JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner-tenant, aggrieved by an order passed by the revisional court whereby the revision filed by the landlord under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial court was reversed, approach this Court by means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. The respondent-landlord filed a suit for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant with the allegations that the tenant is defaulter within the meaning of Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short the 'Act') and thus he is liable to be ejected by decree of the Court. Before the trial court the petitioner-tenant has taken up the case that landlord Is in habit of harassing the petitioner-tenant as would be clear from the fact that respondent-landlord filed J.S.C.C. Suit No. 251 of 1976 for ejectment and recovery of rent which was dismissed on 9th July 1977. A revision against the aforesaid decree was also dismissed. Thereafter another suit was filed being Suit No. 5 of 1982 for ejectment which too was dismissed in the year 1983 and the revision filed against that order was dismissed on 16th March, 1985. It is further stated by the petitioner-tenant that since respondent No. 2 was not accepting rent from the petitioner, the petitioner started depositing rent under Section 30 of the Act in Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 and when the notice for the present suit, namely, Suit No. 42 of 1987 determining the tenancy and demand for arrears of rent was received by the tenant-petitioner he approached several times to the landlord that rent may be accepted but since the rent has not been accepted the same was sent through money order and this money order was also refused by the landlord, therefore, the tenant has deposited the rent in Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981. When the petitioner-tenant received notice terminating tenancy on 11th March, 1986, the entire amount of rent was already deposited in Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 and nothing was due. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that the view taken by the trial court was fully justified and revisional court erred in law in reversing the decree passed by the trial court, as would be clear from perusal of Sections 20 (4) and 30 of the Act which are reproduced below :
"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds.-
(1)..........................................
(2).........................................
(3).........................................
(4) In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of Sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under Sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area.
30. Deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances.-(1) If any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it (2) Where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building.
(3) The deposit referred to in Sub-section (I), or Sub-section (2) shall be made in the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction.
(4) On any deposit being made under Sub-section (1), the Court shall cause a notice of the deposit to be served on the alleged landlord, and the amount of deposit may be withdrawn by that person on application made by him to the Court in that behalf.
(5) On a deposit being made under Sub-section (2), the Court shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the person or persons concerned and hold the amount of the deposit for the benefit of the person who may be found entitled to it by any competent court or by a settlement between the parties, and the same shall be payable to such person.
(6) In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in Sub-section (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in Sub-section (2)."
3. The revisional court while disagreeing with the view taken by the trial court has held that in the facts and circumstances of the case the deposit made by the petitioner-tenant under Section 30 in Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 cannot be said to be a valid deposit which can give him benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. There is no dispute that the deposit made in Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 is not a valid deposit. The tenant cannot escape the eviction and the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 cannot be given to the tenant.
4. In support of his case the landlord relied upon a decision in Ram Sewak v. Munna Lal, 1988 (1) ARC 97. To quote from the judgment the following passage in necessary :
"The section or rules do not seem to contemplate the transmission of this application to the landlord, the fixing of a date of hearing on which both the tenant and the landlord could be heard or the passing of a considered order by the Court after hearing both sides and being satisfied that there was in fact a tender of rent by the tenant and a refusal by the landlord to receive the rent or a dispute regarding the ownership of the property which rendered it difficult or impossible for the tenant to send the money to the landlord straight. The notice which is sent to the landlord merely sets out that money has been deposited in the Court and that the landlord is at liability to withdraw it if, he so desires. All that the landlord can do on receipt of the notice is either to withdraw the moneys deposited or stop future deposits by expressing a willingness directly to the tenant to accept direct payment of rent thereafter. On the language of the statutory provisions therefore, it is not possible to say that a deposit under Section 7C is necessarily a valid one preceded by an enquiry or satisfaction of the Court that the condition precedent set out in Section 7C (1) is fulfilled."
5. The Apex Court further holds as under :
"Once there is a proof of valid deposit then there can be no eviction of the tenant under Section 3 (1) (a) since the section equates such a deposit to a payment to the landlord, thus negativing the existence of any arrears on rent of any wilful default. But at the same time it is necessary for the Court to ensure that the tenants do not resort to the provisions of Section 7C merely to harass the landlord."
6. Another case relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent is in Maiku v. Vilayat Husain, through L.Rs., 1986 (2) ARC 1, Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment are reproduced below :
"8. Section 7C gives a right to the tenant to deposit rent when a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by the tenant. A tenant may allege that the landlord had refused to accept any rent lawfully paid to him. The section itself does not require the Munsif to go into the question the landlord had refused to accept the rent paid lawfully or otherwise. We fail to understand how, the learned Munsif observed, the opposite party was served with a notice. Sub-section (4) of Section 7C contemplates of only one notice after the deposit, in pursuance of the permission granted to deposit the arrears of rent under this section. In the absence of any provision for sending notice to the landlord before granting permission to the tenant, we fail to understand how a notice was sent to the landlord before the passing of the order. The Sub-section clearly contemplates that on any deposit being made under Sub-section (1) the Court shall cause a notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord and the amount of deposit may be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him in this behalf. If the Munsif was to accord the permission to deposit the arrears of rent merely on being satisfied that the necessary allegation as required by Section 7C of the Act has been made, viz., the landlord had refused to accept, the rent lawfully tendered to him, he was not obligated to enquire whether the allegation made in the application was correct or not.
9. Section 7C permits a tenant to deposit the arrears of rent in Court only under two conditions : (i) when the landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by the tenant in respect of any accommodation and (ii) where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who was entitled to receive any rent referred to in Sub-section (1) in respect of any accommodation. If the deposit of arrears of rent was a valid deposit in accordance with the requirements of Section 7C certainty it will amount to the landlord and the tenant will be absolved from the liability of being . evicted. But if the Munsif had only to accept the application and accord permission to the tenant to deposit the arrears in Court merely on the basis that necessary allegations in the application as required by Section 7C had been made, the Court trying the suit for eviction cannot be precluded from enquiring about the permission under Section 7C."
7. Against this learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the notice for terminating tenancy was given before that the amount was deposited in Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 and when the entire amount was deposited in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, the petitioner cannot be said to be defaulter and, therefore, the suit ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon Sub-rule (5) of Rule 21 of the Rules which reads as under :
"In the case of continuance of deposit of rent for any subsequent period, fresh application shall not be necessary. But process fee and the notice in Form F shall accompany every deposit."
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner tries to take benefit of aforesaid rule and has laid emphasis that for every notice of termination of tenancy he need not to file fresh case under Section 30 and therefore the deposit by the tenant under Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 under Section 30 of the Act should be treated to be valid deposit. Learned counsel further relied upon the decisions :
1. Kailash Chand v. Mukundi Lal, JT 2002 (2) SC 9.
2. 'Khacheru v. Jagdish Prasad, 1988 (2) ARC 159.
3. Abdul Hamid v. District Judge, 1984 ARC 31.
4. Gopal v. Pyare Lal, 1985 (1) ARC 131.
5. Mukut Bihari Seth v. IInd Additional District Judge, 1989 (1) ARC 283.
9. To me it appears that the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding applicability of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 21 cannot help the petitioner and the deposit made by the petitioner under Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 after receiving notice of terminating the tenancy is not valid so as to get benefit of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 21 of the Act.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, then relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Laxmi Kishore and Anr. v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 ; Om Prakash and Ors. v. IInd Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, 2000 (4) AWC 3173 : 2000 (2) ARC 739 and Pramod Kumar Gupta v. Ist Additional District Judge, Etah, 2004 (2) ARC 154 submitted that in case the revisional court reappraise the evidence and if it has come to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court deserves to be reversed, it has no option but to remand back the matter to the trial court and the revisional court in the present case has committed an error while decreeing the suit filed by the landlord. To me it appears that principles laid down in the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not apply to the facts of the present case. The revisional court has held on question of laws that the view taken by the trial court regarding deposit of rent under Misc. Case No. 195 of 1981 cannot be said to be a valid deposit so as the petitioner may get benefit of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 21. This, in my opinion, clearly makes a distinction from Division Bench decision of Laxmi Kishore (supra) and Om Prakash (supra) and that of Pramod Kumar Gupta (supra).
11. In this view of the matter and in view of observations made above the writ petition has no force, it deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.
12. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.