A decree of eviction and for damages, pendente lite and future, dated 30.7.12 passed by Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad exercising powers of Small Causes Court has been challenged in this revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Act, 1887.
The two primary questions arising in this revision are as under:-
(i) Whether the suit is barred by Section 13 of the U.P. Industrial Housing Act, 1955?
(ii) Whether the plaintiff respondent No.1 is entitle to maintain the suit for the eviction of the defendant revisionist from the house/quarter in question?
The brief facts giving rise to the present suit are necessary so as to appreciate the controversy arising above.
The Assistant Labour Commissioner (Housing) on 29.4.71 had allotted house No.5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12, a total of 6 houses of block No.59 Industrial Labour Colony in favour of the plaintiff respondent No.1 M/s Unichem Laboratory Private Ltd. on a monthly rent of Rs.23/- per house for the residential purposes of its workers with the condition that the monthly rent shall be payable to the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Housing) Ghaziabad and the allottee worker shall sign the prescribed agreement before occupying the house. The above allotment letter/order also provides for the terms and conditions of allotment.
Pursuant to the above order plaintiffs respondents on the request of one of its worker Dharm Dev Yadav, allotted house No.5 in his favour at the same rate of rent as fixed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Housing) with the condition that the rent shall be deducted from his monthly salary every month for remittance to the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Housing).
The aforesaid worker accepted the allotment on the terms and conditions specified in the two allotment orders referred to above and gave a declaration on 12.5.1971 that he will abide by the terms and conditions and on ceasing to be the worker of the company shall vacate the same immediately.
The aforesaid worker Dharm Dev Yadav, retired on 12.1.1992 and ultimately expired but the said house remained in occupation of his family.
The plaintiff respondent No.1, after terminating the tenancy of the said worker's wife Smt. Rani Devi instituted S.C.C. Suit No.39/01 for her eviction and for damages for its use and occupation.
In defence apart from the other things it was contended that the suit is barred by Section 13 of U.P. Industrial Housing Act, 1955 and that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and therefore the suit is not maintainable.
The suit was however, decreed holding that it is not barred by Section 13 of the Act and that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties stand established and as the worker had ceased to be in service his wife defendant revisionist is liable to be evicted.
I had heard Sri Manish Goyal and Sri S.Shekhar for the respective parties, who consented for the final disposal of the revision on merits at the stage of admission itself.
The two points referred to above alone were reiterate and have fallen for my consideration.
The plaint of the suit is annexure-1 to the stay application filed along with the memo of revision. The relief claimed in the plaint is for a decree of delivery of vacant possession of the above house after evicting there from the defendants to the suit and for awarding a sum of Rs.36000/- in damages @ Rs.1000/- per month w.e.f. 25.9.98 upto the date of filing of the suit and for pendente lite and future damages at the same rate.
In the plaint no challenge has been made to any order of the State Government or any authority passed in exercise of power conferred by the aforesaid Act.
Section 13 of the above Act reads as under:-
"(13) Jurisdiction of Courts barred:-No order made by the State Government or [Labour] Commissioner in the exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any court, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or any authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this act."
A plain reading of the aforesaid provision clearly reflects that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred only in respect of order made by the State Government or the Labour Commissioner in exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act and further the jurisdiction of the court stands excluded in granting injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken again in pursuance of any power conferred by or the under the Act.
The plaintiffs respondents in the suit as stated above had neither challenged any order of the State Government or of the Labour Commissioner passed in exercise of power under the Act nor has made a prayer for grant of injunction in respect of any action or likely to be taken under the Act.
The proceedings claiming arrears of rent damages and eviction without assailing any order of the State Government or the Labour Commissioner passed under the Act or seeking the relief of injunction in respect of any action taken or likely to be taken under the Act, are independent and distinct and such are not excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil court by virtue of Section 13 of the Act.
The court below in deciding issue No.8 in this regard has carefully considered the provisions of Section 13 of the Act as well as the other relevant provisions and has concluded that as under the terms and conditions of allotment the allottee on ceasing to be employee/worker is liable to vacate the house, a suit for his eviction can always be brought as it would be an exercise to evict him and would not be barred by Section 13 of the Act.
Agreeing with the reasoning given by the court below and for my own reasons as stated above, I am of the view that the jurisdiction of the civil court for entertaining a suit for arrears of rent and eviction of the worker or his family and persons claiming through him from the Official house allotted to him for residential purpose do not stand ousted. Accordingly, the suit is not barred.
In connection with the second point, the submission of Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the defendant revisionist is that the house in question is of the State Government and it is only the State Government or the Labour Commissioner or any Officer Authorized on their behalf who is competent to initiate proceedings for the eviction of the defendant revisionist. The plaintiffs respondents have no such authority and the concept of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is completely alien to the provisions of the Act.
In defence Sri Shekhar, learned counsel for the plaintiffs respondents asserted that there is no allotment of the house by the labour department in favour of the husband of the defendant revisionist. He was the worker of the plaintiffs respondents and it was in that capacity that he was permitted by the plaintiffs respondents to occupy the said house on lease. The plaintiffs respondents used to collect rent by deducting it from his salary and it was an obligation of the plaintiffs respondents to get it vacated in the event of violation of the terms and conditions of the allotment or on cessation of his employment. Therefore, in view of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the plaintiffs respondents rightly initiated proceedings for getting the house vacated after determining tenancy of the defendant revisionist who had retained its possession after the death of her husband unauthorizedly.
The evidence on record and the findings of the court below clearly establishes that the house in question is a government accommodation which is within the purview of the above Act. The said Act is applicable to houses constructed by the State Government for the occupation of industrial workers. It is in pursuance thereof that the Labour Commissioner which includes the Assistant Commissioner (Housing) on 24.4.1971 made an allotment of not only of the above house but certain other houses also for the residential purposes of the workers of the plaintiffs respondents. The said order reserves certain houses for the residential purpose of the workers of the plaintiffs respondents leaving upon it to allocate them suitably amongst the desirable workers and it is upon such allocation the order takes the shape of the final allotment. To put it differently, the allotment of house is on behalf of the State Government and the allocation is by the plaintiffs respondents.
Consequently, the husband of the defendant revisionist who was a worker was allotted the said house by the State Government only. The allotment under the Act vide definition contained in Section 2(b) of the Act means the grant by or on behalf of the State Government of a right of use and occupation of any house to any person. The aforesaid definition further lays down that such right to use and occupation would not include grant by way of a lease. In other words, the right to use and occupy the house given to the worker therein is not by way of lease which automatically excludes the relationship of landlord and tenant between the owner or the person in whose favour the grant is made.
The payment of rent under the terms and conditions of allotment or the grant is simply consideration payable periodically for the occupation of the houses as is evident by Section 2(g) of the Act.
In view of above, the monthly rent allegedly paid by the worker by deduction from his salary/wages through the plaintiffs respondents was not actually rent but consideration for use and occupation of the house.
In short what emerges from the above discussion is that under the provisions of the above Act the State Government is the owner of the house and the worker to whom it has been allotted in directly by the plaintiffs respondents happens to be a grantee, who could use and occupy the said house on consideration described as rent payable through the plaintiffs respondents.
Section 7 of the Act prescribes the duties of the Labour Commissioner including the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Housing). It provides that the Labour Commissioner shall be responsible for the allotment of house, realization of the rent and securing the eviction of persons occupying such houses. It therefore, means that it is the State Government or the Labour Commissioner and noneelse who is empowered to secure the eviction of the persons occupying the such houses.
Section 12(2) of the Act authorizes the Labour Commissioner to cancel any allotment of a house held or occupied by any person after notice to him and on consideration of his explanation irrespective of the allotment or allocation of houses to the workers by the plaintiffs respondents.
A reading of Section 20 of the Act conveys that the employer is only responsible for collecting rent from the worker, who has been allotted the house by making deduction from his salary and to remit it to the Labour Commissioner. The employer as such only acts as an agent of the State Government for the limited purposes of collecting rent and does not exercise any other power.
A complete reading of the aforesaid Act reveals that it is a self contained code in itself for the purposes of allowing the industrial workers to occupy residential accommodation of the State Government under the terms and conditions laid down under the Act and the State Government/Labour Commissioner alone is authorized to deal with matters relating to the administration of houses for the purpose of grant of occupancy rights and for securing eviction of the persons occupying them. The concept of landlord and tenant authorizing someone other than the State Government to secure the eviction of occupants is completely foreign to the Act.
The provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 are not applicable to the houses which are governed by the above Act. The aforesaid Act is a very special enactment which would prevail over the Act which is of a general nature. Therefore, the court below committed a manifest error of law in importing the definition of the landlord and tenant as contained in U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in holding that their existed a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and respondents and the defendant revisionist.
The plaintiffs respondents are merely agents of the owner of the house i.e. the State Government who administers it through the Labour Commissioner. The said agent under no instrument is authorized by the State Government or the Labour Commissioner to draw proceedings for the eviction of the occupant of the house obviously for the reason that under the Act such a power vests only with the Labour Commissioner under Section 7 of the Act and is not be delegated.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the suit in question at the behest of the plaintiffs respondents was not maintainable.
The revision as such has to succeed on the above point. It is accordingly, allowed and the impugned order dated 30.07.2012 is set aside. The suit stand dismissed.
The court however is unable to restrain itself from observing that the State Government/Labour Commissioner/Assistant Labour Commissioner (Housing) has turned a blind eye to the fact that the house in dispute had remained unauthorizedly occupied ever since 1992 and none of the authorities have cared to take any step or action to get rid of such unauthorized occupation rather there appears to be some kind of connivance of the labour department with the occupants of the house which is reflected from the fact that actually one Ram Nath Yadav ostensibly appears to be in occupation of the said house who is none other than an employee of the Labour Court.
I therefore, direct the Principal Secretary Labour U.P. to make an inquiry in this regard and to find out the officers or employees responsible for such an inaction or collusion and to draw disciplinary action against them within a period of three months from the receiving the copy of this judgment and order and at the same time to ensure that the house in question is saved from the clutches of such unscrupulous persons by taking recourse to prompt effective legal proceedings as may be permissible in law.
The Registrar General of the court is requested to communicate and send a copy of this to the Principal Secretary, Labour U.P. for necessary action and to report compliance to the court within six months.
Order Date :- 15.10.2012 piyush