K.RAVIRAJA PANDIAN, J.
This Writ petition is filed seeking for the relief of issuance of writ of Quo warranto directing the third respondent to show cause by what authority he claims to have, use, enjoy and perform the rights, duties and privileges of the Office of the Additional Public Prosecutor and Public Prosecutor (In Charge) in the High Court of Madras and consequently declare that the appointment of the third respondent as an Additional Public Prosecutor and Public Prosecutor (in charge) of the High Court of Madras as ab initio void.
2. The petitioner - a practicing advocate of the Madras High Court and Tamil Nadu State Joint Secretary Indian Association of People's Lawyers, has filed the writ petition supported by an affidavit. The material averments in the affidavit are that the petitioner came to know that the third respondent, who is serving as Additional Public Prosecutor of Madras High Court, was appointed as Public Prosecutor (Incharge), that he came to know that the third respondent before his appointment as Additional Public Prosecutor has also served as Government Advocate (Criminal Side) in the Madras High Court from 1996 to 1998; that under Right to Information Act, he obtained certain Government orders and other related documents pertaining to the appointment etc., of the third respondent, that from which he learnt that the third respondent was appointed as Additional Public Prosecutor of Madras High Court in the year 2006 vide G.O.Ms. No.576 dated 23.6.2006; that the petitioner came to know that the third respondent during his tenure as Government Advocate was terminated from his service on corruption charges vide G.O.Ms.No.927 dated 12.6.1998; that he further learnt that the Government Advocates were appointed only for a tenure of two years and subsequently extended for two more years if need be on lawful consideration; that despite the fact that only less than four weeks was remaining for completion of tenure of the third respondent, Government chose to terminate him from service; that reveals the gravity of the corruption charges levelled against the third respondent; that in the Bio-data placed by the third respondent for his appointment to the post of Additional Public Prosecutor, it is stated that the third respondent has served two years as Government Advocate from the year 1996 to 1998; that the said statement is not true as he was terminated from service before the completion of two years from his appointment; that it is clearly evident to conceal the fact of termination, the third respondent has stated that he has completed two years of service as Government Advocate (Criminal Side); that the third respondent's termination from service on corruption charges was totally concealed during his appointment as Additional Public Prosecutor; that
Section 24 of Criminal Procedure Code mandates the consultation of the High Court before the appointment of Additional Public Prosecutor; that the petitioner hoped that the documents relating to the termination and the enquiry proceedings conducted before such termination were not placed before this Court and that fact was completely concealed; that a great sanctity is attached to the post of Public Prosecutor; that the Public Prosecutor is not only defending the State, but also expected to be fair to the Court as well as the accused; that the Public Prosecutor is expected to maintain the decorum, uphold the majesty of justice and help the Court in dispensing justice in Criminal Justice Administration; that if a person, who heads such system, is himself a person removed on the charge of corruption, the very criminal law administration would be at jeopardy; that the procedure of consultation of the High Court for appointment of the Public Prosecutor is not even required for the post of an Advocate General, that the word consultation is real consultation, in the sense, that all the materials in possession of one who consults must be unreservedly placed before the consultee, and withholding of material information like termination of respondent No.3 on corruption charges will vitiate the very appointment of the post of Additional Public Prosecutor. On the above basis the petitioner filed the writ petition for issuance of quo warranto.
3. On an office note dated 17.8.2009, My Lord the Hon'ble Chief Justice has ordered the Registry to post this case before this Bench and as such the matter was listed before this Court on 21.8.1999. On that day, at the request of the counsel appearing for the petitioner to gather more materials, the matter was adjourned to 25.8.2009.
4. The counsel appearing for the petitioner argued the case on 25.8.2009 reiterating what is stated in the affidavit by arguing that a person, who has been terminated from the service of Government Advocate (Criminal Side) on proved misconduct should not have been appointed as Additional Public Prosecutor by respondents No.1 and 2. In his resume (bio-data), the third respondent has stated that he has served as Government Advocate (Criminal Side) in Public Prosecutor's Office, High Court, Chennai for two years (1996-1998), which is incorrect. The third respondent has not completed two years of service, but was terminated few weeks prior to the completion of two years.
Section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires that the State Government has to appoint Additional Public Prosecutor on consultation with the High Court. While respondent No.1 is seeking for the opinion of the Court, he had failed to disclose the material fact of termination of the third respondent on proved corruption charges. In order to bring home his contention, he relied on the decisions of PONNUSAMY VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU reported in 1995 WRIT LAW REPORTER 503, R.RADHAKRISHNAN VS. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE reported in (2008) 1 SCC 660 and ANNA MATHEW VS. N.KANNADASAN reported in 2009-1- Law Weekly 87.
5. On behalf of the respondents, it is submitted that a quo warranto can be maintained only if the person appointed to the Office has no valid qualification to hold the post or if such appointment is made against the relevant statutory provision. In the case of appointment of the third respondent, none of the conditions is contravened. Hence, a quo warranto cannot be maintained. The contention of the petitioner that the third respondent has been terminated from his post as Government Advocate (Criminal Side) on the proved misconduct of corruption is absolutely baseless, but it is a figment of the imagination of the petitioner. The Government Order G.O.Ms.No.927 dated 12.6.1998 with which reliance has been made to contend as above by the petitioner nowhere suggests that the third respondent was terminated from the panel of advocates on the proved charge of corruption. The third respondent was terminated from serving as Government Advocate earlier on the recommendation of the then Public Prosecutor for certain alleged lapses in defending a transfer petition. That cannot be regarded as disqualification for appointing him as Additional Public Prosecutor after lapse of eight years. The State is competent to appoint a lawyer of its choice to the post of Pubic Prosecutor in consultation with the High Court as required under
Section 24(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The third respondent is an Advocate practicing in the criminal side for more than fifteen years meets the requirement of sub section (7) of
section 24 and was appointed as Additional Public Prosecutor in consultation of the High Court, Madras. The writ petition may be dismissed.
6. The file relating to the Order dated 12.6.1998 is placed for our perusal. On a reading of the file, it could be seen that one Satyanathan, first accused in Crime No.40 of 1998 on the file of Sankar Nagar police station obtained an order of anticipatory bail from this Court on 13.1.1998 in Crl.O.P.No.404 of 1998 on conditions that he should appear before the respondent police daily at 10.00 a.m, and 5.00 p.m, until further orders, and also produce the car allegedly involved in the case for investigation purpose as and when required. Subsequently the same Satyanathan filed Crl.O.P.No.2157 of 1998 praying for transfer of investigation of crime No.40 of 1998 from Sankar Nagar Police Station to some other station. On 27.2.1998, this Court passed an order to call the matter on 3.3.1998 along with Crl.M.P.No.1544 of 1998 and in the meanwhile directed the respondent police not to insist the petitioner's presence or harass him. The application in Crl.M.P.No.1544 of 1998 was filed for cancellation of the bail granted earlier. The conditions imposed in the anticipatory bail petition directing Satyanathan to appear before the respondent police and produce the car allegedly involved in the case for investigation purpose as and when necessary was not brought to the notice of the Court while passing the order on 27.2.1998 and that at the time of hearing of Crl.M.P.No.2157 of 1998 filed for transfer of investigation, the third respondent did not present the case properly and did not make any attempt to refute the allegations made against the police officer, were the allegations made against the third respondent. It could be seen from the order dated 27.02.1998 that filing a petition for cancellation of bail in Crl.M.P.No.1544 of 1998 has been brought to the notice of the Court, but for which there is no necessity for the Court to direct the Crl.M.P.No.2157 of 1998 to be posted along with Crl.M.P.No.1544 of 1998. However, on the basis of the above allegation, the then Public Prosecutor sent a letter recommending for termination of service of the third respondent as Government Advocate as his continuance in the office of the Public Prosecutor would be against public interest. Pursuant to the same, G.O.Ms.No.927 dated 12.6.1998 was issued terminating the third respondent from the panel of Advocates. The termination order reads as follows:
"ORDER:-
As per Rule 2 in para VI under the heading "System of Panel of Advocates" in High Court Standing Order Part II, the Government of Tamil Nadu hereby direct that the services of Thiru.P.Kumaresan, Government Advocate (Criminal Side) attached to High Court, Chennai be terminated from the panel of Advocates by giving one month retainer fee from the date of issue of this order.
2. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Chennai is requested to arrange to serve the order to the Law Officer. He is also requested to arrange to draw and disburse the retainer fee as mentioned above to the above Law Officer, High Court, Chennai."
There is absolutely no material or even a whisper in the above order that the third respondent's service as Government Advocate was terminated on proved corruption charges. There is no explanation from the petitioner as to how he came to the conclusion that the third respondent was terminated on proved corruption charges. For the allegation of corruption charges, except the bald averment in the affidavit and the stout argument before the Court, there is no material forthcoming from the petitioner. This is nothing but wild, rather reckless allegation levelled against the third respondent for the reasons best known to the petitioner.
7. The third respondent was appointed as Additional Public Prosecutor on 23.6.2006. It is surprising to note that the petitioner, who claims to be a practicing advocate of this Court came to know about such appointment only recently and filed the writ petition after 3 years and 2 months.
8. The allegation of corruption charges without any basis and on that basis filing a writ petition by a practicing advocate, who is supposed to know about the gravity of the allegation and consequences of filing of the writ petition of the present nature after a period of three years from the date of appointment of the third respondent, cast some suspicion as to the bonafide of the petitioner.
9. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the third respondent was not terminated for the proved corruption charges, which is evident from the reasons stated above. Hence, the very foundation of the case is collapsed and as such the allegations have to be rejected.
10. Now let us consider whether the appointment of the third respondent meets the statutory requirement of sub-Sections (1) and (7) of
Section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The said provisions, which are relevant to the present case, read thus:
"24. Public Prosecutors. - (1) For every High Court, the Central Government or the State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be.
....
(7) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) or sub-section (6), only if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years."
11. The third respondent is a legal practitioner having a standing of fifteen years of practice in the High Court, Madras on the date of his appointment on 23.06.2006. He was appointed by the State Government after consulting the High Court under
Section 24(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code under G.O.Ms. No.576 dated 23.06.2006, which reads as follows:
"ORDER Under
section 24(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974), the Government of Tamil Naldu in consultation with the High Court of Madras) hereby appoint the following Advocates as Additional Public Prosecutors in the High Court of Madras and its Bench at Madurai as noted against each:-
12. Now let us consider as to how the issue of the present nature has been dealt with by the Court of superior jurisdiction. "The matter relating to the appointment of a legal practitioner by a Government may be the subject matter of a legislation. The State by amending the provisions of
Sections 24 and
25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may make a law regulating the appointment of the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor. Such a law can also be made for regulating appointment of other State counsel. In absence of any legislation in that behalf, various States have laid down executive instructions. Thus, the State in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 162 is competent to appoint a lawyer of its choice and designate him in such manner as it may deem fit and proper." (vide M.T.KHAN v. GOVT. OF A.P. (2004) 2 SCC 267).
13. In the case of B.SRINIVASA REDDY VS. KARNATAKA URBAN WATER SUPPLY & DRAINAGE BOARD EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, (2006) 11 SCC 731, the Supreme Court enunciated the principle as follows:
"... 49. The law is well settled. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine, at the outset, as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one which can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.
....
57. It is settled law that a writ of quo warranto does not lie if the alleged violation is not of a statutory nature....
59. In High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat (2003) 4 SCC 712, it was held by this Court that a writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. The judgment in Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. V. Financial Commissioner & Secretary to Government of Haryana (2002) 6 SCC 269, was relied on"
(bold supplied) (See also High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat,(2003) 4 SCC 712)
14. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the court will normally not interfere with the decision. The nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-`-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagements, the courts are normally chary to overturn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. (Vide State of U.P. v. Johri Mal,(2004) 4 SCC 714).
(bold supplied)
15. The Court should consider whether the writ petition is the outcome of the ill will or malice. (Vide A.N. Shashtri v. State of Punjab, 1988 Supp SCC 127). In the earlier paragraph, we doubted the bona fide of the petitioner. Issuance of a writ of quo warranto is discretionary and such a writ should be issued only upon a clear finding that the appointment to a public office was contrary to the statute. (Vide Arun Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 9 SCC 375)
16. In B.R.Kapur v. State of Tamilnadu, (2001) 7 SCC 231), the apex Court has held as follows :
"Quo warranto protects the public from illegal usurpation of public office by an individual and the necessary ingredients to be satisfied by the Court before issuing a writ is that the office in question must be public, created by the Constitution and a person not legally qualified to hold the office, in clear infringement of the provisions of the Constitution and the law.
.............
A writ of quo warranto is a writ which lies against the person, who according to the relatory is not entitled to hold an office of public nature and is only usurpur of the office. It is the person, against whom the writ of quo warranto is directed, who is required to show, by what authority that person is entitled to hold the office. The challenge can be made on various grounds, including on the grounds that the possessor of the office does not fulfil the required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification, which debars the person to hold such office. "
(bold supplied)
17. The Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of THE UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE VS. GOVINDA RAO reported in AIR 1965 SUPREME COURT 491 has held as follows:
"Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enqiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions, it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons not entitled to public office maybe allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court inter alia that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been in accordance with law or not."
(bold supplied)
18. Quo warranto is extra-ordinary remedy and citizen must satisfy, inter alia, that office in question is public office and is held by usurper without legal authority and appointee did not possess requisite qualification. No quo warranto can be issued on basis of mere allegations which are vague. (vide T.Fenn Walter v. Hon'ble Mr.Justice E.Padmanabhan, 2002(3) CTC 321)
19. Pure questions of fact cannot be enquired into in petition seeking issuance of quo warranto. (Vide N.S.Ziauddeen v. S.Ashok Kumar, Principal Sessions Judge, (2002) 2 CTC 257.)
20. Having regard to the fact that the third respondent is having required qualification of seven years standing in the Bar under sub-section (7) of
Section 24 of Criminal Procedure Code and the requirement of consultation of the High Court under
Section 24(1) has also been complied with, the appointment of the third respondent cannot be at any stretch of imagination be considered to be an appointment against the statutory provision. If that be so, no writ of quo warranto can be issued in the light of the judicial pronouncements above referred to.
21. The case laws cited by the counsel for the petitioner are as follows :
The first of the case relied on behalf of the petitioner is PONNUSAMY VS STATE OF TAMIL NADU reported in 1995 Writ Law Reporter 508. In the case, the writ petition was filed for quo warranto questioning the appointment of Advocate General on the ground that three professional irregularities viz., (1) In contempt application No.69 of 1994 pending on the file of this Court, implicating the second respondent therein in the matter of printing and publishing wall-posters denigrating the Judiciary, (2) On 2.11.1981, the second respondent was appointed as Legal Adviser of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Limited(in short, "TIIC"). A written complaint was made by one Mr.Nalla Gounder, complaining about the second respondent's conduct in demanding a sum of Rs.10,000/- for offering legal opinion on the title of the property offered by the said Nalla Gounder as security for a loan sought for from the TIIC.The TIIC sought the opinion of the Government and the Government, by a letter dated 31-1-1985, instructed the TIIC to remove the second respondent from the panel of the Legal Advisers and (3) There were certain proceedings against the second respondent pending before the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu. In those factual circumstances, the writ petition was filed for issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the first respondent State of Tamil Nadu to remove the second respondent therein from the Office of the Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu. However, as the second respondent therein has resigned from the post of Advocate General during the pendency of the writ petition, the Court dismissed the writ petition without laying down any ratio.
22. The second decision relied on by the petitioner is R.RADHAKRISHNAN VS. DIRECTOR GENEARL OF POLICE AND OTHERS reported in (2008) 1 SCC 660, wherein the appellant filed an application for appointment to the post of Fireman on 5.1.2000. He was provisionally selected whereafter he submitted a verification roll, in which the appellant answered negative in respect of three questions as to "Have you ever been concerned in any criminal case as accused?", Have you ever been arrested or convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment or pay a fine in any criminal or other offence? If so, give details with CC No. and Court." and Are there any civil or criminal cases pending against you? If so, details". However, later it was admitted that he was involved in an incident which occurred on 15.4.2000 and was proceeded with against under
Section 294(b) of the Penal Code and he was arrested, but was released on bail, however was acquitted from the charge on 25.9.2000. He was not selected on the premise that he had made a false statement in his verification roll in respect of pendency of aforementioned cases. The Supreme Court held that the non-disclosure of pendency of criminal case is fatal and the non-selection on that ground is in accordance with law. In that case giving false answers to the questions in the verification roll has become fatal to the petition.
23. It appears that the above judgment has been pressed into service by the petitioner on the ground that in the Resume of the third respondent, which the petitioner obtained under the Right to Information Act, the third respondent has given an incorrect statement that he served as Government Advocate (Criminal Side) in Public Prosecutor's Office, High Court, Madras, Chennai for two years (1996-98) and he did not disclose the termination. We are not able to accept the contention of the petitioner that the information that the third respondent served as Government Advocate for two years 1996-98 is incorrect statement as the petitioner himself has stated in paragraph No.5 of the affidavit as follows:
"I came to know that the 3rd respondent before his appointment as Additional Public Prosecutor has also served as Government Advocate (criminal side) in the Madras High Court from 1996 to 1998."
It is also a fact that the third respondent served as Government Advocate (Criminal Side) upto his termination on 12.6.1998. The non-furnishing of the fact of third respondent's termination as Government Advocate in the resume would not ipso facto be regarded as disqualification of the third respondent to hold the office of the Additional Public Prosecutor, as the earlier order of termination was passed by the same respondent, who has passed the present order appointing the third respondent as Additional Public Prosecutor. Thus, there is no suppression of material fact.
24. The third case is ANNA MATHEW VS. N.KANNADASAN reported in 2009-1- Law Weekly 87, which has been merged with the order of the Supreme Court in the case of N.KANNADASAN VS. AJOY KHOSE reported in (2009) 7 SCC 1, in which the core question was whether the respondent therein was qualified to be appointed as the President of the Tamil Nadu State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai. Though the first respondent therein acted as Additional Judge of this Court for a period of two years, his period has not been extended. Whether an Additional Judge, whose term has not been extended, can be regarded as a retired Judge or be regarded as has been a Judge or has held the Office of the Judge was a question. That was held against the first respondent therein. We are of the view that none of the three decisions relied on by the petitioner would advance the case of the petitioner for the relief sought for.
25. In view of the catena of decisions about the maintainability of writ of quo warranto, few of which have been referred to supra, and in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the petitioner has not made out any case for issuance of quo warranto and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. No costs.
usk To
1. The Secretary to Government Public (Law Officers) Department Government of Tamil Nadu Chennai.
2. The Registrar Madras High Court Chennai 102.