State and the land looser can enter into a consent agreement as regards the compensation. In case of the State and the land looser failing to enter into consent agreement, an award under Section 29[3] of the Act shall be passed. The Board in its 343rd meeting dated 24.08.2016 having discussed the said issue in detail, has resolved that the affidavits to the said effect for determination of compensation shall be as per ‘Schedule-I’ of the LARR Act for the purpose of Section 29[3] of the KIAD Act be filed in the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in cases wherein notifications under Section 3[1] and 28[1] of the KIAD Act have been issued on and after 01.01.2014. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Board placing reliance on this resolution, submitted that the petitioners herein are entitled to compensation in terms of Act 2013 as admitted by the Board in Paragraph 17 of the statement of objections in pursuant to the said resolution of the Board dated 24.08.2016. In view of the primary grievances of the petitioners being redressed by the Board as aforesaid, the grounds urged by the petitioners in as much as discrimination in resorting to the provisions of the KIAD Act, does not survive for consideration.
29. As could be seen, the resultant factors of getting compensation under the Act, 2013 being achieved by the petitioners, in view of the undertaking given by the Board before this Court in terms of the objections filed coupled with the submissions of the learned Senior counsel on instructions, the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed.
30. Hence, the following:
ORDER [i] Sections 28[4] and [5] of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 and the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the said KIAD Act are intravires the Constitution of India.
[ii] The notifications dated 09.12.2016 as well as 20.07.2018 issued under Sections 28[1] and 28[4] of the KIAD Act are legally valid and enforceable.
[iii] The petitioners are entitled to compensation in terms of the Act, 2013 as per the undertaking given by the KIADB before this Court in the event the petitioners are not agreeable for a consent award under Section 29[2] of the KIAD Act.
With the aforesaid observations and directions, writ petitions are dismissed.
In view of the dismissal of the writ petitions, all the pending I.As stand disposed of.
Sd/- JUDGE NC.