JUDGMENT Smith, J.
1. Certain partition proceedings were pending in the Court of the Assistant Collector when one of the par. ties to the proceedings, Tameshar, died. Three persons applied for the substitution of their names as his heirs. The appellants were two of them. The Assistant Collector dismissed the application of the appellants, holding that they were not the heirs of the deceased; ha substituted the name of the deceased's daughter, one of the rival applicants. An application by the appellants asking for leave to file a civil suit was summarily rejected. Appeals were preferred by the appellants to the District Judge, both from the order refusing to substitute their names as the heirs of the deceased and from the order rejecting their application for permission to file a civil suit. The presetat appeal relates to the order dismissing the application for the substitution of the names of the appellants in place of Tameshar. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that no appeal lay to him. He returned the memorandum of appeal to the appellants for presentation to the proper Court.
2. Treating the order of the District Judge as one returning the appeal, it is not a decree, but merely an order passed in appeal by the District Judge when hearing a revenue appeal. The learned Judge took the view that no appeal lay to him, since, as was contended for the respondent, Mt. Mantorna, the order appealed against did not fall within the purview of Section 111(i)(c), Land Revenue Act, inasmuch as the objection involving the question of proprietary title contained in the application of 23rd April 1929 was not raised within the time proscribed by Section 110 of the Act. He made reference to a ruling reported in Mukhtar Ahmad v. Barati Lal A.I.R. 1914 Oudn. 115.
3. The application for partition was made on 3rd January 1928, The proclamation prescribed by Section 110, Lead Revenue Act, fixed 28th February 1928 for objections. It was only on 30th March 1929 that Tameshar died.
4. The various applications that his death gave rise to were therefore not (sic) "objections" as are contemplated (sic) Section 111(1) of the Act, since the date (sic) under Section 110 was passed long before (sic) meshar died.
5. In these circumstances the order passed by the Assistant Collector cannot be regarded as one under Section 111(1)(c) of the Act, and no appeal lay under Section 112 to the District Judge. As was remarked in the Oudh case referred to by the District Judge:
a reference to the provisions of Section 210 and 211 of the Act shows that no orders under the Act other than those passed in proceedings under Clause (c) are made appealable to the civil Courts.
6. No appeal lay to the District Judge from the order refusing to substitute the names of the appellants. The view taken by the lower appellate Court was correct, and the appeal is dismissed with costs.