The first defendant in O.S.No.96 of 1999 on the file of the Sub Court, Sivakasi, is the appellant. The suit in O.S.No.96 of 1999 was filed by the respondents 1 to 6 herein seeking partition and separate possession of their half share in the suit properties. The plaintiffs claimed half share in the suit properties contending that the item No.1 of the suit property belonged to their grandfather E.A.P.Ayya Nadar as his separate property and the suit second item was the ancestral property of the said Ayya Nadar. The plaintiffs who are the daughters of the first daughter of Ayya Nadar, Thenpalam would contend that the deceased Ayya Nadar had executed the settlement deed on 02.02.1938 in favour of the plaintiffs' mother Thenpalam and the first defendant. Since the settlees were minors, he had appointed his wife Chinnathaiammal @ Durgai Ammal as the guardian. The said settlement deed was to take effect after the death http://www.judis.nic.in 3 of Ayya Nadar and his wife. Claiming that the said Ayya Nadar had no other issues, the said Ayya Nadar having sold certain properties with consent of the settless the only property left is the item No.1 of the suit schedule property. He had also sold some of the properties which were subject matter of the settlement deed with the consent of the settlees and the suit properties continued to remain in the hands of Ayya Nadar till his death on 09.11.1974, the grandmother of the plaintiffs, namely, Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal died sometime in 1979. Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, they are entitled half share while the other half share belonged to the first defendant. It is also the claim of the plaintiffs that the defendants 2 to 5 who are the husband and sons of the Thenpalam had relinquished their interest in the suit properties in favour of the plaintiffs. Since the demand of the plaintiffs for partition was not acceded to by the first defendant, the plaintiffs had sought for partition and separate possession.
2.The suit was resisted by the first defendant contending that the settlement deed dated 02.02.1938 was never acted upon since the settlement deed was not accepted by Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal on behalf of the minor daughters. The fact that Ayya Nadar had exercised his rights of ownership and had sold the properties was also highlighted by the first defendant to buttress the claim that the settlement deed dated 02.02.1938 was not acted upon. The first defendant would further claim that her mother, wife of Ayya http://www.judis.nic.in 4 Nadar had executed a registered settlement deed on 01.11.1976 settling the suit properties in her favour and therefore, she had become the absolute owner of the first item of the suit properties. It was also claimed that the life estate obtained by Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal got enlarged in view of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
3.As regards the suit second schedule property which is the ancestral property of the Ayya Nadar, the first defendant would contend that Ayya Nadar by a registered sale deed dated 18.11.1964, settled the entire second schedule property in favour of the first defendant and her husband S.K.D.Rathnaswamy Nadar. It is also claimed that the settlees had accepted the settlement and hence, the plaintiffs have no right to sue in respect of the second item of the suit schedule property.
4.The first defendant would also plead that the plaintiffs 3 to 5 were ousted from the joint possession of the properties from 01.11.1976 and therefore, the suit filed after lapse of 21 years is barred by limitation. It is the further claim of the first defendant that she had spent huge amount in developing the first item of the suit schedule property which is admittedly a residential house. On the above pleadings, the first defendant sought for dismissal of the suit.
5.At trial, the fourth plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A-1 to A-6 were marked on the side of the plaintiffs. The fourth http://www.judis.nic.in 5 defendant was examined as D.W.1 and the husband of the first defendant S.K.D.Rathinaswamy Nadar was examined as D.W.2. The defendants also examined as D.Ws.3 to D.W.6. One Advocate, namely, Thiru.Baburaj was examined as Court Witness. Exs.B-1 to B-88 were marked on the side of the defendants. On the basis of the above pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues:-
“1.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to partition to suit properties and for separate possession of half share in suit properties?
2.Whether the defendants are liable to pay future mesne profits to plaintiffs?
3.Whether the settlement deed of 02.02.1938 executed by E.A.P. Ayya Nadar in favour of his minor daughters never came into operation or given effect to?
4.Whether the first schedule property was not brought to sale in court auction and whether the debts incurred by E.A.P.Ayya Nadar were not discharged by the mother of plaintiffs?
5.Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming any property as per settlement deed of 02.02.1938, since it was not intended to be acted upon?
6.Whether D1 was in possession of first schedule property through registered settlement deed dated 01.11.1976 executed by Chinnathayammal alias Durgaiyammal?
7.Whether the second schedule property was given to D1 and her husband by E.A.P.Ayya Nadar by settlement deed dated 18.11.1964?
http://www.judis.nic.in
8.Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of 6 other co-owners?
9.Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
10.Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary and proper party in respect of item No.2 of schedule property?
11.Whether the court fee paid is not correct?
12.Whether the suit properties are in joint possession of the plaintiffs and defendants?
13.To what reliefs, if any the plaintiffs are entitled to get?”
6.The learned Subordinate Judge upheld the contention of the first defendant that the settlement deed dated 02.02.1938 was not acted upon. In coming to the said conclusion, the learned Subordinate Judge relied on the fact that the despite having executed the settlement Ayya Nadar had exercised ownership over the properties subject matter of the settlement deed and sold many of the suit properties. It was also concluded that the guardian of the minors namely, Chinnathayammal @ Durgaiammal had not accepted the settlement deed. As regards the settlement deed dated 18.11.1964, executed by Ayya Nadar in favour of the first defendant and her husband, the learned trial Judge, concluded that the said settlement has been proved in accordance with law and the same is true and valid.
7.The claim of the first defendant that Ayya Nadar had no right to settle the ancestral properties was rejected by the trial Court http://www.judis.nic.in 7 on the ground that Ayya Nadar being the sole surviving coparcener was entitled to settle the properties in favour of his daughter. On the above conclusion, the learned trial Judge held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in the second item of the suit schedule property.
8.With reference to the settlement deed dated 01.11.1976 said to have been executed by the wife of Ayya Nadar namely, Chinnathaiammal @ Durgaiammal settling the first item of the suit schedule property in favour of the first defendant, the learned trial Judge, concluded that the said document is invalid with reference to the share of the first defendant and the plaintiffs' mother Thenpalam. The learned trial Judge concluded that the said document though true, its validity would be confined to the 1/3rd share of Chinnathaiyammal @ Durgaiammal inasmuch as Ayya Nadar died only in 1974, after coming into force of the new Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The claim of the first defendant that Chinnathaiyammal @ Durgai Ammal became the absolute owner of the properties in view of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act was rejected by the trial Court.
9.On the question of ouster pleaded by the first defendant, the trial Court concluded that the first defendant has not established that the plaintiffs were actually ousted from the enjoyment of the suit properties. The learned trial Judge held that the http://www.judis.nic.in 8 first defendant had not established the necessary ingredients in support of her plea of ouster in order to deny the share to the plaintiffs. On the above conclusions, the learned trial Judge, decreed the suit granting 1/3rd share in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendants 3 to 5. Insofar as the suit second item of the property, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the first defendant had come forward with this appeal.
10.Pending appeal, the first appellant/first defendant died and the appellants 2 to 8 were brought on record as her legal representatives. Her husband, S.K.D.Rathinaswamy Nadar who was brought on record as the second appellant also died. The appellants 3 to 8 were recorded as his legal representatives by an order dated 09.03.2017. The 8th respondent in the appeal Thiru.R.Balachandran had died pending the appeal and his legal representatives were brought on record as respondents 11 to 13. The 7th respondent A.Ranjitham had also died pending appeal.
10.I have heard Mr.S.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants for Mrs.P.Jessi Jeeva Priya, Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 and Mr.N.Dilipkumar, learned counsel for the respondents 9 to 13.
11.Insofar as the dismissal of the suit, with reference to the second item of the suit schedule property is concerned, the plaintiffs/respondents 1 to 6 have not challenged the same. Hence, http://www.judis.nic.in 9 the validity of the settlement deed dated 18.11.1964 need not be gone into in this appeal.
12.The learned counsels on either side would submit that they are not seriously disputing the finding of the trial Court that the settlement deed dated 02.02.1938 which was marked as Ex.A1 was not acted upon. Therefore, we have to proceed on the footing that succession to the estate of Ayya Nadar opened on 09.11.1974 and in view of the fact that the character of the property as a self-acquired property in the hands of Ayya Nadar is also admitted, the succession would be governed by
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to this extent, the parties are not at variance.
13.Mr.S.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would contend that wife of Ayya Nadar namely, Chinnathayammal @ Durgaiammal had executed the settlement deed on 01.11.1976 settling the entire property on the first defendant/first appellant and therefore, she having claimed absolute right over the properties, the plaintiffs cannot seek to claim a share nearly 21 years after execution of the document. He would also add that the first defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the property as the owner thereof to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and therefore, the plaintiffs are ousted from the enjoyment of the property. He would also plead that the suit filed 21 years after the execution of the settlement deed dated 01.11.1976, is barred by limitation. He would http://www.judis.nic.in 10 further point out that pursuant to the settlement deed, the municipal register was changed in the name of the first defendant and she has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property as a owner thereof by paying necessary taxes. He would place considerable reliance on the fact that the first defendant has paid taxes for the first item of the suit schedule property from 1979 onwards. According to him, even if it is to be assumed that Chinnathayammal @ Durgaiammal wife of Ayyanadar had only 1/3rd share in the first item of the suit schedule property, she had settled the entire property claiming adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs and hence, the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by limitation.
14.Per contra, Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents 1 to 6 would submit that mere long possession would not amount to ouster. He would also contend that in order to constitute ouster, there must have been open assertion of hostile title to the knowledge of the other co-owner which distinguishes a plea of ouster from a plea of ordinary adverse possession.
15.Mr.N.Dilipkumar, learned counsel for the respondents 9 to 13, would substantially, adopt the submissions of Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs.
16.Upon hearing the learned counsel on either side, the following points framed for determination in this appeal:-
absolute estate in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and
(ii)Whether the plaintiffs were in fact ousted from the enjoyment of the suit properties so as to deny them in the suit first item of the properties.” Point No.I
17.Though Mr.S.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal had a life estate in the property and the same had blossomed into an absolute estate in view of
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act , I am unable to accept the said submission.
18.In order to invoke the provisions of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it should be shown that the Hindu woman had acquired the limited estate in the property prior to 1956. The fact that Ayya Nadar died only 1974 and the admitted position that the first item of the suit property was his self-acquired property would initiate against the claim of the first defendant that the limited estate had blossomed into absolute estate under
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
19.The settlement deed dated 02.02.1938 did not create interest in favour of Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal as she was only shown as a guardian of the minor daughters who were the settlees under the document. The trial Court recorded a finding that http://www.judis.nic.in 12 the settlement deed dated 02.02.1938 marked as Ex.A1 was not acted upon. Therefore, the property remained as self-acquired property of Ayya Nadar in his hands till his death on 09.11.1974. Therefore, it is clear that wife of Ayya Nadar, namely, Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal did not acquire a limited estate in the suit property. In view of the above, the first defendant or the deceased Chinnayathayammal @ Durgai Ammal cannot invoke
Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 claiming right over the said property. In fact, a perusal of the settlement deed dated 01.11.1976, would show that Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal has not claimed that she had a limited estate which blossomed into an absolute estate under the said document. The recitals in the document read as follows:-
“,jd; jgrpy; fz;l brhj;jhdJ vd; ghh;jj; h i\ nyl; ,.V.ma;aehlhh; mth;fSf;Fg; ghj;jpag;gl;L i\ahh; rh;t Rje;jpukhf mDgtpj;J te;J 1974-k; tU\k; etk;gh; khjk; fhykhf gpd; vdf;F kl;Lk; thhpR chpikapy; rh;t Rje;jpu ghj;jpankw;gl;L tPl;L thp KjyhdJ vd;
nguhy; brYj;jp FoapUe;J tUfpnwd;”
20.From the above recitals, it is clear that the parties were aware of the legal position. In the absence of any proof to the effect that Chinnathaiyammal @ Durgai Ammal had acquired the limited estate before coming into the force of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, enlargement of such limited estate under
Section 14 of the said Act would not arise.
http://www.judis.nic.in
21.
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as 13 follows:-
“14.Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property:-
(1)Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation:-In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or nor, before, at or after the marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2)Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”
22.A reading of the above provision would make it clear that in order to invoke the provisions of
Section 14, it should be shown that the property should have been possessed by a female Hindu as a limited owner at some point of time prior to enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Admittedly, Ayya Nadar died only in the http://www.judis.nic.in 14 year 1974 and when succession opened,
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would apply and Chinnathaiammal @ Durgai Ammal, the first defendant, the plaintiffs and the defendants 3 to 5 were the class-I heirs of Ayya Nadar being the wife, daughter and children of a predeceased daughter, Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal had only 1/3rd share in the suit properties, whereas the remaining 2/3rd share had devolved only on the first defendant and the plaintiffs 3 to 6 equally.
23.The trial Court has taken note of the said fact and has held that in view of settlement deed dated 01.11.1976 marked as Ex.B.4, the first defendant would be entitled to her 1/3 rd share and the 1/3rd share of Chinnathayammal @ Durgai Ammal. I, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the said finding of the trial Court. The point is answered against the appellants and in favour of the respondents.
Point No.II:-
24.As regards the plea of ouster is concerned, the evidence that is available on record, no doubt true establishes the exclusive possession of the first defendant ever since the execution of the settlement deed dated 01.11.1976. While the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would vehemently contend that the fact that Chinnathaiyammal @ Durgai Ammal had asserted the hostile title by execution of the settlement deed in favour of the first defendant http://www.judis.nic.in 15 and coupled with the fact that the first defendant continued to be in possession of the first item of the suit schedule property by effecting improvements would satisfy the legal requirements to constitute ouster, Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 would submit that even assuming that the first defendant was in exclusive possession of the property to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the said possession alone, in the absence of any overt-act on the part of the first defendant to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs are ousted from the claim of share in the first item of the suit schedule property.
25.Both the learned counsels would rely upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Mohaideen Abdul Kadir and others Vs.Mohammad Mohaideen Umma reported in ILR (1970) 2 Mad 636. While Mr.S.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would rely on the observations of the Hon'ble Mr.Justice Ramamurti found in paragraph 165 of the judgment which reads as follows:-
165.....It is important to notice that the learned Chief Justice has stressed that the most important element is the length of time. The aforesaid Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court was followed in all the subsequent decisions:- vide Gobinda Chandra Bhattacharjee Vs.Rajendranath (2).Reference may also be made to the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mahendra Nath http://www.judis.nic.in Biswas Vs.Charu Chandra Bose (3) where following the 16 decision in Ayenenussa Bibi Vs.Sheikh Isuf (4) ouster was presumed, when the defendants were in possession from 1892 and the suit was filed 32 years later, in the year 1924.
(166)The same view was taken in the Patna High Court, following the principle of the aforesaid cases:- vide: Padma Pande Vs.Ram Sarup Pande (5) in which ouster was presumed in the case of exclusive possession for over 25 years. The Court observed that the sole possession and enjoyment of profits by one co-ower continuously for along period without any claim or demand by the other co-
owner is evidence from which an actual ouster of the other co-owner may be presumed. Reference may be made to a Bench decision of the same Court in Ramlakhan Singh Vs. Bhaira Chathu Sahi, in which it is observed that even though possession of one co-owner is on behalf of all, if the claimant owner has been out of possession and had not been in participation of rents and profits for a long lapse of time, the Court may draw the presumption of ouster from such long lapse of time in the light of the attendant circumstances of the case.” Mr.M.P.Senthil would draw my attention to the observations of the same learned Judge found in paragraph 168 which reads as follows:-
“168...So far as this Court is concerned, it is sufficient to refer to the decision of Venkatarama Iyer,J., as a Judge of this Court, reported in Krishnayya Vs.Udayalakshmamma. In that case, the exclusive possession and non participation was only for a period of 18 years and in the light of the attendant circumstances of the case it was held ouster had not been established.” http://www.judis.nic.in 17
26.The learned Judge speaking for the Bench further observed at paragraph No.172 as follows:-
“172.From this analysis of the case law (English and Indian), it is seen that a presumption of ouster may be drawn from long continuous exclusive possession by a co-
owner in the light of the attendant circumstances of the case, i.e., If other circumstances concur. In other words, knowledge of ouster is imputed to the other co-owner in the light of the other circumstances of the case coupled with long continuous exclusive possession by one co-owner.”
27.In the very same decision, the Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.S.Venkataraman,J had at paragraph Nos.105 and 106 observed as follows:-
“105.The substantive law is thus that to bring about ouster the co-owner's exclusive possession must be in denial of the title of the other co-owner and must be brought home to the knowledge of the latter. In this respect there is a difference of the co-owners' adverse possession from the adverse possession on the part of a stranger. In the latter case it is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercise due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening.” Vide Secretary of State for India Vs.Debendralal Khan (1) and also Palania Pillai Vs.Ibrahim Rowther (2).
106.The question whether the evidence in a particular case is sufficient to infer ouster is a different http://www.judis.nic.in matter and related to the branch of the law of evidence.
18
Obviously it will depend on the facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. But the following factors will be relevant: (i)exclusive possession and perception of profits for well over the period prescribed by the law of limitation (12 years in India); (ii)dealings by the party in possession treating the properties as exclusively belonging to him;(iii)the means of the excluded co-sharer of knowing that his title has been denied by the co-owner in possession.”
28.In Ibramsa Rowther (Minor) and others Vs.Sk.Meerasa Rowther and others reported in AIR 1972 Madras 467, another Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the question of ouster. The Hon'ble Mr.Justice Ramamurti, speaking for the Bench, after referring to the judgment of the Division Bench in Mohaideen Abdul Kadir and others Vs.Mohammad Mohaideen Umma reported in ILR (1970) 2 Mad 636 had summarized the legal position as follows:-
“8.We shall briefly summarise the legal position. There is a basic distinction between adverse possession as between strangers and ouster and exclusion of co-owners.
In the case of adverse possession as against strangers, it is sufficient that adverse possession is overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person, against whom time is running, ought, with the exercise of due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening. It is not necessary that adverse possession should be brought home to the knowledge of the owner. If his rights have been openly http://www.judis.nic.in usurped (not secretly), he cannot be heard to complain that 19 the fact of adverse possession was not brought to his knowledge. If the adverse possession is open, visible and notorious, even if the owner remains ignorant and indifferent, it is his own fault. The observations in some of the cases, in general, that in the case of adverse possession between strangers, knowledge of adverse possession on the part of the owner is an essential element of adverse possession are too widely expressed and do not represent the correct legal position. Vide: the following observations of Lord Macmillan in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Debendralal Khan, ILR 61 Cal 262 at p. 266 = (AIR 1934 PC
23):
"The classical requirement is that the possession should be Nec Vi Nec Clam Nec Precario. Mr. Dunne for the Crown appeared to desiderate that the adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the Crown "but in their Lordship's opinion, there is no Authority for this Requirement." It is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person, against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening".
In a case of ouster of a co-owner, the position is entirely different. The possession of one co-owner is presumed to be on behalf of all the co-owners in view of the unity of title and possession. Because of this presumption of joint ownership in the case of co-owners the law requires to constitute ouster, proof of something more than mere exclusive possession and exclusive receipt of income. Along with exclusive possession there must be an ouster, a hostile, http://www.judis.nic.in open denial and an open repudiation of the other co-owner's 20 right to the latter's knowledge. The co-owner in exclusive possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-owner merely by any secret, hostile animus on his own part in derogation of other co-owner's title.
29.From the above stated position of law, it is clear that in order to constitute ouster, it should be shown that the co-owner in possession had by his conduct made it known to the other co-owner that he is asserting the hostile title.
30.As rightly pointed out by Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6, there is no proof such overt-act or a open assertion of hostile title by the first defendant. The voluminous documentary evidence in the form of tax receipts produced by the first defendant would only show that she has been in possession of the property and nothing more. The husband of the first defendant who was examined as D.W.2 had specifically admitted that he has been a municipal councilor for a considerable length of time and therefore, he was able to effect changes in the municipal records. At the same time, the first defendant has not produced any revenue record to show that mutation was effected in the revenue records pursuant to the settlement deed dated 01.11.1976. From the evidence available on record though it can be concluded that the first defendant was an exclusive possession of the property from 1976, till the filing of the suit in 1997 over the period of 21 years, the same by itself, http://www.judis.nic.in in my considered opinion, is not sufficient to conclude that the 21 plaintiffs were actually ousted from the enjoyment of the property. The mother of the plaintiffs had died even in the year 1964 and in the normal course of events, they were living with their father. In such circumstances, unless it is shown that the first defendant had either by her conduct or by assertion of an open hostile title brought it to the knowledge of the plaintiffs that she has asserted and exclusive title over the suit properties and it is shown that the first defendant had continued in possession for over the statutory period after such assertion it cannot be said that the plaintiffs are ousted from claiming a share in the first item of the suit schedule property. Of course, ouster can be presumed by long possession. Even then, the law laid down by this Court as well as the Supreme Court, is very clear to the effect that the mere possession for any length of time cannot amount to ouster of a co-owner inasmuch as a co-owner is deemed to be in joint possession of the property and therefore, I am of the considered opinion the evidence available on record in the case on hand, is insufficient to conclude that the first defendant had been in possession of the property asserting that open hostile title to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and the defendants 2 to 5. Hence, the second question is also answered against the appellants in favour of the respondents.
31.In fine, the appeal suit stands dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 30.03.2001 in O.S.No.96 of 1999 on http://www.judis.nic.in 22 the file of the Subordinate Judge, Sivakasi. Considering the relationship between the parties, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
28.11.2018 Index : yes/no Internet : yes/no sms http://www.judis.nic.in 23 To 1.The Subordinate Judge, Sivakasi 2.The Section Officer, Vernacular Records, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. http://www.judis.nic.in 24 R.SUBRAMANIAN,J sms Pre-delivery judgment made in Appeal Suit No.111 of 2001 28.11.2018 http://www.judis.nic.in