JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the tenant-petitioner is directed against the orders dated 8th September, 2003 and 23rd July. 2004. passed by the prescribed authority under the provisions of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short 'the Act'), copies whereof are annexed as Annexure Nos. '2' and V, respectively, to the writ petition.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition are that the petitioner in this petition is the tenant and the respondent is the landlord of the accommodation in dispute. On 18th November, 2002 an application has been filed by the landlord-respondent purporting to be an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the accommodation in dispute in favour of the landlord. The prescribed authority vide its Order dated 15th February, 2003, held that the service of summons of the aforesaid application for release of the accommodation filed by the landlord is sufficient and directed the case to be proceeded ex parte. On 8th September, 2003, the prescribed authority allowed the release application ex parte filed by the landlord and directed release of the accommodation in dispute in favour of the landlord. The petitioner-tenant for the first time when came to know of the aforesaid proceedings on 23rd January, 2004, filed an application under Rule 22 (b) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, read with Section 151 and Order IX. Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present application filed by the tenant, which was supported by an affidavit, he has categorically stated that he came to know of the pendency of the aforesaid release application only on 23rd January, 2004, He further stated that the tenant-petitioner has never been served with any notice of the release application filed by the landlord and it is wholly incorrect to say that the opposite party ever met with any process server of the Court with regard to service of summons of the aforesaid release application. It is also incorrect to say that the tenant-petitioner has received any registered notice sent by the Court in present release application pending before the prescribed authority, therefore there is no question of petitioner's refusing to receive any summons sent by the Court. The petitioner-tenant further stated that in fact with the collusion of postman and the opposite party-landlord it appears that a forged report regarding service of the registered letters/notice were manipulated on the basis of which the prescribed authority has presumed the service of summons to be sufficient, whereas in fact the notice has never been served upon the petitioner-tenant. The prescribed authority by the Order Impugned found that from the endorsement of the refusal, It is presumed that the service of summons is sufficient and proceeded to decide the matter ex parte. It is further submitted that the presumption of service of summons refusing by the petitioner-tenant is rebutable presumption and once the petitioner-tenant has put in appearance denying the allegations that he has ever been served and that the note of refusal has been manipulated, therefore, it was incumbent upon the prescribed authority to have recorded a finding by asking the landlord to produce the postman concerned as held by this Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-tenant relied upon the case in Gur Bachan Singh v. Dharam Samaj Society, AIR 1981 All 208, particularly paragraph 11, which is reproduced below :
" 11. The crucial question which thus arises in the present case now is as to whether in the state of evidence which exists on the record the defendant can be said to have rebutted the presumption which had been raised against him. The defendant in the present case stated on oath that the postman has not served the notice on him. He has not at all been cross-examined on the aforesaid point by the plaintiff. The plaintiffs only witness has made a statement that he had not accompanied the postman. The only thing which the plaintiff has been able to point out is that the notice has been sent to the correct address of the defendant. The contention of the plaintiff's counsel that the defendant should have cross-examined the plaintiff on the aforesaid question and should have also produced the postman, in my opinion. is without any force. The plaintiff himself had not accompanied the postman for effecting the service and thus there was no question of cross-examining the plaintiff on that question. The postman had made an endorsement of refusal on the notice and the defendant would not call a witness who was going to depose against him. It was for the plaintiff, in case he wanted to produce better evidence to produce the, postman in evidence in Order to believe the version of the defendant that he was not served. On similar facts this Court in the case of Shiv Dutt Singh v. Ram Dass, 1980 All LR 457 : AIR 1980 All 280, held :
"In the instant case, the defendant clearly gave out that the postman never came to him to offer this notice nor he refused to take it. Nothing was elicited in cross-examination to show that he was not telling the truth. He could not have examined the postman as he would not have deposed against his own endorsement and more so if it was done to oblige the plaintiff. The defendant could not have produced any other witness as that would have been stamped as got up evidence. As a party to the suit, having knowledge of the facts, he was bound to examine himself otherwise another presumption would have been raised against him. Therefore, the presumption of service in the circumstances of this case was amply rebutted by the solitary statement and the suit was bad for want of notice."
Similar view has been taken by this Court in Hub Lal v. Bhudeo Prasad Sharma, 1980 All LJ 437 ; Amar Nath v. Smt. Champa Devi, 1978 All LR 90 ; Ram Nekshatra v. Girdhar Das Kashya, 1979 (UP) RCC 5 and also by the Delhi High Court in Jagat Ram Khallar v. Battu Mal, AIR 1976 Del 111. In my opinion in the present case the defendant rebutted the presumption of service of notice against him by examining himself and deposing that the postman never served a notice on him. His testimony was not challenged by the plaintiff in the cross-examination. The plaintiff did not produce the postman or any other evidence to show that the defendant was not deposing the truth and that notice had, in fact, been served on him. The plaintiff having failed to prove that he had served notice of termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act on the defendant, the plaintiffs suit was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone."
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant-petitioner further relied upon a decision in Shiv Dutt Singh v. Ram Dass, AIR 1980 All 280, wherein paragraph 10 relied upon by learned counsel for the tenant is reproduced below:
"10. In Jagat Ram Khullar v. Battu Mal, AIR 1976 Del 111, It was observed that a statement of the addressee on oath that the postal cover said to have been refused by him, was never tendered to him would be sufficient to ' dislodge the presumption and shift the onus on the other side to establish by evidence that the service had been duly effected. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that the bare statement on oath of the addressee in such a case would not, as a matter of law, be sufficient to dislodge the presumption that may be raised either under Section 114 of the Evidence Act or under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. A statement on oath of a party to the proceedings is a piece of oral evidence like statement of any other witnesses-and there is no Rule of law that such a statement should not be accepted merely because it is made by a person who is interested in the proceedings nor is there any requirement of law that the statement on oath of a party to the proceedings must always be corroborated by any independent evidence before it could be accepted by Court of law. Once the presumption is raised the matter of rebuttal needs not be limited to the instance given in the counter Illustration to Section 114."
4. It is further submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant-petitioner that the petitioner having discharged his burden by making a statement that the service of summons has in fact never ' been done and that he has never refused to receive the registered letters/summons and further that the said refusal has been manipulated. In view of the law laid down, referred to above, the Order to proceed ex parte by the prescribed authority is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner further relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Ramji Dass and Ors. v. Mohan Singh, 1978 ARC 496, wherein the Apex Court has held as under :
"..........................After having heard counsel, we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Court's discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not t6 shut out hearing. Therefore, we think that the Order of the High Court should not have been passed in the Interests of justice which always informs the power under Section 115, C.P.C. We, therefore, set aside that Order and also the ex parte decree. We direct the trial court to take back the suit on file and proceed forthwith to trial"
5. In view of what has been stated above, the orders passed by the prescribed authority impugned in the writ petition dated 8th September, 2003 and 15th February, 2003, deserves to be quashed and is hereby quashed. The matter now will go back to the prescribed authority to be decided in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the tenant-petitioner.
6. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The Order dated 8th September, 2003, passed by the prescribed authority, Annexure-2 to the writ petition and the Order dated 15th February, 2003, is quashed. The matter now will go back to the prescribed authority to be decided in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the tenant-petitioner. Since the matter is old, the prescribed authority is directed to decide the application filed by the landlord-respondent for release of the accommodation in dispute within a period of six months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this Order before him.