JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. By means of the instant writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 27.8.2002, passed by the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar-respondent No. 1 seeking relief of direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the release order dated 5.3.1992, order dated 2.6.1997 by which the review application has been dismissed as well as the impugned order dated 27.8.2002, dismissing the revision.
2. Facts of the case, in brief are that the petitioner claims himself to be an old tenant of a portion of house No. 88/478 (old No. 88/465) on the first floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 63 per month which was purchased by the father of the present landlord-respondent No. 3 in 1960. The accommodation in the tenancy of the petitioner consists of two rooms, verandah, court-yard, kitchen, latrine and bath-room.
3. It is alleged that the petitioner later on came to know that the respondent No. 3--landlord had moved an application dated 7.2.1991 under Section 16(1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for release of the disputed accommodation. The respondent No. 3--landlord had moved the application dated 7.2.1991 under Section 16 (1)- (b) of the Act aforesaid alleging that the premises in dispute was in occupation of seven tenants, namely, S/Sri Shankar Lal, Hasa Nand, Rewa Chandra-the present petitioner, Nathu Lal, Kanhaiya Lal, Santosh Kumar, Manohar Lal and Trilok Chandra. in his application, the landlord stated that the tenants, including the petitioner had vacated the accommodation under their tenancy.
4. The revisional court has held that the revision was not maintainable by observing that looking to the facts of the case and declaration of vacancy and order of release having been passed the revision has no merits as the counsel for the revisionist was not ready to argue the revision and the vacancy was declared and accommodation had already been released.
5. The petitioner filed supplementary-affidavit. The rejoinder-affidavit was also filed and the case was taken up on 31.10.2002 when counsel for the respondent-landlord gave undertaking not to evict the petitioner. The undertaking given by the counsel for the respondent continued having been extended from time to time till 16.4.2003 as per last order dated 3.4.2003. However, the case was dismissed in default on 28.4.2003. The counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of the Court that he contacted Sri R.N. Bhalla, counsel for the respondent at 3.15 p.m. on that day itself who requested to take up the case on next day. Ultimately, the Restoration Application No. 76393 of 2003 was taken up on 30.4.2004, the order of dismissal of the petition was recalled on 30.4.2003. The case was directed to be listed in the next cause list.
6. It appears that one Ishrat Qayum had also moved an application dated 11.2.1991 for allotment of the portion of the premises, in dispute and it was on this allotment application as well as release application filed by the landlord that the Rent Control inspector submitted his report about vacancy.
7. It also appears that the Rent Control Officer-respondent No. 2 passed release order dated 5.3.1992, releasing the entire accommodation of the premises, in question, in favour of the landlord-respondent No. 3 holding that the portions occupied by the seven tenants are being released in favour of the landlord-respondent No. 3 on the basis of the seven tenants having vacated their accommodations under their respective tenancy. However, the petitioner-tenant filed a review application dated 26.3.1992 under Section 16 (5) of the Act for review of the release order dated 5.3.1992 on the ground that he was not given notice as contemplated under Rule 8 (2) of the Rules and as such he is continuously occupying the portion under his tenancy. It was also averred in the review application that the petitioner had never engaged Mohd. Shahid as his counsel nor had he signed vakalatnama in his favour; that the respondent No. 3 had forged the signatures of the petitioner in the vakalatnama said to have been executed by the petitioner in favour of Mohd. Shahid with a view to manipulate release order in his favour behind the back of the petitioner.
8. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the review application filed under Section 16 (5) of the Act by his order dated 2.6.1997, by recording a finding that the vakalatnama executed by Sri Rewa Chandra in support of the application dated 1.4.1991, to the effect that he has vacated the premises in dispute under his tenancy in favour of Mohd. Shahid, advocate was duly executed and signed by the petitioner; that in the disputed accommodation, Sri Ishrat Qayum was residing and was also having a telephone connection in his name; that the extract of telephone directory bearing the name of Sri Ishrat Qayum and telephone No. 548961 at 88/465 Chamanganj, Kanpur, was filed (copy of which is also appended as Annexure-C.A. 7 to the counter-affidavit) and that the petitioner-Rewa Chandra was delaying the disposal of the review application since 1992 and lastly that his conduct clearly proves that he had in fact, vacated the accommodation, in dispute, claimed by him to be under his tenancy.
9. Thereupon, the petitioner moved Revision No. 55 of 1997 under Section 18 of the Act for quashing of the order dated 2.6.1997, alleging that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had passed the aforesaid order without considering the objections and grounds raised by the petitioner. in the grounds of revision, it was also asserted that the petitioner as tenant was not given any notice before declaration of vacancy under Rule 8 (2) of the Rules; that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not consider the evidence led by the petitioner and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer illegally held that the petitioner appeared in the release proceedings and did not raise any objection. The petitioner also filed xerox copy of the vakalatnama allegedly said to have been issued by the petitioner in favour of Mohd. Shahid. advocate which alleged to be a forged document. No relief in revision was prayed against the order dated 6.2.1992, declaring the vacancy and order dated 5.3.1992, releasing the accommodation in favour of the respondent-landlord.
10. An application praying for amendment in the memo of revision to the effect that the disputed accommodation is waqf property was moved by the petitioner thereby denying the title of the respondent-landlord. It was rejected by the District Judge with the finding that there is no evidence on record which may show that the property is waqf. He further held that the conduct of the petitioner shows that he is seeking adjournment since 1997 and unnecessary hampering the cause of justice by delaying tactics.
11. The contentions of counsel for the petitioner are that the petitioner being tenant of the portion in his occupation having not vacated the same, was entitled to notice under Rule 38 (2) of the Rules. It is urged that the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in their Judgments have consistently held that revision lies against the order passed under Section 16 (5) of the Act or release order passed in favour of the landlord under Section 16 (1)(b) of the Act as such the District Judge-respondent No. 1 committed error of jurisdiction in not deciding the revision on merits holding that the revision is not maintainable. in support of his contention that the District Judge committed error in dismissing the revision as not maintainable and he erred in not deciding the revision of the petitioner on merits, he relied upon the decisions in Surendra Kumar Vishnoi v. Smt. Katori Devi 1983 (2) ARC 389; Yogendra Tripathi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur 1984 (2) ARC 7; Copal Prasad Agrawal v. Mahendra Singh Chaudhary 2005 (2) ARC 726 : 2006 (1) AWC 51 and Achal Mishra v. Rameshwar Singh 2005 (1) ARC 877.
12. Counsel for the respondents has urged that the conduct of the petitioner as noticed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as by the District Judge that he was deliberately delaying the disposal of the review application and the revision shows that he had already vacated the accommodation. It is stated that the order dated 6.2.1992, declaring the vacancy was never challenged by the petitioner who had himself moved application dated 1.4.1991, that he had vacated the accommodation.
13. It is further stated that the petitioner had moved review application in collusion with Ishrat Qayum who entered in the accommodation taking advantage of the situation and actually Ishrat Qayum was contesting the proceedings in the name of the petitioner and in any case, the petitioner, in the present capacity, is no more aggrieved person as he has already vacated the accommodation. It is also stated that no rent is being paid by the petitioner since 1991 and ishrat Qayum is in illegal occupation of the disputed accommodation in collusion with him.
14. It is urged that as the petitioner has denied the title of the respondent-landlord by moving an application dated 9.5.2002 to the effect that the disputed accommodation is waqf property, as such, he has violated the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act and has lost the right to remainintenant in the accommodation, in dispute.
15. It is submitted that the petitioner himself had not argued the revision before the court below arid actually he had not pressed the revision, as such, it is not open for him to challenge the findings recorded by the revisional court in the extraordinary writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since the District Judge has committed no illegality in dismissing the revision.
16. It is further urged that the argument of the petitioner that the District Judge has dismissed the revision as not maintainable is not correct and is against the record as from the perusal of the order of the District Judge, it is apparent that though the District Judge noticed the argument on the part of the respondent-landlord that the revision is not maintainable but he has actually passed the order, on merits, that the revisionist is not ready to press the revision and further that the vacancy has been declared and the release order has already been passed.
17. Having heard counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case, I am of the view that though the petitioner has right of filing revision against the release order under Section 18 of the Act but no revision was filed by him against the release order dated 5.3.1992, hence the order dated 5.3.1992 is not liable to be challenged in writ jurisdiction before this Court. It appears that the petitioner has not come with clean hands as he has already handed over the accommodation to Ishrat Qayum who is contesting the writ petition on his name, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. Moreover, the report of the S.O. Chamanganj dated 26.11.1997 and the report dated 18.8.1998 of Chauki in charge, Dalelpurwa Police Station, Chamanganj, which was submitted after spot inspection, contained in Annexures-C.A. 12 and C.A. 13 respectively to the counter-affidavit, clearly shows that the accommodation, in dispute, is in possession of Sri Ishrat Qayum.
18. So far as contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the District Judge could not have verified the signatures of the petitioner on the vakalatnama executed in favour of Mohd. Shahid, advocate and ought to have got the opinion of the Hand Writing Expert is concerned, it is not tenable. Court can itself look in to the disputed signatures and arrive to a conclusion about its correctness under Section 93 of the Evidence Act. There is no bar upon the Court in tallying the disputed signatures though normally, as a matter of precaution, Court may refer the same to the Hand Writing Expert for his opinion. It also appears that in the writ petition, the landlord had given an undertaking not to evict the petitioner, however, the writ petition was dismissed in default on 28.4.2004 which was restored on 30.4.2004, with the condition of deposit or Rs. 10,000 within a period of one month. Said condition is said to have been complied with by the petitioner on 30.4.2004. The contention of counsel for the petitioner that he is continuously in possession over the disputed accommodation does not require scrutiny by this Court for the reason that the court below has recorded a finding of fact that the petitioner had vacated the tenanted portion and there is no averment that the petitioner had not vacated the same. His claim of continuous physical possession over the tenanted accommodation appears to be only on paper as after dismissal of the writ petition, the undertaking of the landlord merged in to final order. Whatever may have been happened, this Court cannot judge the factual position after dismissal of the writ petition and after restoration of the same.
19. The case laws mentioned in the body of this judgment cited by counsel for the petitioner do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
20. No other point was argued.
21. For all the aforesaid reasons stated above, I find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order and the writ petition is devoid of any merit or substance.
22. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.