S. Sankarasubban, J. 1. This revision petition is filed against the order in I.A. 1201 of 1995 in O.S. 150 of 1980 of the Munsiffs Court, Muvattupuzha. The plaintiff is the revision petitioner. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from entering into the plaint schedule property and interfering with his enjoyment and possession. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The District Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. A second appeal was taken to this Court and this Court reversed the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and passed the judgment as follows :--
"Since the appellant is the son of Skaria, brother of Ithara and the respondents are daughter and son-in-law of Mathew, a brother of Annam-wife of Ithara, both the parties should, according to us, make partition and enjoy the properties in equal moiety".
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the property belongs to both the plaintiff and defendants and they should enjoy the properties in equal moiety. Subsequent to the judgment of the Supreme Court, the present I.A. was filed by defendants 1 and 2 for passing of a final decree in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court. The present revision petitioner was the first respondent in the I.A. He filed an objection, stating that he was the plaintiff in the suit and the suit was for injunction. It is true that the Supreme Court has passed judgment and there is an observation that the parities should enjoy the properties in moiety. But, the objection was raised that the judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be termed as a preliminary decree and what was expressed in the judgment was only a wish and no right is created.
2. The lower Court after hearing both parties held that the judgment of the Supreme Court clearly shows that both the parties should enjoy the property in equal moiety. Hence, it cannot be said that that does not create a right on the parties. The Court below accepted the I.A. and by the impugned order held that the petition was maintainable. It is against the above order that the present revision is filed.
3. Senior Counsel Mr. S. V. S. Iyer appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was the plaintiff in the suit. He filed the suit only for injunction and not for partition. A suit for injunction cannot be converted into a suit for partition. The observation of the Supreme Court if at all creates only a right on the respondents to file a suit for partition. In the present suit, an application cannot be filed for a final decree.
4. Mr. K. Ravindranathan Nair, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court has to be respected and has to be implemented. The technical plea advanced regarding the nature of the suit cannot be accepted. He contended that in so far as the Supreme Court has held that the parties should enjoy the property in equal moiety, there was nothing wrong on the part of the respondents in filing the I.A.
5. After hearing the parties, I am of the view that the order of the Court below has to be sustained. There is no dispute between the parties that in the judgment of the Supreme Court it has been clearly stated that the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 should enjoy the property in equal moiety. Thus, by virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it has become clear that the plaint schedule property belongs to both the parties and that they should partition the properties and enjoy the property in equal moiety. The contention that the suit was for injunction and hence in such a suit a decree for partition cannot be passed is ordinarily true. But, the Supreme Court has got power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The said Article further states that any decree so passed or any order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India. In Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112, it was held by the Supreme Court that clause (1) of Article 142 gives the Supreme Court wide power to make orders ancillary to its power to make decisions under Arts. 131 to 136 of the Constitution. In Manganese Ore v. Chandi, AIR 1991 SC 520, it was held that by the power under Clause (1) of Article 142 it is competent for the Supreme Court to extend the benefit of a judgment to a case which is not in appeal where the interest of justice so requires. Thus, the power is given to the Supreme Court to pass such decree and orders in order to establish substantial justice between the parties. The observations in the judgment that the party should enjoy the property in equal moiety cannot be brushed aside as a mere pious wish. Since it was a suit for injunction, the Court could have very well said that one of the parties was in possession and confirm the decree of injunction. But, after seeing the near relationship of parties, the Court was of the view that since both the parties have right over the properties, they should enjoy the property in equal moiety. Hence, I am of the view that by the judgment of the Supreme Court both the parties acquire equal right over the property. It is not necessary to establish such a right in a fresh suit.
6. The next contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the observation made by the Supreme Court does not mean that the party can file an application for passing a final decree because no preliminary decree has been passed in the case. Hence the contention was that a fresh suit for partition should have been filed by the defendant and he should have obtained a preliminary decree. I do not think, that is the only way. The party has got options. He could have either filed a suit or on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court filed petition in the same suit and that is what he has done. The contention that no preliminary decree was passed cannot be accepted. The judgment of the Supreme Court can be taken to be a preliminary decree. There is nothing wrong. Further, I feel, what the Court below has done is only to implement the judgment of the Supreme Court. Even if a contrary view can be taken that a separate suit can be filed, I do not think, this Court should exercise this power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with the order of the Court below.
In the above view of the matter, the C.R.P. is dismissed and the order passed by the Court below is confirmed.