Heard Mr. Anand Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Rajendra Kumar Dwivedi, learned Additional Government Advocate.
The petitioner has prayed for quashing the proceedings of Sessions Trial No. 56 of 2010 pending before the court of Sessions Judge , Ambedkar Nagar by applying the principles of Stare decisis on the ground that co-accused Rajesh Rajbhar has already been acquitted from the same charge by means of order dated 28th of March 2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Tract), Ambedkar Nagar in Sessions Trial No. 73 of 2004.
The submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner based on the principles of 'Stare Decisis'.
Black's Laws Dictionary defines Stare decisis as under:-
1. Under doctrine a deliberate or solemn decision of court made after argument of question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent in the same court or in other courts of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy. Doctrine is one of the policy, grounded on theory that security and certainty require that accepted and established legal principle, under which rights may accrue, be recognized and followed, though later found to be not legally sound, but whether previous holding of court shall be adhered to, modified, or overruled is within court's discretion under circumstances of case before it. When point of law has been settled by decision, it forms precedent which is not afterwards to be departed from, and, while it should ordinarily be strictly adhered to, there are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. The doctrine is not ordinarily departed from where decision is of long- standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public policy demand it. The doctrine is limited to actual determinations in respect to litigated and necessarily decided questions and is not applicable to dicta or obiter dicta.
'Stare Decisis' is only doctrine derived from Stare decisis et non quieta movere, which differs from that of doctrine of res judicata in the following ways :
The Hon'ble Suprem Court in the case of K.K. Premshanker Vs. Inspector of Police & Anr. 2003 (1) JIC 206 (SC) considered the relevancy of judgements in light of the provisions of section 41 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act relying upon its earlier case MS Sheriff and Anr. vs. State of Madras and Ors., AIR 1954 Supreme Court 397, and gave conclusive opinion as under:-
Para 26. "What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is - (1) the previous judgement which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act; ( 2) in civil Suits between the same parties, principle of res- judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case Section 300 Cr. P.C. makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgement of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in section 41. Section 41 provides which judgement would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein."
In the M.S. Sheriff's Case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal Courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages "such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages."
In the case of Karan Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 1037, Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the same question, the relevant paragraph 6 of which is extracted below:-
6. "We are therefore of opinion that the judgment in Krishna Govind Patil's case, AIR 1963 SC 1413 does not assist the appellant at all. On the other hand we think that the judgments earlier referred to on which the High Court relied, clearly justify the view that in spite of the acquittal of a person in one case it is open to the Court in another case to proceed on the basis - of course if the evidence warrants it - that the acquitted person was guilty of the offence of which he had been tried in the other case and to find in the later case that the person tried in it was guilty of an offence under S. 34 by virtue of having committed the offence along with the acquitted person. There is nothing in principle to prevent this being done. The principle of Sambasivam's case, 1950 AC 458 has no application here because the two cases we are concerned with are against two different persons though for the commission of the same offence. Furthermore, as we have already said, each case has to be decided on the evidence led in it and this irrespective of any view of the same act that might have been taken on different evidence led in another case."
In the case of Rajan Rai Vs. State of Bihar (2006)1 SCC 191, the police after registering the case took up the investigation and on completion thereof submitted the charge-sheet against all the six accused on receipt whereof cognizance was taken and all of them were committed to the Court of Sessions to face trial. As one of the accused was absconding, his trial was separated from that of other five accused persons, out of whom one died before the commencement of trial, as such, the trial proceeded against the remaining four accused persons and all were convicted. Against the said judgement they preferred the appeals. During the course of pendency of appeals, the other one co-accused was apprehended and was put on trial ultimately the trial court convicted him. He also filed an appeal before the High Court. The appeals preferred by the other four convicted accused persons challenging their convictions, which were decided by the High Court and the same were allowed and their convictions and sentences set aside. The appeal filed by the other co-accused was taken up later. The High Court upheld his convictions and sentences. Then, he preferred appeal by Special Leave before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to attack the impugned Judgement on three counts. One of the ground was that in appeal arising out of the earlier trial, the High Court acquitted the other four accused persons on merit, therefore, it was not permissible for it to uphold the conviction of the appellant on the basis of evidence of the same witnesses examined during the course of trial of the appellant. In considering the case the Hon'ble Supreme Court also cited the provisions of section 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act 1872, which are under the heading "Judgements of courts of justice when relevant" and found that it has not been shown that the judgement of the acquittal rendered by the High Court in appeals arising out of the earlier sessions trial could be said to be relevant under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, it was clearly "irrelevant" and could not have been taken into consideration by the High Court while passing the impugned judgement. The Hon'ble Court also considered other earlier judgements rendered in the trial and ultimately formulated the following opinion.
"We are clearly of the view that the judgement of acquittal rendered in the trial of the other four accused persons is wholly irrelevant in the appeal arising out of the trial of the appellant Rajan Rai as the said judgement was not admissible under the provisions of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. Every case has to be considered on the evidence adduced therein. Case of the four acquitted accused persons was decided on the basis of evidence led there while the case of present appellant has to be decided only on the basis of evidence adduced during the course of his trial".
The relevancy of judgement of course of justice derives a power from the provisions of section 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, which are reproduced hereinunder:-
40. "Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.- The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial."
41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.- A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.
Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof-
that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation;
that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease;
and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property."
42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41.- Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state."
43. "Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant.- Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act."
By considering the decisions the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kumar Rinki Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2008)3 JIC 267 (Allahabad) concluded its opinion on the point as under paragraphs 13 &14.
13. "The inference that is deducible from discussion of the above decisions that the judgement of acquittal rendered in the trial of other co-accused is wholly irrelevant as the said judgment would not be admissible under the provisions of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. It also leaves no manner of doubt that every case has to be decided on the evidence adduced therein and therefore, the case of the petitioner has to be decided on the basis of evidence which may be adduced during the course of trial."
14. "Th principles that are distilled from the discussion of the above decisions are:
(i) the acquittal of a co-accused in a separate trial cannot be made basis for quashing the proceedings against another co-accused who is being separatedly tried on the principle that each case has to be decided on the evidence adduced in that case;
(ii) Judgement of acquittal rendered in one case is not relevant in the case of co-accused separately tried inasmuch as Sections 40 to 44 of the evidence Act deal with relevancy of certain judgments in probate, matrimonial, admiralty and insovency jurisdiction and therefore, inapplicable to a criminal case."
In light of the discussions made by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the point in issue, I am of the view that the proceeding in question does not warrant interference by this Court in light of the decision rendered in the earlier trial being sessions trial no. 73/2004. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
Order Date :- 23.02.2011 Amit