JUDGMENT Vineet Saran, J.
1. The petitioner was Secretary of the Urban Co-operative Bank, Saharanpur. By the impugned order dated 9.3.2004 he has been placed under suspension. ? Challenging the said order'this writ petition has been filed. Affidavits have been exchanged and with consent of learneed Counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of at the admission stage itself.
2. Brief facts of this case are that on certain charges including some which were of serious financial irregularities, proceeding under Section 68 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), had been initiated against the petitioner. On some such charges having been proved, by order dated 24.5.2001 a punishment was imposed on the petitioner Although the said order dated 24.5.2001 has not been annexed with the writ petition nor the punishment imposed has been described but on being questioned, Sri H.R. Mishra, learneed Counsel for the petitioner, stated that by the said order recovery of over 9 lakhs of rupees had been directed from the petitioner. However, in appeal filed by the petitioner, by order dated 23.9.2003, certain interim protection has been granted, details of which have also not been given in the writ petition.
3. Learneed Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had thereafter on 24.7.2001, been issued another notice initiating proceedings under Section 38(2) of the Act. It has thus been urged that the suspension order dated 9.3.2004 could not have been passed by the Administrator of the Bank as the charges levelled in the said suspension order are more or less the same which are there in the proceedings under Sections 38 and Section 68 of the Act.
4. I have heard Sri H.R. Mishra, learneed Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Chandra Shekhar Singh, learneed Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent No. 3 and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State- respondents and have perused the record.
5. The said order of suspension has been challenged by the petitioner mainly on two grounds, namely :-
(i) the suspension order is as a measure of punishment and as such the same could not have been passed without giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the petitioner; and
(ii) since on practically the same charges, two earlier proceedings under Sections 38 and 68 of the Act were already going on, the third departmental proceeding by which the petitioner has been placed under suspension could not have been initiated, as the same would amount to triple jeopardy.
6. With regard to first ground it may be observed that although the wordings of the order may show that the petitioner has been found guilty of the charges levelled against him but by the said order the petitioner has only been placed under suspension, which cannot be said to be a punishment, as no penalty has been imposed. Even otherwise the copy of the said order has been forwarded to the District Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Saharanpur for information and necessary action for appointing an Enquiry Officer in the matter for enquiring into the charges levelled against the petitioner. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that no enquiry is contemplated and that merely forwarding a copy of the suspension order to an authority to get the matter enquired into, would not amount to initiating enquiry proceeding without the same being incorporated in the body of the order; does not have much force. In my view, the departmental enquiry has been ordered by the impugned order itself. As such, considering the facts of this case, the impugned suspension order cannot be termed as punishment order, although the order may not have been very happily worded. This Court is to see the intent and effect of the order and not examine the mistake in its language.
7. The other submission, that the action of initiating departmental proceedings by which the petitioner has been placed under suspension would amount to triple jeopardy as two proceedings under Section 38 and under Section 68 of the Act are already depending against the petitioner, also does not have much force. The other two proceedings have been initiated by and on behalf of the Registrar of the Co- operative Societies which, under the Act, exercises power of superintendence over the societies. Any irregularity found in the working of the society can be enquired into and action be taken by the Registrar against the society and its officers and members. However, by the impugned order, departmental proceedings have been initiated by the Bank which are different from the proceedings under the Act. The said departmental proceedings have been initiated under the UP. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 that govern the services of the employees of the societies. The penalties, which can be imposed in such disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, are totally different from" the dnes, which can be imposed under Sections 38 and 68 of the Act. The same would be clear from perusal of Regulation 84 of Regulations, 1975 and the provisions of the Act. Even otherwise the petitioner having been found guilty of certain charges in the proceeding under Section 68 in which an appeal is already, pending prima facie goes to show that the petitioner has committed certain irregularities and the Bank has full authority and right to initiate departmental enquiry into the charges against its employees and take appropriate action. Proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act are thus distinct from the departmental proceedings, which are under the Regulations of 1975.
8. Accordingly, I do not find force in the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and this writ petition is thus liable to be dismissed.
9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the enquiry in pursuance of the said order has already been completed (a copy of which has been filed alongwith the supplementary affidavit filed on 19.7.2004) and thus the bank may be permitted to take suitable action in the matter. Since this Court has already found that the impugned order passed is valid, the respondents are free to proceed in the matter in accordance with law.
10. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No order as to costs.