JUDGMENT R.K. Agrawal, J.
1. By means of the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner-M/s. Rampur Distillery & Chemical Company, Rampur, seeks the following reliefs :
(i) issue a suitable writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the record and quashing the demand order dated 27th January, 1999 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition).
(ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to recover any amount in pursuance of the notice dated 27th January, 1999 towards interest.
(iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to refund the amount of sum of Rs. 73,380 deposited by the petitioner on 3rd April, 1996 under protest after conferring the similar benefit as has been conferred upon M/s. Mohan Meakins Ltd. in Writ Petition No. 699 of 1996.
(iv) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring the order of Excise Secretary dated 6.6.1996 as null and void.
(v) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to release the security furnished by the petitioner in pursuance of the interim order within one month."
2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present writ petition are as follows :
M/s. Rampur Distillery & Chemical Company Ltd., now known as a unit of Redico Khetan Ltd., is a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Act and has its registered office at Bareilly Road, Rampur. It has been granted licence in Form PD-2, i.e., for establishing a distillery for manufacture of potable as well as non-potable alcohol at Bareilly Road, Rampur. According to the petitioner during the excise year 1977-78 one M/s. Shyam Mohan Sita Ram, a partnership firm, hereinafter referred to as the firm was granted licence in Form FL-2, i.e., for whole sale vend of Indian made foreign liquor. The said firm was entitled to make supply of beer and Indian and foreign liquor to retail vendors holding licence in Form FL-5. The firm was liable to pay assessed fee at the rate of Rs. 5 per bottle of wine, spirit and 0.90 paisa per bottle of beer. According to the petitioner under Rule 462 of the U.P. Excise Rules the liability of payment of assessed fee was squarely on the FL-2 licensee which in the present case was with the firm. Regarding some dispute of payment of the assessed fee with the Government of U.P., the firm filed a civil suit in the Court of the District Judge, Rampur which was numbered as Original Suit No. 10 of 1981 in which it had prayed that a permanent injunction be granted restraining the respondents from realizing assessed fee from it. According to the petitioner they were not party in the suit. The suit was decreed vide judgment and order dated 23rd May, 1984 and the State Government was restrained from recovering any amount towards assessed fee from the said firm. On the basis of the findings recorded in the suit, the Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad, issued notice dated 11th/14th April, 1985 calling upon the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 73,380 being the amount of assessed fee which was payable on the alleged sale effected by the petitioner to the said firm. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid notice by means of Writ Petition No. 311 of 1985 before this Court. On 22nd September, 1985, an interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner wherein it was directed that the respondent shall not require the petitioner to deposit the amount of the assessed fee in question. Apart from the petitioner three other distilleries, namely, M/s. Mohan Meakins Ltd., Saraiya Distillery and Daurala Distillery were also served similar notices by the Excise Department calling upon them to pay assessed fee in respect of the alleged sales made by them to the firm. According to the petitioner M/s. Mohan Meakins Ltd. filed a first appeal before this Court against the decree passed in Original Suit No. 10 of 1981 along with an application for leave to file appeal. This Court vide order dated 12th December, 1985, declined to grant leave to M/s. Mohan Meakins Ltd. for filing appeal on the ground that it was not party in the suit, and, therefore the findings recorded in that suit were not binding on it and no cause of action has arisen for filing an appeal. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was finally disposed of vide order dated 24th July, 1989. This Court had held that notice in question should not have been issued without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The notice in question was treated as a show cause notice. Directions were issued for giving an opportunity and passing appropriate order thereafter. After considering the reply/objections the Excise Commissioner vide order dated 31st January, 1996 affirmed the demand of Rs. 73,380 against the petitioner. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner preferred a revision under Section 11 (2) of the U.P. Excise Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the State Government. The revision was rejected vide order dated 6th June, 1996. The petitioner had deposited the sum of Rs. 73,380 on 4th April, 1996 under protest. It may be mentioned here that M/s. Mohan Meakins Ltd. which had also filed a revision before the State Government and whose revision had been rejected by the State Government vide order dated 6th June, 1996 challenged the said order before this Court by means of filing Writ Petition No. 699 of 1986 which has been allowed vide judgment and order dated 20th August, 1997. This Court has held that there is no liability of the distillery to pay assessed fee. However, it directed the Excise Commissioner to implead the firm M/s. Shyam Mohan Sita Ram in the proceedings before the Commissioner and determine the liability of the said firm, if any. This Court also directed for refund of the amount deposited by M/s. Mohan Meakins Ltd. and also observed that the Excise Commissioner may file an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Original Suit No. 10 of 1981. The respondents have now issued a notice dated 27th January, 1999, calling upon the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 1,45,509.55 which represents the interest on the amount of assessed fee for the period 19th March, 1985 to 4th April, 1996. The notice dated 27th January, 1999, is under challenge in the present writ petition.
3. We have heard Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.P. Kesarwani, learned standing counsel for the respondents.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that earlier order dated 14/15th May, 1985 did not survive in view of the judgment and order dated 24th July, 1989 of this Court passed in Writ Petition No. 311 of 1985 and, therefore, after the fresh demand was created on 31st January, 1996, the petitioner immediately deposited the amount under protest on 4th April, 1996 and, therefore, no interest under Section 38A of the Act was leviable. In support of the aforesaid plea he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Gopal v. State of U.P. and Ors. , 1992 ALJ 237.
5. Learned standing counsel, however, submitted that the petitioner had disclosed sales of Indian made foreign liquor and wine to the firm which was a fictitious sale as the said firm had denied to have received such supplies, therefore, the liability for payment of assessed fee on such sales recorded fictitiously in the name of the firm was that of the petitioner. As the petitioner had not deposited the amount of assessed fee, the Excise Commissioner had issued notice on 11/14th April, 1985 and 15th May, 1985 calling upon the petitioner to deposit the amount. He further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6993 of 1999, State of U.P. v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., decided on 6th December, 1999 has held that the liability for payment of the assessed fee was that of the respondent therein in the event if the goods have not been received by FL-2 licensee. The Apex Court has held that as far as the department is concerned, in view of the subsisting order of the civil court, it was within its jurisdiction to have claimed the fee from the respondent. He, thus, submitted that the respondents are well within their rights to claim interest as provided under Section 38A of the Act. In support of the aforesaid plea, he has relied upon the following decisions :
(1) Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works, Allahabad v. State of U.P. and Ors. , AIR 1973 SC 2226.
(2) Ram Chandra Ram Contractor, Country Liquor Shop, Raiganj, Ghazipur v. State of U.P. and Ors. , 1974 UPTC 15 (FB).
(3) Sales-tax Officer, Sector-I, Kanpur and Anr. v. Dwarika Prasad Sheo Karan Dass, 1977 UPTC 619 (SC).
(4) Maha Luxmi Sugar Mills Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, 1980 UPTC 689.
(5) Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Company v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. , AIR 1997 SC 2920.
6. He further submitted that this Court while deciding the case of Ram Gopal (supra) has not considered the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works (supra) and the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Ram, Contractor (supra) regarding interest where the stay order is operating and, therefore, the said decision does not lay down the correct law and in any case is not binding upon this Court being per incuriam.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we find that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 6993 of 1999, State of U.P. v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., decided on 6th December, 1999, the liability for payment of assessed fee in respect of the sales alleged to have been made to the said firm was that of the present petitioner and the department in view of the subsisting order of the civil court was within its jurisdiction to claim the fee from the present petitioner. In this view of the matter, challenge to the order dated 6.6.1996 passed by the Secretary, U.P., also fails.
8. The question is now only regarding liability of interest. Section 38A of the Act reads as under :
"38A. (1) Where any excise revenue has not been paid within three months from the date of which it becomes payable, interest at such rate not exceeding twenty-four per cent per annum, as may be prescribed, shall be payable from the date such excise revenue becomes payable till the date of actual payment:
Provided that until a higher rate is prescribed, the rate of interest will be eighteen per cent per annum :
Provided further that in respect of an excise revenue which becomes payable before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Excise (Amendment) Act, 1985 interest at the said rate shall be payable from the date of such commencement if the excise revenue is not paid within three months of the said date.
Explanation.-Nothing in this Sub-section shall be construed to affect the payment of interest under an agreement from the terms of an auction or, a decree of the Court, passed before the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Excise (Amendment) Act, 1985 or which may be passed after the date of such commencement, in suits or proceedings filed before the said date.
(2) Provisions of Section 39 shall mutatis mutandis apply to realisation of such interest as they apply to realization of excise revenue."
9. From a reading of the aforesaid provisions it is clear that interest is payable where any excise revenue has not been paid within three months from the date of which it becomes payable. It is not in dispute that the assessed fee which the petitioner was liable to pay is excise revenue.
10. In the case of Ram Gopal (supra) the facts were that Ram Gopal along with Hira Lal was granted licence by public auction for retail sale of the country liquor in respect of some shops in the district of Lalitpur for the excise year 1977-78. There was some dispute regarding curtailment of hours of the sale. He claimed compensation for the loss which he suffered due to illegal curtailing of selling hours of the country liquor. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 1st July, 1980 with certain observations. On the basis of the observations made by this Court, the petitioner therein applied for remission of the licence fee before the District Magistrate, Lalitpur. During the pendency of the application, recovery for a sum of Rs. 96,739.70 towards payment of balance amount of the licence fee was issued. The recovery certificate was challenged before this Court by means of Writ Petition No. 278 of 1980. Vide order dated 25th July, 1980, this Court stayed the recovery proceedings. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed on 16th December; 1986. During the pendency of the writ petition Section 38A was inserted by U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985 which came into force w.e.f. 29th March, 1985. After the dismissal of the writ petition the amount of licence fee was paid on different dates and thereafter another recovery certificate was issued on 30th September, 1988 seeking recovery of interest of Rs. 47,556.70 which was due against the petitioner on the unpaid amount from 29th March, 1985. On these facts this Court has held that on the date the U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act commenced the excise revenue was not payable by the petitioner therein. It was certainly payable at an anterior point of time, but in between intervened the Court's interim order which created a situation that on the date U.P. Act No. 7 of 1985, commenced, no excise revenue was payable by the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner is liable to pay interest only from 17th December, 1986, i.e., the next day after the petitioner's writ petition was dismissed till the date petitioner paid the licence fee.
11. In the case of Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works (supra) the Apex Court has considered the question of levy of interest under the provisions of U.P. Sales Tax Act. Section 8 (1A) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, which provides for interest, reads as follows :
"(1A) If the tax payable under Sub-section (1) remains unpaid for six months after the expiry of the time specified in the notice of assessment and demand, or the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bikri Kar (Dwitiya Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1963, whichever is later, then without prejudice to any other liability to penalty which the defaulter may, in consequence of such nonpayment, incur under this Act, simple interest at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum shall run on the amount then remaining due from the date of expiry of the time specified in the said notice, or from the commencement of the said Adhiniyam, as the case may be, and shall be added to the amount of tax and be deemed for all purposes to be part of the tax :
Provided that where as a result of appeal, revision or reference, or of any other order of a competent court or authority, the amount of tax is varied, the interest shall be recalculated accordingly :
Provided further that the interest on the excess amount of tax payable under an order of enhancement shall run from the date of such order if such excess remains unpaid for six months after the order."
12. The Apex Court repelled the argument advanced before it that the interest on arrears of sales tax could not be realised for the period during which the recovery of sales tax was stayed. In paragraph 10 of the report the Apex Court has held as follows :
"10. Argument has also been advanced by Mr. Sen that the interest on arrears of sales tax could not be realised for the period during which the recovery of sales tax was stayed. We find it difficult to accede to this contention because there is nothing in the language of Section 8 (1A) of the Act which prevents the running of interest because of the operation of any stay order. Indeed, the liability to pay interest is created by the statute and the Sales Tax Officer has no discretion to grant any exemption from the payment of interest."
13. In the case of Ram Chandra Ram Contractor (supra) the Full Bench of this Court has held that there is nothing in the language of Section 8 (1A) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which prevented the running of interest because of the operation of any stay order. In paragraph 7 of the report the Full Bench has held as follows :
"7. In our opinion when the Supreme Court said that there was nothing in the language of Section 8 (1A) of the Act which prevented the running of interest because of the operation of any stay order, it meant to lay down that no order staying recovery of tax, passed either by the Government or any authority including the High Court, will prevent the running of interest. We have come to this conclusion because the Supreme Court has based its judgment on the interpretation of Section 8 (1A) and had held that it does not permit the stoppage of the accrual or running of interest. According to the judgment, interest accrues and continues to run automatically by force of law contained in Section 8 (1A) of the Act. This Court cannot, therefore, enter into the merits of the controversy to find out if the interest ran during the period of stay or not."
14. In the case of Dwarika Prasad Sheo Karan Dass (supra) the Apex Court while following the decision of Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works (supra) has held that liability to pay interest under Section 8 (1A) is automatic and arises by operation of law.
15. In the case of Maha Luxmi Sugar Mills Company (supra) the Apex Court has held that liability to pay interest is as certain as the liability to pay cess while interpreting the provisions of Section 3 (3) of the U.P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956. It has held as follows :
"11. Now the interest payable on an arrear of cess under Section 3 (3) is in reality part and parcel of the liability to pay cess. It is an accretion to the cess. The arrear of cess "carries" interest ; if the cess is not paid within the prescribed period a larger sum will become payable as cess. The enlargement of the cess liability is automatic under Section 3 (3). No specific order is necessary in order that the obligation to pay interest should accrue. The liability to pay interest is certain as the liability to pay cess. As soon as the prescribed date is crossed without payment of cess, interest begins to accrue.........."
16. In the case of Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Company (supra) the Apex Court has considered the provisions of Section 10A of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, which provided for payment of interest by a dealer. The Apex Court has held as follows :
"10. The State is empowered by the Legislature to raise revenue through the mode prescribed in the Act so that State should not be the sufferer on account of the delay caused by the tax payer in payment of the tax due. The provision for charging interest would have been introduced in order to compensate the State (or the Revenue) for the loss occasioned due to delay in payment of the tax (Vide Commr. of Income-tax A. P. v. M. Chandra Sekhar, 1985 (1) SCC 283 : AIR 1985 SC 114 and Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, 1986 (3) SCC 461 : AIR 1987 SC 438."
17. In the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1, the Apex Court has held that wherein operation of the order has been stayed by the Court it only means that such order would not be operative from the date of its passing. It would not mean that the order stayed had been wiped out from existence and the order of stay granted pending disposal of a case comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and it is the duty of the Court in such cases to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the Court.
18. In the case of Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P.S.E.B., (1997) 5 SCC 772, the Apex Court has held that the grant of stay had not the effect of relieving the litigants of their obligation to pay late payment with interest on the amount withheld by them when the writ petition was dismissed ultimately. Holding otherwise would be against public policy and the interest of justice.
19. In the case of Kashyap Zip Industries v. Union of India, (1993) Supp (3) SCC 493, the Apex Court has awarded interest to the Revenue for the duration of stay under the Court's order, since the petitioners therein were found to have the benefit of keeping back the payment of duty under orders of the Court.
20. In the case of Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 89, the Apex Court has held that it is settled principle of law that as and when the party applies and obtains a stay from the court of law, It is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying for stay and mere passing of an order of stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of any additional right upon the litigating party. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has considered the provisions of Section 3 of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, which provided for fixation of consideration money of any transfer to the Central Government in such manner and at such rate of interest as may be prescribed. The Apex Court has upheld the awarding of interest at the rate of 15% per annum. It appears that this Court in the case of Ram Gopal (supra) had not considered the settled principles laid down by the Apex Court that staying the recovery of tax does not prevent the running of interest.
21. So far as the plea of per incuriam advanced by the learned standing counsel is concerned, we find that doctrine of per incuriam is applicable where by inadvertence a binding precedent or relevant provisions of the Statute have not been noticed by the Court.
22. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26 on pages 297-98, para 578 per incuriam has been stated as follows :
"A decision is given per incuriam when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow ; or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision ; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force. A decision should not be treated as given per incuriam, however, simply because of a deficiency of parties, or because the Court had not the benefit of the best argument, and, as a general rule, the only cases in which decision should be held to be given per incuriam are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or binding authority. 'Even if a decision of the court of appeal has misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the court of appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House of Lords to rectify the mistake."
23. In the case of Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal (1975) 2 SCC 232, the Apex Court has held as follows :
"Certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts-all flowering from the same principle-converge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reaching, it may not have the sway of binding precedent. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission. No such situation presents itself here and we do not embark on the principle of judgment per incuriam.
Finally it remains to be noticed that a prior decision of this Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points in a later case. Here we have a decision admittedly rendered on facts and law indistinguishably identical and that ruling must bind."
24. In the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, the Apex Court has quoted the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt, (1947) 2 All ER 270 (KBD) and Penny v. Nicholas, (1950) 2 All ER 89 (KBD), to the following effect :
" 'Per incuriam' are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong."
25. In the case of State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, the Apex Court has observed as follows :
" 'Incuria' literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignorantium. English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignorantium of a statute or other binding authority Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 2 All ER 293.
26. In the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 356, the Apex Court has held that a prior decision of this Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a latter case. This is not an exceptional case by inadvertence or oversight of any judgment or statutory provisions running counter to the reason and result reached. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the principle of judgment 'per incuriam'.
27. In the case of Government of A. P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao, (2000) 4 SCC 462, the Apex Court held that the rule of per inquriam can be applied where a Court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same Court or the superior Court rendered on the same issue or where a Court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue.
28. In the case of State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer alias Kalika Singh and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 448, the Apex Court has held that per incuriam would mean such element of rendering a decision in ignorance of any provision of the statute or the judicial authority of binding nature and earlier decision cannot be said to have been rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored on the ground that a possible aspect of the matter was not considered or not raised before the Court or more aspects should have been gone into by the Court deciding the matter earlier.
29. Thus, it is well-settled by the decision of the Apex Court for the last more than 30 years that staying the recovery of tax does not prevent the running of interest. The decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works, (supra) and of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Ram Contractor (supra) have not been noticed by this Court in the case of Ram Gopal (supra) and the principles laid down in the case of Ram Gopal (supra) are in the teeth of the decision of the Apex Court and also of the Full Bench of this Court referred to above. The two provisions levying interest under Section 8 (1A) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and Section 38A of the U.P. Excise Act are similar. Same principle shall be applicable in the cases falling under the U.P. Excise Act also. Thus, it can safely be said that the decision in the case of Ram Gopal (supra) is per incuriam and is not a binding precedent.
30. Applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that the amount of assessed fee was payable by petitioner right from the date when the sales were alleged to have been made in the fictitious name of the firm and, therefore, no benefit can be derived by the petitioner on the ground that in Writ Petition No. 311 of 1985, filed by it this Court by its final order dated 24th July, 1989, held that there is no obligation to pay the amount and the liability only occurs on 31st January, 1996, when the Excise Commissioner had rejected the objection filed by the petitioner.
31. In view of the foregoing discussions, we find no merit in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.