JUDGMENT K.C. Bhargava, J.
1. This is an appeal against the order dated 31-7-1996 passed by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal in Contempt Petition No 172 of 1993.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of respondent No. 2.
3. A preliminary objection has been raised that the appeal is not maintainable as no order of punishment had been passed in the present case. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the appeal is maintainable as a finding has been given that a prima facie contempt is made out. In order to resolve the controversy it is necessary to reproduce the impugned order dated 31-7-1996 :
"The opposite party has applied for discharge of notice. It is objected. After hearing I have carefully perused the relevant material en record. There is a definite finding on 25-7-1995 that a prima fads contempt is made out. After this opposite party was given three option on 24-8-1995. He did not follow any of them. Hence, it transpires that he is virtually avoiding the compliance including the attempt to get a post created. Therefore the discharge is refused.
Let the case be listed on 22-8-1996 for framing of charge against him. Opposite party to remain present on that date.
Sd/- J. B. Singh 31-7-1996
4. Reliance has been placed in this order on the words "There is a definite finding on 25-7-1995 that a prima facie contempt is made out'', it has been held by this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of decisions that every order passed in contempt proceedings is not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act or under Section 5-A (c) of the U. P. Public Services Tribunals Act, Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act are reproduced below :-
"5-A(c). In Section 19 of the Act,-
(1) for sub-section (1) the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:-
"(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt to the High Court."
"19. Appeal (1) An appeal shall lie as a right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of it's jurisdiction to punish for contempt:-
(a) Where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of net less than two judges of the Court ;
(b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court Thus we find that under both the above provisions an appeal has been provided from the decision or order of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal. The word contempt has been defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, which reads as under :-
"2(b)' Civil contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or a wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;
(c) "Criminal contempt" means the publication whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise or any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which--
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or
(ii) prejudices/or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings ; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner"
5. A perusal of sub-clause (1) of Section 5-A (c) of the U.P. Public Services Tribunals Act and that of sub-clause (1) of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act goes to show that an appeal lies as of right from any decision or order which has been passed to punish for contempt. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the orders passed during the contempt proceedings are appealable as there is no bar under the above provisions to prevent any interim order from being challenged in appeal. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has argued that all the interim orders are not appealable and only those orders which decide controversy or impose punishment are appealable. In this respect a number of decisions have been cited by both the sides which are discussed below:
(1) Purshotam Das Goel v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.S. Dhillon and Ors., (1978) 2 SCC 370. In this case it was held that the order appealed against under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act is such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question. No appeal lies as a matter of right from the order of the High Court in proceedings for contempt. There may be many interlocutory orders but all of them are not appealable The order merely initiating the proceedings without anything further does not decide anything against the alleged contemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Section 19.
(ii) State of Maharashtra v. Mehboob Alibhoy, (1986) 4 SCC 411. In Para 4 of this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that contempt proceeding is not a dispute between two parties ; the proceeding is primarily between the court and the person who is alleged to have committed contempt of court. The person who informs the court or brings to the notice of the court that anyone has committed contempt of such court is not in the position of a prosecutor; he is simply assisting the court so that the dignity and the majesty of the court is upheld and maintained. After referring to a number of decisions the court came to the conclusion that no appeal is maintainable against the order dropping or refusing to initiate the proceedings for contempt. Therefore it was held that the appeal was net maintainable.
(iii) Ashok Kumar Duggal v. Dr. Ram Prakash Gupta and Ors., 1996 (14) LCD 871. In this case the main question was whether the Hon'ble Single Judge who had passed the order had jurisdiction to hear the contempt petition. After going through the facts the Division Bench of Court held that the Hon'ble Single Judge who passed the impugned order had no jurisdiction to entertain the contempt proceedings because the jurisdiction vested in some other court and the order of the Hon'ble Single Judge was set aside.
6. On the other side learned counsel for the opposite party has placed reliance on the case of D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, 1988 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 546. In this case it was held that the right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of Section 19 only against any decision or order passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. In Para 10 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"But when a court is conferred with the power or jurisdiction to act in a particular manner, the exercise of jurisdiction or the power will involve the acting in that particular manner and in no other. Article 215 confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to punish for contempt The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only by punishing for contempt. It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and, if necessary, examines witnesses and, thereafter, passes an order either acquitting or punishing him for contempt. When the High Court acquits the contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing punishment for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution"
7. In Para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration."
8. Learned counsel for the opposite party has further relied on the case of S. P. Wahi and Anr. v. Surendra Singh, 1983 Cri LJ 1426 In this case it was held that where a single Judge of High Court merely directed the alleged contemnor to appear before the Court on the next date fixed for argument, the direction or order could not be said to be one passed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and would merely be an interlocutory order against which an appeal would not lie under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. Only those orders or decisions are appealable under Section 19(1) in which the Court adjudicates or records finding in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It is not each and every order passed during the contempt proceedings that is appealable but any such order which determines any matter raised before the Court by the parties in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt that is appealable. Every interlocutory order which is not passed in exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court to punish for contempt is net appealable.
9. Before parting with the appeal we find that the learned Member of the Tribunal has erred in passing the order dated 31st July, 1996. The order dated 25th July, 1995 is also before the Court, a copy of which is Annexure-6 to the appeal. The words which have been reproduced in the earlier part of this judgement are not to be found in that order. That order does net say that prima facie contempt is made out. From the wordings of the order it transpires that only a notice for personal appearance and for filing compliance report. An option was given in that order to make compliance Against this order an appeal was filed which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal No. 18 of 1995 on 23-8-1995. By this order the appellant was directed to raise all the grounds before the Tribunal which will consider the same and pass suitable orders. As no ground for interference was made out the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter the Tribunal on 24-8-1995 passed an order in which three options were given to the appellant. It was also mentioned that failure will invite initiation of actual proceedings. This order escaped the attention of the learned Tribunal which passed the impugned order dated 31-7-1996 because after 25-7-1995 another order was passed on 24-8-1995. The Tribunal should have been guided by the order dated 24-8-1995 instead of order dated 25-7-1995. Therefore the learned Tribunal committed a mistake by mentioning that a prima facie contempt is made out. This Court has jurisdiction to set right the wrong committed by the Tribunal in its order.
10. In the result the appeal is dismissed. However, it is directed that the Tribunal shall consider afresh the application of the appellant which he has moved for discharge of the notice. The application shall be decided ignoring the order dated 31-7-1996.