Present appeal arises out of a judgment and order rendered by Sessions Court, Mehsana in Sessions Case No.169 of 2004 on 07/01/2005, convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo RI for three years with a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default, to undergo SI for six months and further convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo RI for life with a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default, to undergo SI for two years. The Sessions Court, simultaneously, acquitted A-2 – Raval Lilaben Ambalal, mother of the appellant, who was also accused of the said charges. 2. The prosecution case is that the appellant happened to be the husband of Ushaben and they were staying at Mumbai. Their marriage life was of about 12 years and from the said wedlock, deceased – Ushaben had delivered two children.
2.1 About three days before the incident, the appellant had come from Bombay to native Shahpur (Vad) where the victim was staying with her mother-in-law, and on 14/04/2004 the appellant and his mother allegedly poured kerosene on Ushaben, wife of appellant and set her to fire and then left the house. Deceased raised shouts and was rescued; was taken to hospital where her history was recorded by Doctor. Police was informed. Police, in turn, informed the Executive Magistrate for recording her dying declaration and the Executive Magistrate recorded her dying declaration. Police recorded FIR as given by the deceased. The offence was registered, investigated and ultimately charge-sheet was filed.
2.2 Charge was framed against accused at Exh.3 by the Sessions Court for offences punishable under Sections 498 (A), 302 r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Both the accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. Having considered the evidence led by the prosecution, the trial Court concluded that the prosecution was successful in proving charges against the appellant, but not against original A-2, and declared the judgment accordingly as stated herein above.
3. We have heard learned Advocate Mr.Parikh for the appellant and Mr.Pandya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent.
4. Mr.Parikh submitted that the entire case depends on three dying declarations allegedly made by the deceased. First being the history recorded by the Doctor, second being the dying declaration recorded before Executive Magistrate and third being the FIR, as recorded by the Police and given by the deceased. According to Mr.Parikh, these dying declarations are not consistent with each other and the facts emerging from the dying declarations, are not supported by independent witnesses and, therefore, the judgment may be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted.
4.1 Mr.Paikh submitted that on same set of evidence, A-2 has been acquitted by the trial Court, whereas A-1 – appellant has been convicted and, therefore, also the benefit ought to have been given to A-1-appellant.
5. Learned APP has opposed this appeal. According to him, the three dying declarations are consistent in the main. The inconsistency, if any, is not in respect of cause of death, and even if ignored, the dying declarations reflecting the cause of death are consistent. The dying declarations are recorded by witnesses like Doctor and Executive Magistrate, who are independent persons and have no axe to grind against the accused and, therefore, the appeal may be dismissed.
6. We have examined the record and proceedings in context of rival submissions. We find that the case of the accused is that the deceased suffered burn injuries out of her own act and her death was suicidal.
7. At the outset, we may record that peripheral witnesses including the parents of the deceased have not supported the case of prosecution and, therefore, the case hangs mainly on dying declarations. The dying declaration first in point of time is the history recorded by the Doctor. Dr.Pravinkumar Popatlal Soni, who is examined at Exh.9, has stated in his deposition that on 15/04/2004, deceased – Ushaben Vijaykumar Raval was brought before him for treatment and on being questioned, she gave a history of she being set to fire by her husband – Vijaykumar by pouring kerosene on her. She was conscious and was able to speak and was competent to give reply to the questions. Doctor says that he had recorded history as given by the patient. The medical case papers are at Exh.10. Exh.10, if perused, it would indicate that the history as given by the patient in Gujarati was recorded by the Doctor in that very language which can be translated thus:
“set to fire with matchstick by pouring kerosene by husband – Vijaykuamr Ambalal Raval.”
The certificate then proceeds to record the injuries noticed.
7.1 The next dying declaration is recorded by Executive Magistrate, Kapadiya Kamleshkumar Ranchhoddas, who has deposed at Exh.13 and dying declaration is at Exh.11. We notice that the dying declaration is in question-answer form and declarant – Ushaben has stated that her husband is a drunkard. He used to quarrel with her because of her objecting to it. Her mother-in-law also sides with him. Her husband had set her to fire after pouring kerosene and there was none else involved in the act of setting her to fire.
8. Executive Magistrate is examined at Exh.13 where, he states that he received a telephone call from Police Station indicating that patient – Ushaben wife of Vijaykumar Ambalal of Shahpur (Vad), Tal.
Vadnagar has been brought to Civil Hospital for treatment and her dying declaration was to be recorded. He, therefore, asked them to send a yadi to that effect. In the meantime, concerned Officer came with a Yadi, which he received at about 01:45 a.m., which is at Exh.12. Thereafter, he went to the Hospital and firstly met the Medical Officer, inquired about the health of the patient and was told that patient was conscious and was competent to speak. He then obtained endorsement from the Medical Officer. Then the witness says that he himself also verified whether the deceased was in a competent state to give declaration and after being satisfied about the competency of Ushaben of giving dying decalration, recorded her dying declaration. He then proceeds to narrate what was stated by the victim before him and recorded by him, as is emerging from dying declaration – Exh.11. It emerges from Exh.11 that after giving primary details about herself, the deceased indicated that her husband is a drunkard, which ultimately, resulted in quarrel with her. Her mother-in-law also did not support her. She says that her husband poured kerosene on her and set her to fire with matchstick. There was none else in the act, and the dying declaration has been signed by the victim.
9. Third dying declaration is in form of FIR as recorded by PW No.9 - Police Witness – Maganbhai Rupabhai Exh.20. He again states that when he recorded the FIR as given by the deceased, she was conscious and was capable of speaking and he recorded her statement as stated by her through his writer which is at Exh.21.
10. All the three witnesses, viz., Doctor, Executive Magistrate and Police Constable, have been put to the test of cross-examination, but in our view, nothing emerges to turn the case in favour of accused – appellant.
11. Learned Advocate for the appellant feebly contended that there are inconsistencies amongst the three dying declarations to the effect that allegation about the appellant being drunkard, is not present in her FIR, which is otherwise to be found in the dying declaration before Executive Magistrate. Similarly, the version about husband having left her after setting her to fire in the room after locking the room from outside, is not present in all three dying declarations.
11.1 In our view, these inconsistencies need to be ignored as they cannot be said to form part of dying declaration as contemplated under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The dying declarations are consistent, so far as the averments made therein relate to cause of death of the victim and are therefore consistent and need to be accepted. This Court has no reason to disbelieve the dying declarations recorded by independent officers. There is no reason to doubt truthfulness of the dying declarations or the genuineness of the dying declarations as recorded by the independent officers.
12. The resultant effect is that we have on our record dying declarations which clearly implicate the appellant No.1. The trial Court having found this material, has recorded conviction and has also recorded acquittal, when declarant, in terms, states that there was none else than her husband in the act of setting her to fire.
13. Learned Advocate, Mr.Parikh relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shaikh Bakshu & Ors., Vs. State of Maharashtra as reported in (2007) 11 SCC 269. Emphasis was placed on paragraph Nos.13 and 14 of the said judgment which run as under:
“13. PW-1 in his statement stated that on 19.8.2001, on the basis of a letter requiring him to record dying declaration of the person who was admitted to the hospital. He went to the hospital at 7.00 p.m., met the medical officer in the hospital and thereafter he requested the medical officer to show the person to him. The letter in question was not produced by him. The trial court came to the conclusion that PW-3, the medical officer and the constable reached the Burns Ward at about 7.10 p.m. As noted above, it was the evidence of PW-3 that he had accompanied the Naib Tehsildar PW-1. Even if it is accepted as noted by the trial court that the Naib Tehsildar has not produced the letter because it may be misplaced but nothing prevented the prosecution to produce the copy of the letter which was purportedly written to the Naib Tehsildar. No effort in that regard has been made. The trial court and the High Court noted that the condition of the deceased was very poor as was stated by the medical officer and the condition was deteriorating since 6.10 p.m. The trial court, however, held the dying declaration to be credible because the medical officer was present when the dying declaration was recorded. There as no mention in the dying declaration that it was read over and explained to the deceased. The Trial court and the High Court concluded that even though it is not so stated, it has to be presumed that it was read over and explained. The view is clearly unacceptable.
14. So far as the presence of the relatives and the tutoring aspect is concerned, the High Court held that there cannot be a possibility of tutoring Rubina for falsely implicating appellants in the offence because of the promptness in recording the dying declaration by PW 1 and PW 3. The conclusion is clearly based on surmises and conjectures. Another fallacy in the conclusions of the High Court and the trial Court was that mere change the place of occurrence as borne out in the dying declaration, as projected by the prosecution with reference to the spot panchnama was not material. According to the deceased, the occurrence took place in the bed room. It is to be noted that no mark of burn injury was noticed in the bed room and they were noticed in the kitchen. High Court noted even if spot of occurrence has not been correctly stated by the deceased same is of no consequence. That certainly has effect on the credibility of the dying declaration, contrary to what the High Court has observed. Another aspect which assumes great importance is that in the dying declaration the deceased stated that she was brought to the hospital by a neighbour but the official records show that she was brought to the hospital by the accused no.2 i.e. sister-in-law. It was categorically asked to the doctor whether in the admission register it was recorded that the injuries were due to the accidental burn. He stated that the witness has not gone through the register of that date.”
13.1 The view was taken by the Apex Court in view of the fact that the Yadi, on the basis of which the Executive Magistrate had claimed to have visited and recorded dying declaration, was not forming part of record. Whereas, in the instant case Yadi was forming part of record and is at Exh.12. That is a yadi which also bears endorsement of the Doctor about conscious state of mind of the deceased and is a document contemporaneous in nature for which this Court has no reason to doubt its authenticity.
13.2 In our view, therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate for the appellant cannot be of any help.
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal must fail and stands dismissed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence recorded by the Sessions Court, Mehsana in Sessions Case No.169 of 2004 on 07/01/2005 convicting and sentencing the appellant is confirmed.
(A L DAVE, J.)
(PARESH UPADHYAY, J.)
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