Court No. - 7
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 22642 of 2019
Petitioner :- Ramrati Singh Balika Inter College Respondent :- State Of U P And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Kamlesh Kumar Tiwari
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ram Kumar Verma
Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot,J.
The instructions produced by learned Standing Counsel are taken on record.
Sri R.P. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel on the basis of instructions submits that the enquiry in regard to the recall of recognition granted to the petitioner institution has been concluded. The final decision on the recall of recognition to the petitioner institution will be taken by recognition committee. The matter is pending before the recognition committee.
Sri Kamlesh Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the authorities have not adopted a fair procedure in the past. The petitioner has not been issued a show cause notice till date.
The only prayer made by Sri Kamlesh Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the authorities may adopt a fair procedure while considering the issue of withdrawal of recognition of the petitioner institution.
The orders dated 20.02.2018 withdrawing the recognition granted to the petitioner institution and the consequential order dated 22.04.2019, cannot survive.
The orders dated 20.02.2018 and 22.04.2019 are quashed.
The matter is remitted to the recognition committee, where the proceedings are still on foot.
Withdrawal of recognition of an institution visits the institution with drastic consequences. Considering the penal consequences of withdrawal of recognition the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Council for the Teacher Education and Another Vs Vaishnav Institute of Technology and Management, reported at (2012) 5 SCC 139, held thus:
"28. Derecognition or withdrawal of recognition of a recognised institution is a drastic measure. It results in dislocating the students, teachers and the staff. That is why, the Council has been empowered under Section 13 to have a constant vigil on the functioning of a recognised institution. On recommendation of the Council after inspection, if a recognised institution does not rectify the deficiencies and continues to function in contravention of the provisions of the 1993 Act or the rules or the Regulations, the Regional Committee under Section 17 has full power to proceed for withdrawal of recognition in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein."
In the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Council for the Teacher Education and Another (supra), the procedure to be adopted by the recognition committee, while considering the issue of withdrawal of recognition granted to the petitioner institution, has to be consistent with principles of natural justice. A Division Bench of this court (in which I Ajay Bhanot, J, was a member), in Writ-C No. 445 of 2018 (Mukesh Yadav Vs State of U.P. and 3 others) laid down the law regarding applicability of principles of natural justice in the following terms:
"25. At this stage it would be apposite to understand and extract the elements of natural justice which would be relevant for a judgment on the issue at hand.
26. The case law on various aspects of natural justice is very large and largely consistent. It would not be prudent to overburden this judgment with repetitive citations. However a few relevant case laws would suffice to give a comprehensive understanding of the law and provide a clear vision for action.
27. In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 519 the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the jurisprudential foundation of natural justice and the necessity of incorporating it in administrative procedures to ensure fairness and good governance and prevent miscarriage of justice. The judgment also cites with approval past authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein principles of natural justice were held to be an integral part of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was also held that the principles of natural justice were applicable even when there was no statutory requirement. The relevant extracts of the judgment are quoted here under:-
"24. The principles have sound jurisprudential basis. Since the function of the judicial and quasi-judicial authorities is to secure justice with fairness, these principles provide great humanising factor intended to invest law with fairness to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. The principles are extended even to those who have to take administrative decision and who are not necessarily discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They are a kind of code of fair administrative procedure. In this context, procedure is not a matter of secondary importance as it is only by procedural fairness shown in the decision making that decision becomes acceptable. In its proper sense, thus, natural justice would mean the natural sense of what is right and wrong.
26. Allan, on the other hand, justifies the procedural fairness by following the aforesaid principles of natural justice as rooted in rule of law leading to good governance. He supports Galligan in this respect and goes to the extent by saying that it is same as ensuring dignity of individuals, in respect of whom or against whom the decision is taken, in the following words:
"The instrumental value of procedures should not be underestimated; the accurate application of authoritative standards is, as Galligan clearly explains, an important aspect of treating someone with respect. But procedures also have intrinsic value in acknowledging a person's right to understand his treatment, and thereby to determine his response as a conscientious citizen, willing to make reasonable sacrifices for the public good. If obedience to law ideally entails a recognition of its morally obligatory character, there must be suitable opportunities to test its moral credentials. Procedures may also be though to have intrinsic value in so far as they constitute a fair balance between the demands of accuracy and other social needs: where the moral harm entailed by erroneous decisions is reasonably assessed and fairly distributed, procedures express society's commitment to equal concern and respect for all."
27. It, thus, cannot be denied that principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decision and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms.
28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not.
29. De Smith captures the essence thus-
"Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent on the question of hearing, the courts would apply rule of universal application and founded on plainest principles of natural justice".
30. Wade also emphasizes that principles of natural justice operate as implied mandatory requirements, non-observance of which invalidates the exercise of power.
31. In Cooper v. Sandworth Board of Works (1863) 14 GB (NS) the Court laid down that:
'...although there is no positive word in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet justice of common law would supply the omission of Legislature".
33. In his separate opinion, concurring on this fundamental issue, Justice K. Ramaswamy echoed the aforesaid sentiments in the following words:
"61. It is now settled law that the proceedings must be just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends Articles 14 and 21. It is well settled law that principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the report along with the final order is like a post mortem certificate with putrefying odour. The failure to supply copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice."
34. Likewise, in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India and Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 78, this Court once again held that principle of natural justice was applicable even though it was not statutorily required. The Court took the view that even in the absence of statutory provision to this effect, the authority was liable to give notice to the affected parties while purchasing their properties Under Section 269-UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It was further observed that:
"30.........the very fact that an imputation of tax evasion arises where an order for compulsory purchase is made and such an imputation casts a slur on the parties to the agreement to sell leads to the conclusion that before such an imputation can be made against the parties concerned they must be given an opportunity to show-cause that the under valuation in the agreement for sale was not with a view to evade tax.
It is, therefore, all the more necessary that an opportunity of hearing is provided."
35. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak's case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248 also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills and Anr. (1994) 5 SCC 566, this aspect was explained in the following manner:
"3. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action Under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact- situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case."
28. In the case of Gorkha Security Services Vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2014) 9 SCC 105 Hon'ble Supreme Court provided for implied applicability of principles of natural justice to statutory provisions unless the stature specifically or by necessary implication excluded such applicability. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"29. However, their aim is to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. It is now well established proposition of law that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, in exercise of power pre-judicially affecting another must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice.
30. We are conscious of the following words of wisdom expressed by this Court through the pen of Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Anr. v. Ramjee 1977 (2) SCC 256:
"1..If the jurisprudence of remedies were understood and applied from the perspective of social efficaciousness, the problem raised in this appeal would not have ended the erroneous way it did in the High Court. Judges must never forget that every law has a social purpose and engineering process without appreciating which justice to the law cannot be done. Here, the socio-legal situation we are faced with is a colliery, an explosive, an accident, luckily not lethal, caused by violation of a Regulation and consequential cancellation of the certificate of the delinquent shot-firer, eventually quashed by the High Court, for processual solecisms, by a writ of certiorari.
13....Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt--that is the conscience of the matter....
14...We cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact. Nor can we fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity."
29. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. Vs Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 519, Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised and provided for the need to adapt the principles of natural justice with flexibility to the facts of the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to cast the principles of natural justice in any straight-jacket formula. In para 38 Hon'ble Supreme Court stated the law as under:-
"38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post- decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on."
30. Yet again in the case of Poonam Vs State of U.P. and Ors. (2016) 2 SCC 779, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized the need to embed principles of natural justice even when not embodied in a statute or in the rules framed there under. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also required that the administrative authorities which passed orders affecting the rights of individuals need to inform their decisions by principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down law and in paragraph 20 of the judgment held as under:-
"20. In this context the authority in Sadananda Halo and Ors. v. Momtaz Ali Sheikh and Ors. (2008) 4 SCC 619 is quite pertinent. The Division Bench referred to the decision in All India SC and ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen (2001) 6 SCC 380 wherein this Court had addressed the necessity in joining the necessary candidates as parties. The Court referred to the principle of natural justice as enunciated in Canara Bank v. Debasis Das (2003) 4 SCC 557. We may profitably reproduce the same:
"63...Natural justice has been variously defined. It is another name for common sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice." And again:
"63...Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance "
31. In the case of Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj and Ors. Vs Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and Ors. (2016) 6 SCC 82, Hon'ble Supreme drew additional contours of principles of natural justice, namely providing adverse material and an opportunity to meet the same to parties who would be adversely affected by the decision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the law on the aforesaid proposition in the following terms:-
"44. The principles of natural justice require that the Petitioners ought to have been granted an opportunity to see the video recording. Perhaps they might have had an opportunity to explain why the video recording does not contain any evidence/material for recommending action against all or some of them or to explain that the video recording should have been interpreted differently.
45. The Privileges Committee should have necessarily offered this opportunity, in order to make the process adopted by it compliant with the requirements of Article 14. Petitioner No. 1 in his reply letter to the notice issued by the Privileges Committee seeks permission to give further explanation when the video recording is provided to him. The Petitioner No. 3 in his reply letter states that he believes his version of his conduct will be proven by the video recording. The other Petitioners do not mention the video recording in their reply letters. However, it is not the Petitioners' burden to request for a copy of the video recording. It is the legal obligation of the Privileges Committee to ensure that a copy of the video recording is supplied to the Petitioners in order to satisfy the requirements of the principles of natural justice The failure to supply a copy of the video recording or affording an opportunity to the Petitioners to view the video recording relied upon by the committee in our view clearly resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice i.e. a denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case. We, therefore, have no option but to set aside the impugned resolution dated 31.03.2015 passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The same is accordingly set aside."
32. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kemtech International Pvt. Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Customs (I & G) (2014) 14 SCC 552 wherein in para 4 Court held as under:-
4. Bearing in mind the principles of natural justice, we feel, the prayer made is reasonable. Accordingly, we direct that, while examining the case for the purpose of quantification of short-levy, the Adjudicating Authority shall supply all the documents, on which it proposes to place reliance, to the Appellants. It will be open to the Appellants to furnish their explanation thereon. They would also be permitted to lead additional evidence, in support of their claim."
33. Lastly in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs District Collector, Raigad and Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 407 and Manohar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2012) 13 SCC 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering with approval previous authority on the point holding that the requirement to record reasons in support of the decision was one fundamental aspect of principles of natural justice. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgments are reproduced here under:-
"42. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1984, it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. The expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice provides for requirement to record reasons as it is now regarded as one of the principles of natural justice, and it was held in the above case that except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly or by necessary implication dispensed with, the authority must record reasons for its decision.
43. In Krishna Swami v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 1407, this Court observed that the rule of law requires that any action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded on the reason stated in the order or borne-out from the record. The Court further observed:
"47...Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair procedure offending Article 21."
44. This Court while deciding the issue in Sant Lal Gupta and Ors. v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 336, placing reliance on its various earlier judgments held as under:
"27... It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice - delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice.
"3...The giving of reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before Courts, and which is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the Court concerned had really applied its mind."
The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected."
45. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 71, this Court held that on charge of misconduct the authority holding the inquiry must record reasons for reaching its conclusion and record clear findings. The Court further held:
"30...In fairness and justice, the member is entitled to know why he has been found guilty. The case can be so serious that it can attract the harsh penalties provided by the Act. Moreover, the member has been given a right of appeal to the High Court under Section 22A of the Act. The exercise his right of appeal effectively he must know the basis on which the Council has found him guilty. We have already pointed out that a finding by the Council is the first determinative finding on the guilt of the member. It is a finding by a Tribunal of first instance. The conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee does not enjoy the status of a "finding". Moreover, the reasons contained in the report by the Disciplinary Committee for its conclusion may or may not constitute the basis of the finding rendered by the Council. The Council must, therefore, state the reasons for its finding."
46. The emphasis on recording reason is that if the decision reveals the 'inscrutable face of the sphinx', it can be its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before the court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made. In other words, a speaking out, the inscrutable face of the sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi- judicial performance.
56. The explanation furnished by the Appellant for not holding the meeting and acceptance of tender by the council itself and not by the Appellant, has not been considered at all. No reasoning has been given by the Statutory Authority for reaching the conclusions. We fail to understand as on what basis such a cryptic order imposing such a severe punishment can be sustained in the eyes of law.
18. In the case of A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., the Court held as under:
"17.... It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding...
20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi- judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case."
19. In the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Masood Ahmed Khan and Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Court dealt with the question of demarcation between the administrative orders and quasi- judicial orders and the requirement of adherence to natural justice. The Court held as under:
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision- making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of 'due process'."
In the light of the law laid down in Mukesh Yadav (supra), the interest of justice would be subserved by directing the recognition committee to execute the following directions:
(i) The recognition committee shall issue a show cause notice to the petitioner along with any adverse material which is sought to be relied upon against the petitioner institution.
(ii) The petitioner shall be given a reasonable time of not less than two weeks to tender his reply to the show cause notice.
(iii) The recognition committee shall given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The recognition committee shall decide the controversy by a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law.
(iv) The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.
Order Date :- 26.8.2019 Pravin